The Secretariat of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) presents the following compilation regarding the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit. The main purpose of this précis is to highlight aspects related to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation that are under the scope of the OPANAL and the participation of the four member States present in the Summit.

Background
On 5 April 2009, the President of the United States (US) made a speech in Prague, Czech Republic, in which he stated that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists “is the most immediate and extreme threat to global security”. However, for the vast majority of States, the most immediate and extreme threat is the existence of nuclear weapons.

According to data published in 2016 by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “[the US] maintains an estimated stockpile of 4,670 warheads to be delivered via ballistic missiles and aircraft. Most of these weapons are not deployed but stored, and 2,300 are destined to be retired. Of the approximately 1,930 warheads that are deployed by the US, 1,750 are on ballistic missiles or at bomber bases in the US with another 180 tactical bombs deployed at European bases” (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey). Furthermore, in 2015, the Congressional Budget Office projected a total of USD 355 billion

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for fiscal years 2015 to 2024, which would include upgrades to nuclear command and control.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russia has a total inventory of 7,500 warheads (1,780 deployed); the United Kingdom has 215 (150 deployed); France has 300 (290 deployed); China has 260 (no data of deployment available); India has 90-110 (no data of deployment available); Pakistan has 100-120 (no data of deployment available); Israel has 80 (no data of deployment available); and North Korea has 6-8 (no data of deployment available).

In addition, according to the Institute for Science and International Security, the nine States possessing nuclear weapons have 97% (238 metric tons) of the separated plutonium in the world. This material would be sufficient to produce approximately 29,000 nuclear weapons. On the other hand, other five non-nuclear-weapon States possess 2.7% of the separated plutonium in the world.

Moreover, the US and Russia maintain 92.51% (1,330 metric tons) of the highly enriched uranium (HEU) in the world capable of producing some 50,000 nuclear weapons, whilst a group of six States possess 6% of the HEU in the world.

The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in its 2015 annual report “Global Incidents and Trafficking Database” mentions a total of 514 recorded incidents involving nuclear and other radioactive materials outside of regulatory control during the period 2013-2015. Of those, 188 incidents took place in 2015 in 26 different countries. The International Atomic Energy Agency also produces a similar database.

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The Nuclear Security Summit (NSS)\textsuperscript{7}

On 12 and 13 April 2010, the first Nuclear Summit was held in Washington D.C. further to appeals by President Barack Obama to undertake a global summit on nuclear security in order to “secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.”\textsuperscript{8} The primary goals established by the summit included “addressing the threat of nuclear terrorism (…) and enhancing international cooperation to prevent the illicit acquisition of nuclear material by non-state actors such as terrorist groups and smugglers, and taking steps to strengthen the global nuclear security system.”\textsuperscript{9}

Each Summit issued a communiqué with the objective of reaffirming its comprehensive goals and encouraging States to take relevant actions. Compliance with the communiqués by States is strictly voluntary. They may opt for joint commitments known as “gift baskets” which may span a wide range of topics.\textsuperscript{10} Additionally, States undertake to present progress reports at each Summit.\textsuperscript{11} Although 2016 marks the end of the Nuclear Summit process, the participating States remain committed to the “full implementation” of the commitments established since the Summit’s inception.\textsuperscript{12}

Participating States and International Organizations

52 States participated in the IV Nuclear Security Summit, namely: Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States and Vietnam.

\textsuperscript{7} Four Nuclear Summits have been held: Washington (2010), Seoul (2012), The Hague (2014) and Washington (2016).


\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.


2016 Communiqué\(^\text{13}\)

The Communiqué of the 2016 Summit\(^\text{14}\) makes only one reference to nuclear disarmament, one to nuclear non-proliferation and two to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. No reference is made to nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy are described as “shared goals” in the Communiqué. However, it is important to highlight that the peaceful use of nuclear energy is not a goal, but rather an inalienable right of all States, being the starting point of Article 1 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

Action Plans

Five action plans were concluded, of which some aspects are presented hereafter:

- **Action plan in support of the United Nations** is a consensus-based document which includes commitments by participating States to undertake technical, legislative and financial assistance in order to enhance the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.\(^\text{15}\)

- **Action plan in support of the International Atomic Energy Agency** consists of a technical document which includes commitments such as advocating for the maintenance of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) leading role in the coordination of international activities regarding nuclear security.\(^\text{16}\)

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• **Action plan in support of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)** includes commitments such as supporting the activities coordinated to “prevent, detect, deter and respond to nuclear terrorism”\(^\text{17}\). This action plan is applicable to States participating in the GICNT (86 countries, including Argentina, Chile and Mexico).\(^\text{18}\)

• **Action plan in support of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP)** includes commitments to: support and coordinate activities aimed at ameliorating national regulations and policies on nuclear security and to provide assistance in activities aimed at managing and converting highly enriched uranium.\(^\text{19}\) This action plan is applicable to States participating in the Global Partnership (GP).\(^\text{20}\)

**Progress Reports presented by Participating States**

Of the 52 States participating in the IV Nuclear Security Summit, a total of 48, including **Argentina, Brazil, Chile** and **Mexico**, presented progress reports on their commitments related to nuclear security.\(^\text{21}\)

**National Statements**

The four OPANAL Member States that participated in the IV Nuclear Security Summit, **(Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico)** delivered speeches, some of which made reference to the Treaty of Tlatelolco as well as to nuclear nonproliferation.

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\(^{18}\) The GICNT is a voluntary association of 86 States including Argentina, Chile and Mexico, which aims to strengthen the global capacity to prevent, detect and respond to nuclear terrorism. Russia and the United States of America are joint co-chairs of this initiative. For further information, visit: http://www.gicnt.org/partners.html


\(^{20}\) The GP comprises of the members of the G8 plus Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, Holland, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland and the Ukraine. For further information, visit: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/184789.pdf

\(^{21}\) Entirety of the National Statements available at: http://www.nss2016.org/2016-progress-reports/
Argentina:

“[…] los esfuerzos significativos que han venido realizando los países no poseedores de armas nucleares en el campo de la seguridad nuclear, tendrán un éxito relativo mientras la agenda de desarme no sea impulsada con el mismo impetu colectivo.”

Brazil:

[Nuclear weapons] are detrimental to the most elementary foundations of international humanitarian law. That is why our region signed, in 1967, the Tlatelolco Treaty, which established a Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Latin American and Caribbean countries are proud to have created a vast region free of weapons of mass destruction, which served as an inspiration to similar initiatives in other parts of our planet.

The reaffirmation of deterrence doctrines, modernization plans and long-term investments in nuclear weapons programs also serve to undermine the legitimacy of the non-proliferation and disarmament regime. These trends pose serious challenges to nuclear security initiatives. The vast majority of the world’s fissile material—which could be used in nuclear weapons—is located in military facilities which are not subject to any international oversight, information-sharing or confidence-building mechanisms.

Besides strengthening nuclear security, we also need to sustain non-proliferation efforts and make rapid progress towards nuclear disarmament, with a view to bringing about a world free of nuclear weapons, or any other weapons of mass destruction.

Chile:

We also participated actively in the promotion of the universalization and full implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which continues to be the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime.

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Mexico:

“Es verdad que las armas nucleares son la ‘amenaza más peligrosa para a seguridad global y la paz’. Por eso, como comunidad internacional no podemos y no debemos aceptar que la existencia de armas nucleares sea un destino ineludible para la Humanidad.”

“La seguridad nuclear es un tema de la mayor relevancia para el mundo de hoy y de mañana; es un desafío que nos compromete a todos. Las naciones debemos trabajar corresponsablemente, en la construcción de una arquitectura global para la seguridad nuclear, asumiendo compromisos en materia de desarme nuclear, no-proliferación y el respeto al derecho de los Estados a desarrollar energía nuclear para fines pacíficos.”

Gift baskets

The following are the Gift baskets adopted during the IV Nuclear Security Summit:

- **Certified Training for nuclear security management:** 12 States (no Latin American participants) undertook to further support the World Institute for Nuclear Security in its efforts to expand its international certification program.

- **Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security Architecture:** 39 States, including Argentina, Chile and Mexico, are involved herein. The joint objective is to facilitate cooperation and sustain activity on nuclear security after the conclusion of the 2016 NSS. They also commit to: establish a Nuclear Security Contact Group; and designate an appropriately authorized and informed senior official or officials to participate in the Contact Group.

- **LEU Fuel Bank:** 19 States (none Latin American) participate herein. The importance of developing an International Bank for Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) is presented as one of the mechanisms to assure the supply of nuclear fuel.

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• **National Nuclear Detection Architecture:** 23 States, including Argentina and Mexico, stated their commitment to developing national-level nuclear detection architecture and strengthen regional efforts as an effective capability in combating illicit trafficking and malevolent use of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

• **Countering Nuclear Smuggling:** 37 States, including Chile, committed to working together to build and sustain national capabilities to counter smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

• **Consolidate Reporting:** In order to simplify the process of reporting and information sharing, 17 States, including Argentina, Chile and Mexico, presented an attached Consolidated National Nuclear Security Report (Consolidated Report) as a suggested reporting template and guide for States.

• **1540 Committee:** 36 States, including Argentina, Chile and Mexico, reaffirmed their commitment to the full and universal implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540, including the implementation of obligations to enhance the security of nuclear materials worldwide. They also reiterated their support for the activities of the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts.

• **Nuclear Terrorism Preparedness and Response:** 24 States, including Chile and Mexico, recognized that ensuring adequate nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities complements international nuclear security efforts.

• **Maritime Supply Chain Security:** 13 States, including Mexico, endorsed a number of best practices and recommendations identified at a November 2015 workshop which focused on promoting radiation detection in the maritime supply chain and developing enhanced measures to permanently remove materials out of regulatory control.
• **Forensics in Nuclear Security:** 30 States, including **Argentina, Chile** and **Mexico**, undertook to advance nuclear forensics as a key element of effective nuclear security.

• **Cyber Security:** 29 States, including **Argentina** and **Chile**, committed to ensure adequate cyber security at nuclear facilities.

• **HEU Minimization:** 23 States, including **Argentina, Chile** and **Mexico**, declared commitment to a comprehensive plan aimed at minimizing – and ultimately eliminating – the use of HEU in civilian applications.

• **Nuclear Training and Support Centers:** In support of the IAEA NSSC Network and nuclear security training and support center sustainability, 28 States including **Argentina, Chile** and **Mexico**, undertook to support a number of activities, based on the availability of resources.

• **Insider Threat Mitigation:** 27 States, including **Chile** and **Mexico**, undertook to establish and implement national-level measures to mitigate any insider threat.

• **In Larger Security: A Comprehensive Approach to Nuclear Security** (Full text attached): consists of a joint statement by 16 States, including **Argentina, Brazil, Chile** and **Mexico**, all of them Parties to a Treaty establishing Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones (NWFZ). This is the only gift basket wherein reference is made to the themes of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. Furthermore, States reiterated their firm conviction that the sole guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is the total elimination of same.

• **Strengthening the Security of High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources (HASS):** 28 States including **Chile** affirmed that the shared goal of nuclear security can be advanced by further strengthening the security of high activity sealed radioactive sources (HASS). They further affirmed their commitment to encourage and support such an effort from 2016 onwards.
• **High-Density Fuel Development**: 5 States reaffirmed their shared will to cooperate and ultimately convert the BR-2 reactor in Belgium, the RHF and RJH reactors in France, the FRM-2 reactor in Germany, and the MITR, MURR, NCNR, ATR, and HFIR reactors in the United States to LEU fuel as soon as technically and economically feasible. In order to attain said goal the States pledged to pool the necessary expertise, technical and financial resources to develop and test new high-density LEU fuels.

**Joint Statements**

In addition, the Summit included 10 Joint Statements, two of them involving Member States of OPANAL: the *Joint Statement on the Contributions of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) to Enhancing Nuclear Security*\(^26\) and the *Statement by the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.*\(^27\)

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\(^{27}\) NTI (16 September 2015), *Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction (“10 plus 10 over 10 program”).* Retrieved from [http://bit.ly/23g8S7M](http://bit.ly/23g8S7M)
Annex

2016 Nuclear Security Summit

In larger security: looking ahead

Joint Statement by
Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and Vietnam

1. The need for a more encompassing view of various global nuclear challenges was the focus of the Joint Statement “In larger security: a comprehensive approach to nuclear security”, issued at the 2014 Hague Summit. We believe the core message of that Joint Statement is still valid and more urgent than ever.

2. As the process of Nuclear Security Summits (NSS) draws to a close, we recognise, among its important achievements, that greater international awareness has been raised about the fundamental responsibility of States to ensure effective nuclear security of all nuclear materials, including those used in nuclear weapons.

3. While we understand that the security of nuclear weapons remains the primary responsibility of States possessing them, the international community has the right to demand from such States decisive steps to secure, reduce and irreversibly eliminate their nuclear arsenals and their huge stocks of weapon-grade materials (highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium).

4. Indeed, nuclear security cannot be strengthened if we confine our efforts to the relatively small quantity of nuclear materials in peaceful use, while ignoring the dangers posed by the vast quantities of materials involved in nuclear weapons programs.

5. The additional risks stemming from the possibility of non-State actors having access to nuclear weapons or to weapons-grade materials only heightens the need to expedite nuclear disarmament. As long as such weapons and materials exist, there will be risks, including that they get into the hands of terrorists, thereby leading to possible attacks with unprecedented mass casualties.

6. The NSS Communiqués reaffirm our shared goals of nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, thus emphasising the interlinkages between such goals and the broader context in which nuclear security, to be consistent and ultimately effective, must be addressed.
7. In the same context, the 2015 IAEA General Conference, in particular, acknowledged that nuclear security contributes to the broader goal of strengthening international peace and security, and that further progress is urgently needed in nuclear disarmament.

8. Serious questions about the future of the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime have been raised with the failure of the 2015 NPT Review Conference to reach agreement on an outcome document. Regrettably, this failure highlights the deep divisions lingering within the Treaty’s membership and the lack of political will by some to take further steps on nuclear disarmament.

9. The failure of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to enter into force, now 20 years after its conclusion, has also negatively impacted the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. We emphasise the need for rapid entry into force and universalisation of the Treaty.

10. Moreover, the reiteration of deterrence doctrines, the continued existence of nuclear arsenals, and the modernisation plans, activities and long-term investments being made into nuclear weapons programs have become a cause of great international concern. Extended reliance on defence policies based on nuclear weapons may well fuel proliferation, hamper progress towards nuclear disarmament, and undermine nuclear security worldwide.

11. The catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the possible detonation, either by intent or by accident, of the most lethal and indiscriminate device ever conceived, are more than apparent. 70 years after the adoption of the very first UN General Assembly Resolution aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons and all other weapons adaptable to mass destruction, 45 years after the NPT’s entry into force and 25 years after the end of the Cold War, the continued existence of thousands of nuclear weapons, many still on high-alert status, remains the greatest and most immediate risk for humanity.

12. We reiterate our firm conviction that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of such weapons.

13. Following the conclusion of the NSS process, it is imperative that future endeavours to strengthen nuclear security in all relevant international fora be guided by mutually reinforcing measures to address the security risks posed by nuclear arsenals and the vast stocks of materials associated with nuclear weapons programs.

14. We can only achieve an effective and sustainable nuclear security architecture when international efforts are predicated on an approach that promotes nuclear security along with nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Such an approach should be based on the strict and full implementation of relevant international obligations, and not exclude other initiatives or legally binding instruments aimed at the prohibition and elimination of nuclear arsenals.