2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

27 April 2015

Original: English/ Spanish

New York, 27 April-22 May 2015

Recommendations for consideration by the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons


1. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, which creates the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in Latin America and the Caribbean, signed on 14 February 1967, predates the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Latin American and Caribbean States are thus initiators of the concept of prohibition of nuclear weapons, disarmament and non-proliferation. All of them are Parties to the NPT, the provisions of which they comply with thoroughly. Moreover, the NWFZ in Latin America and the Caribbean has certainly been an inspiration for subsequent NWFZs.

2. The Latin American and Caribbean States, all of them Parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and Members of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), have a special interest in the success of the 2015 NPT
Review Conference and consider that the results of the Review and Extension Conference of 1995 and of the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences remain valid.

3. In addition to the Memorandum submitted by OPANAL (Document NPT/CONF.2015/5) and, without any intention of covering the entire scope of the Conference, the Latin American and Caribbean States present a series of elements that should necessarily be contained in the final document of the 2015 NPT Review Conference:

(1) The use and threat of use of nuclear weapons are a crime against humanity, a violation of International Law, including International Humanitarian Law, and of the Charter of the United Nations.

(2) There is a pressing need to begin negotiations towards the prompt adoption of a universal and legally binding instrument prohibiting the possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons taking in full account the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability.

(3) The undertakings of Article VI of the NPT must be entirely complied with.

(4) The role of nuclear weapons must be eliminated from the nuclear weapon States’ security doctrines and policies; non-nuclear weapon States that are covered by extended nuclear deterrence policies by means of military alliances should seek alternative security policies.

(5) The qualitative improvement and development of new types of nuclear weapons must cease.

(6) The consideration of the humanitarian impact and environmental consequences of any nuclear detonation, intentional or accidental, in all their aspects should be pursued.

(7) For the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), it is urgent that all States that are included in Annex 2 complete their
ratification process; meanwhile the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions must be maintained and strictly observed.

(8) The negotiation and adoption, without delay, of a universal and legally binding instrument on negative security assurances.

(9) The universality of the NPT remains a fundamental objective through the accession of States non parties to the Treaty as non nuclear weapon States.

(10) The Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones represent one of the most important achievements in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament; therefore, the establishment of such regimes in new regions should be actively supported.

(11) The NWFZs, established through the initiative of the States in the respective regions and recognised by the United Nations General Assembly, must be respected by all States, without any reservations or limitations.

(12) The convening of the international conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East, an outstanding result of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, remains a priority for the States Party to the NPT.

(13) The machinery established by the United Nations General Assembly for disarmament must be strongly supported so that the UN Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament fulfil their mandates, which are not being enforced for more than a decade.

(14) Recognition of the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and of the safeguards agreements in the implementation of the NPT.

(15) Full observance of the inalienable right of all States to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, as stated in Article IV of the NPT.

(16) Implementation of education programmes for peace, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.