XIX Regular Session of the General Conference  
Santiago, Republic of Chile, 7-8 November, 2005.

Mr./Madam Chair, Excellencies, Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen,

1. It is a great honour for me to address the XIX Regular Session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL). I wish to thank the OPANAL Secretariat for providing me this opportunity and commend OPANAL for its unflinching support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). I wish also to congratulate the Chilean authorities for the excellent organization of the present event.

Mr./Madam Chair,

2. I hardly need to remind you that the establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) strengthens the international non-proliferation regime and provides further assurances that non-proliferation is attainable. Thus, NWFZs and the CTBT have complementary roles. As the intergovernmental agency created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco to ensure that Treaty obligations are met, OPANAL contributes to further strengthening the international non-proliferation regime. In support of their objectives, NWFZs in general, and the Tlatelolco Treaty in particular, can rely on the CTBT verification technologies to enhance their respective verification regimes. Through its comprehensive nuclear-test ban, the CTBT would impede development of new types of nuclear weapons by the existing nuclear powers and any would-be proliferators.
3. The Preparatory Commission is using state-of-the-art technologies (seismic, radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasound) to build a seamless verification network. As of October 2005, over two-thirds of the 321 stations comprising the International Monitoring System (IMS) provided for in the Treaty, were installed and substantially met the Commission's specifications while over 40 percent of those stations were already certified as meeting all technical requirements.

4. OPANAL Member States play a key role in the CTBT monitoring system; more than one third of OPANAL Member States (i.e., 13 States) will be hosting 41 stations and 2 radionuclide laboratories of our monitoring system. Though very encouraging, progress in the establishment of the IMS also brings about new important and urgent tasks. As a matter of fact, more resources will be devoted to provisional operation and maintenance as well as continuous testing and evaluation in the future. We have assessed the scale of the tasks ahead of us and are adapting to this new situation.

5. The current testing and evaluation phase of the monitoring system shows promising results and we are confident that the network will be completed within the next three to four years. In order to provide the necessary legal framework and facilitate IMS station building and operation, the Commission concluded, as of 31 October 2005, 33 facility agreements with facility-hosting States, of which 25 have entered into force and 2 are being provisionally applied.

6. With the progress made in the establishment of the IMS, data flows between the International Data Centre (IDC) and the 89 National Data Centres currently in operation, nearly tripled over the last two years. This data traffic is expected to further grow in the future and is a clear indication of both the growing capacity of our verification system and the importance Member States attach to the Treaty.

7. One-Site Inspection (OSI) is another key element of the CTBT verification regime. Even though such an inspection is, as provided for in the Treaty, regarded as an ultimate verification measure and would only occur once the Treaty has entered into force, one of the top priorities of the Preparatory Commission remains the development of an Operation Manual for OSI, providing detailed procedures for the implementation of an OSI.
Mr./Madam Chair,

8. I wish to thank all Member States of the Preparatory Commission that made these achievements possible through their long-standing support for and unswerving faith in the Commission's activities. In fact, the CTBT has become an undeniable international norm and can boast about an overwhelming commitment towards it from the international community. To date, the Treaty has been signed by a total of 176 States, of whom 125 have deposited their instrument of ratification, including 33 of the 44 whose ratification is required for the Treaty’s entry into force. Among OPANAL Member States, 28 have signed and 21 have ratified the CTBT.

9. These achievements are indeed laurels on the Preparatory Commission’s brow. Though very encouraging, these achievements are not yet enough. In spite of the ever-growing number of States signing and ratifying the Treaty as well as the remarkable progress made in establishing the CTBT verification system, the CTBT has not yet entered into force. To that end, we must reaffirm our common nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament goals and examine how to achieve them by making progress on specific measures. Part of this task has been adequately addressed by the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT which was held, in September 2005, in New York.

10. On that occasion, around 120 ratifying States and States Signatories reiterated their support for the CTBT and called upon those States which have yet to sign and/or ratify to do so. They further adopted twelve measures that may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of the Treaty. Beyond providing an opportunity to assess achievements and charting a course for the future, the Conference demonstrated, once more, the commitment of the international community to establishing a universal and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test ban, as a major instrument in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. In view of the record number of States participating in that Conference and their high level of representation, it was undoubtedly an additional milestone on the path to a nuclear-free world.

Mr./Madam Chair,

11. Though the CTBT is primarily a nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament instrument aimed at enhancing international peace and security, its verification technologies offer additional potential civil and scientific benefits of great importance. These were substantially documented
by the “Experts’ Discussions on the Civil and Scientific Applications of the CTBT Verification Regime” held in London, United Kingdom (2002), Sopron, Hungary (2003) and Berlin, Germany (2004). In the wake of the Northern Sumatra earthquake and the subsequent tsunami of 26 December 2004, the Preparatory Commission decided in March 2005, to test the usefulness of IMS data for tsunami warning.

12. Thus, we are working with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and other international and national entities dealing with tsunami warning. The Commission participated in the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, held on 18-22 January 2005, in Kobe, Japan, as well as in the subsequent Planning Meeting convened by the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO, on 3-8 March 2005 in Paris, France.

13. The Preparatory Commission offers a wide range of training opportunities aimed at enhancing the national capacities of States Signatories in the implementation of the Treaty and promoting cooperation to support the establishment of the Treaty’s verification regime. They include verification-related courses, International Cooperation workshops, national seminars on the CTBT, and information visits.

Mr./Madam Chair,

14. As one can see, the CTBTO Preparatory Commission has become a key player in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Though the CTBT has not yet entered into force, its verification system already acts as a deterrent for would-be proliferators because they know that no nuclear test explosion would go undetected. However, we need more than moral persuasion if we are to confront squarely the nuclear threat.

15. In closing, I therefore would like to seize this opportunity to invite all those OPANAL Member States which have yet to sign and/or ratify the CTBT to do so at their earliest opportunity. It is only by teaming up that we will be able to secure the world from the nuclear threat because, in the long run, the number of States with nuclear weapons cannot be held in check, if all States do not fully hold their end of the bargain.

Thank you, Mr./Madam Chair.