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**REMARKS OF MRS. JAN PRIEST  
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INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) VIENNA.**

**Model Protocol Additional to Agreement(s) between State (s) and the International  
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of the Safeguards  
(INFCIRC/540 (CORR.))**

Distinguished Representatives of Contracting Parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, it gives me great pleasure to be with you here today to represent the International Atomic Energy Agency at this XVI Ordinary Session of the General Conference of OPANAL. From the Agency's respective, the relationship between our respective Organizations is closed and cordial and something to which we attached the highest importance. In the framework of the co-operation agreement of 1972 between OPANAL and the IAEA, and through its distinguished Secretary General, H.E. Mr. Enrique Román-Morey, we are in regular contact with OPANAL and thus in touch with developments relating to the Treaty. We seek ways of increasing our co-operation, as appropriate, in areas of mutual professional interest. It is in that warm spirit, that the Agency has been invited to participate in regular sessions of the OPANAL General Conference and additionally now, in the International Seminar on "Disarmament and Security: a new Latin America and Caribbean Agenda for the next millennium" which will take place after this session with the involvement also of the Government of Peru and of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs. The Agency's relationship with OPANAL, of

course, derives from the Tlatelolco Treaty itself. Article 13 of the Treaty, a trailblazer and example for all, establishes the application of safeguards, as part of the control system of the Treaty. Additionally Article 28 of the Treaty, prescribes that the conclusion of safeguards agreements are a key requirement for entry into force. Some of the amendments to the Treaty enhance the potential IAEA role carrying out any special inspections required under the Treaty. It is clear from all of this that our two Organizations are inextricably linked.

I have been asked to talk to you today about the Model Protocol Additional to safeguards agreement (which I shall refer to "Model Additional Protocol") approved by the Agency Board of Governors in May 1997 as a contribution to global non-proliferation objectives. It is fitting to do so in this forum, which is keenly aware of the importance of safeguards to regional and international efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and move toward nuclear disarmament. These are issues to which the Latin American and Caribbean region is known to attach the greatest importance.

Our experience in Iraq showed that if safeguards were to be truly effective, they had to be equipped not only to verify what States had declared about their nuclear material and activities but also, to the extent possible, to provide assurance about the absence of undeclared material and activities. This has been the focus of all steps taken since the strengthen the safeguards system through new measures. Key to the whole process is the idea of nuclear transparency in other words, the more that is known about a State's nuclear activities and plans, the more comprehensive the verification can be and the more robust the assurances derived therefrom. Accordingly, strengthening measures have concentrated on seeking more information about States' nuclear programme and more access to places and locations at which nuclear material is/or could be present.

#### **Rights and Obligations under the Additional Protocol**

The Model Additional Protocol is of the highest importance in this respect. Building upon earlier strengthening measures; it embodies powerful new tools to help the Agency to verify compliance with a State's legal undertakings. In combination with the relevant comprehensive safeguards agreement, it provides for as complete a picture as practicable about a State's production of and holdings of nuclear material; the nuclear activities and plans are elements of the infrastructure, which supports a State's current or planned nuclear fuel cycle.

The Model Additional Protocol also seeks to rationalize and streamline safeguards administration and, like comprehensive safeguards agreements, reflects an agreed balance between rights and obligations. Thus, if a State concluding an Additional Protocol incurs certain additional, legal obligations, its rights are protected through certain obligations on the part of the Agency.

#### **Current Status of the Additional Protocol**

To date, Additional Protocols for 45 States have been approved by the IAEA Board of Governors. Seven Additional Protocols have already entered into force and one is being applied provisionally. All States are urged to conclude Additional Protocols: the full potential of the strengthened safeguards system depends on it. In this regard, a crucial, first step is to have a safeguards agreement in force with the Agency.

Of all the States, which have signed and ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty, only one State has yet to bring its safeguards agreement into force. Accordingly, the parties to this important instrument are well placed to demonstrate renewed commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and again be an example to others. With a view, in particular to next year's NPT Review Conference, the IAEA appeals to all States that have not yet done so to conclude Additional Protocols at the earliest possible date. The "Principles and Objectives" emanating from the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference said, that decisions taken by the IAEA Board of Governors to strengthen safeguards "should be supported and implemented". I assume that all NPT parties especially those of this region which have been trailblazers for others, will wish to act accordingly.

Of the States of the Latin American and Caribbean region, two States that have signed and ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty (Uruguay and Ecuador) have signed Additional Protocols. Cuba, which has not yet ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty, has also concluded an Additional Protocol. The Agency was delighted to learn, very recently, that the Government of Peru wishes to submit its own Additional Protocol to the IAEA Board of Governors in December. We very much hope that all other countries of the region will sign Additional Protocols soon.

Many Contracting Parties to the Tlatelolco Treaty have concluded safeguards agreements with the Agency, which have protocols to those agreements (known as "Small Quantities" Protocols (SQPs)). These provide, inter alia, for holding in abeyance provisions of the agreement regarding safeguards implementation. It is nevertheless important that such countries should also conclude Additional Protocols thereby renewing their commitment to non-proliferation and reinforcing the non-proliferation regime.

Finally, I thank you for this opportunity to be present at this important event and to share with you our hopes and aspirations for the Additional Protocol. We look, with confidence, to the Contracting Parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco to set an example to the world in this regard and to be as much a source of inspiration to others now as they have been in the past. I thank you for your attention.