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STATEMENT OF HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES L. MALONE
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Mr. Chairman,
Mr. Secretary General,
Distinguished Delegates and
Friends of the Treaty of Tlatelolco:

Before proceeding with my statement, I would like to read a personal message to those participating in this Conference from the President of the United States of America:

"It is a privilege to extend my personal greetings on the occasion of the Eighth Ordinary Session of the General Conference of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL).

"The Treaty of Tlatelolco is a singular achievement in the History of Diplomacy and deserves the admiration and respect of people everywhere. Each of the Parties to this Treaty can take great pride in its contribution to realizing the vision of the Latin American Statesmen who understand the vital importance of removing the spectre of nuclear weapons from the region.

"The United States has a long tradition of supporting this Treaty, including the ratification of Protocol II in 1971 and, more recently, its adherence to Protocol I. It is a source of particular pride to me that my administration was able to secure final United States action on Protocol I, which was approved unanimously by the U.S. Senate in early November 1981. Ten days later the U.S. Secretary of State personally deposited the Instrument of Ratification in Mexico City.
"This action reflects the importance the United States attaches to arms control and to working with countries of Latin America in charting a future of peace and stability in this hemisphere.

"While the Treaty of Tlatelolco has accomplished much, its goal of banning the acquisition and deployment of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America remains unfulfilled. I would urge those countries which have not yet joined the Treaty or its Protocols to conclude that their security would be better ensured over the long term by joining the Treaty. Taking such a step will right-fully earn the gratitude of all countries in the region that share the goal of a Latin America free of nuclear weapons and the respect of the International Community for contributing to the ever growing consensus against the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries.

"I extend my best wishes for a successful General Conference which I hope will provide additional momentum toward entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco throughout the region." (That concludes the President's message).

It is an honour to represent the United States at this Eighth Regular Session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. The Treaty of Tlatelolco exemplifies the cooperation among nations that is essential to preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons and to promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The United States is proud to be associated with this far-sighted effort by regional States to ensure that nuclear weapons do not disrupt the long-term prospects for a stable and prosperous Latin America.

The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, like the Antarctic Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty, seeks to limit the spread of nuclear weapons by preventing their introduction into areas hitherto free of them. Unlike the other Treaties, however, the Latin American Treaty is concerned with a populated area.
The United States favors the establishment of nuclear free zones where they will not disturb existing security arrangements and where provisions for investigating alleged violations can give reasonable assurance of compliance. We also consider it important that the initiative for such zones originate in the geographical area concerned and that all States important to the denuclearization of the area participate.

Even before the Cuban missile crisis, the Brazilian Representative to the UN General Assembly had suggested making Latin America a nuclear weapons free zone. During the crisis, he submitted a draft resolution calling for such a zone. The draft resolution was not put to a vote at the General Assembly that year, but the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 brought home the dangers of nuclear war.

In April 1963, the Presidents of five Latin American countries—Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico—announced that they were prepared to sign a multilateral agreement that would make Latin America a nuclear weapons free zone. On November 27, 1963, this declaration received the support of the UN General Assembly, with the United States voting in the affirmative.

The Latin American nations followed this initiative by extensive and detailed negotiations among themselves. At the Mexico City Conference (November 23-27, 1965), a Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America was created, which culminated in the signing of the Treaty on February 14, 1967.

Let me take this opportunity to pay tribute to the leading role played by Mexico in this pioneering achievement, and to the Diplomat most responsible for its successful negotiation, Alfonso Garcia Robles. His sharing of the 1982 Nobel
Peace Prize was a fitting recognition of a lifetime of dedication to promoting a peaceful world.

It is an axiom of international relations that peace and stability can best be assured over the long term by adopting an institutional framework that helps to establish and enforce certain norms in relations among countries. The Treaty of Tlatelolco is an expression of the will of Latin American countries that the chances for regional peace and stability will be improved if countries agree to ban the acquisition and deployment of nuclear weapons within the framework of a regional treaty. Of course, even if there ultimately is success in establishing a nuclear weapons free zone throughout the region, this is regrettably no guarantee of the absence of tension or conflict. However, as circumstances in other regions demonstrate, suspicions about neighboring countries' commitment to peaceful nuclear development can themselves help to sow more distrust and contribute further to regional instability. An institutional approach such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco can help considerably in allaying these suspicions.

I would reiterate President Reagan's call for those countries of the region that are not Parties to the Treaty to reassess their position. By joining the Treaty of Tlatelolco, you would firmly demonstrate to your neighbors and the world, your longing for a future free from the nuclear threat, and move Latin America further into the forefront of creative international diplomacy by demonstrating its ability to formulate an effective regional approach to one of the foremost challenges of our time.

As one of the few nations which possesses nuclear weapons, the United States recognized its responsibility for minimizing the chance that these weapons will ever be used and
for taking concrete steps toward negotiating mutual and verifiable limitations and reductions on the nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. President Reagan has spoken often of this responsibility and has put forward an ambitious arms control agenda. To complement such bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, the United States has always supported the principle of nuclear weapons free zones under appropriate conditions. Thus far, the only populated region where this concept has taken hold is in Latin America. President Reagan's decision to urge final Senate action on Protocol I demonstrates the desire of the United States to extend maximum cooperation to our Latin American neighbors in this objective. By joining Protocol I, the United States has undertaken to apply the basic obligations of Article 1 of the Treaty to territories in the region for which it is responsible. Through its earlier adherence to Protocol II, the United States has agreed to respect the demilitarized status of the region and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against countries for which the Treaty is in force. These are major commitments for the United States which reflect our agreement with the creators of the Treaty that a Latin America free of nuclear weapons promotes the security and well-being of us all.

This type of international cooperation is essential if our mutual interest in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons is to succeed. Approaches such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco contribute to international security in a number of ways.

First, by undertaking a formal Treaty obligation, countries in the region provide the highest possible expression of their decision not to acquire such weapons. A Treaty obligation is a binding pledge of a nation's future conduct, and experience makes clear that countries are reluctant to violate
such obligations. As a result, possible motivations in other States to acquire nuclear weapons will be kept in check.

Second, the Treaty also prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons by countries outside the region in territories for which the Treaty is in force. In that regard, the United States would welcome prompt action to bring Protocol I into force for all eligible Parties. The United States recognizes the importance of studying carefully the issues relevant to the ratification of any Treaty, but believes any such questions regarding the Treaty of Tlatelolco can and should be resolved promptly.

Finally, the Treaty contributes to international security by recognizing the importance of an adequate control system. The articles of the Treaty dealing with verification contain some unique ideas that should help to prevent suspicions that Parties to the Treaty are undertaking prohibited activities. The Treaty of Tlatelolco recognizes the value of countries' accepting controls that will provide adequate assurance to their neighbors that they are engaged only in peaceful nuclear activities. A key part of this control system is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The IAEA is another example of international cooperation to ensure the continued peaceful use of nuclear energy. Many countries of Latin America participate actively in the IAEA, and can help to ensure that the Agency continues to play a useful role in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under effective IAEA Safeguards. If the IAEA fails in this task over the long run, we will all lose. Regional security would be harmed, international nuclear commerce could break down, and important treaties against the spread of nuclear weapons would be imperiled. Without the IAEA, the Treaty
of Tlatelolco regime would lose its principal verification mechanism. There would be an irreplaceable loss of institutional experience which the IAEA has developed in some fifteen years of safeguards experience. While OPANAL could establish its own control system, it would take untold time, resources and efforts to develop a safeguards system equivalent to that of the IAEA. It is clear that we must all work together to ensure that the IAEA's ability to carry out its historic tasks.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco establishes an excellent framework for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The United States will cooperate with other nations in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, under a regime of adequate safeguards and controls. Some Latin American States have made considerable progress in the development and use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. We wish to maintain close ties in this field with our Latin American neighbors, and we want to show that we can be a reliable supplier to the expanding Latin American market for peaceful nuclear material, equipment and technology.

Adherence to the Treaty of Tlatelolco weighs significantly in a decision by the United States to conclude new agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation, or to expand cooperation under existing agreements. Ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, including waiver, of the Treaty into force and conclusion of an appropriate safeguards agreement, represents from our standpoint a non-proliferation commitment of considerable significance. For example, two of the new agreements for cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy which we have concluded recently, are with Colombia and Peru, both Parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. In this way, the Treaty of Tlatelolco allows us to cooperate with other nations, and to supply nuclear material, equipment and technology under conditions which strengthen regional security and the global non-proliferation regime.
In this regard, we have taken measures to encourage adherence to the Treaty of Tlateloico. Certain programs which the United States has established for assistance through the IAEA are available on preferential basis to Parties to the Treaty of Tlateloico with an appropriate safeguards agreement in place, as well as to other countries which have undertaken a comparable obligation. These programs include financial support and gifts-in-kind for approved IAEA programs of technical assistance for such countries, and the annual gift of nuclear material made by the United States Department of energy to the IAEA for peaceful nuclear research uses.

I should note that while the United States does grant certain preferences to Treaty of Tlateloico Parties, we are prepared within the framework of United States Law to find ways to have constructive nuclear relationship with all countries in Latin America. By maintaining a dialogue with other countries we can better understand their views and seek ways to serve our mutual interests.

Another area where it is essential to establish international norms in peaceful nuclear programs is nuclear commerce between countries. All countries — both suppliers and recipients — need to ensure that commerce in nuclear materials and equipment is carried out in a manner that reinforces confidence that nuclear facilities are not being used for nuclear explosives. It is essential that all countries recognize that the future of international nuclear cooperation is dependent on establishing such confidence. Latin American countries must face this question as its more advanced nuclear States begin to engage in nuclear export activity. Article 23 of the Treaty of Tlateloico recognizes that Parties to the Treaty can generate confidence in such civil nuclear cooperation by providing certain information to OPANAL on their nuclear agreements. The
United States would encourage the members of OPANAL to consider other ways that it can encourage regional nuclear exporters to engage in such activity in a manner consistent with the objectives of the Treaty.

In conclusion, I would note that United States' support for the Treaty of Tlatelolco is indicative of the broader aim of the United States to find constructive approaches to the problems we share with our Latin American neighbors. We share a joint responsibility for building a structure of peace for the region that can ensure tranquility for the generations to come. Cooperation among us must be dependent on mutual respect, and on an understanding for the varying perspectives we each bring to the problems which confront us. The Treaty of Tlatelolco exemplifies that cooperative spirit. Let us dedicate ourselves anew to maintaining the spirit that gave birth to this important Treaty.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.