Mr. Chairman,

The NPT has been largely successful in achieving its non-proliferation objectives, in sharp contrast, however, with the dismal achievement of the nuclear disarmament goals set out under Article VI.

It is clear that, as long as nuclear weapons exist, there will be States or non-State actors tempted to acquire or develop them.

Nuclear disarmament is, and will continue to be, the best antidote to nuclear proliferation.

Any approach focused only on non-proliferation is doomed to fail. The current threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons program testifies to the dangers of inaction on nuclear disarmament.
Brazil has strongly condemned the nuclear and missile tests carried out by the DPRK in violation of its obligations under relevant UN Security Council resolutions. We urge the DPRK to comply with those resolutions and return, without delay, to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. Brazil calls on all parties to refrain from any action leading to the escalation of tensions in Northeast Asia and reiterates its support for diplomatic efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.

Mr. Chairman,

Brazil’s firm commitment to the exclusively peaceful uses of the atom are enshrined in our Constitution and reaffirmed in all international legal instruments my country has subscribed, including the NPT, the Tlatelolco Treaty and the Quadripartite Agreement with Argentina, the IAEA and the Argentine-Brazilian Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). Our nuclear facilities are subject to comprehensive safeguards not only under the IAEA, but also under the ABACC. Since its inception, over 25 years ago, the two agencies have had a productive relationship, leading to increasing effectiveness and efficiency in the application of comprehensive safeguards in Brazil and Argentina.

My country is supportive of endeavours towards the strengthening of IAEA safeguards. This process, however, must be conducted within a framework that fully respects the appropriate legal undertakings by States, and do not impose additional obligations. While Brazil notes the sovereign decision of those States that decided to sign an Additional Protocol with the Agency, it should be recalled that INFCIRC/540 was approved by the IAEA Board of
Governors on the understanding that it is a voluntary instrument. This was recognized in the 2010 Action Plan and IAEA General Conference resolutions. Furthermore, Action 30 of the 2010 Action Plan also stated that “additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved”. It is very unfortunate that a world free from nuclear weapons remains a distant hope, when Nuclear-Weapon States would also be subject to full-scope safeguards agreements and additional protocols.

In the same vein, Brazil understands that the work of the Agency in safeguards must be guided by its Statute, the decisions of its Policy Making Organs, and the agreements signed with the concerned States. We welcome the fact that the Secretariat is involved in a dialogue with Member States on safeguards issues, including the application of State-level approaches. This dialogue provides opportunities for closer involvement of Member States, and greater accountability and transparency in the Agency’s safeguards activities. Brazil reiterates the importance that State-Level Approaches be rigorously based on the supplementary document GOV/2014/41 and the assurances given by the IAEA Secretariat at the September 2014 Board of Governors, and reflected in the safeguards resolutions approved by the General Conference.

Mr. Chairman,

Brazil took satisfaction in seeing vindicated our long-standing support for a diplomatic solution that would ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program. We hope that the successful example of the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action reached with Iran will provide inspiration for other pressing regional issues.

It is disappointing, in this regard, to see the indefinite postponement of the Conference on the Establishment of a Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, as called for by the 2010 Action Plan. We urge all interested parties to help make this Conference a reality soon.

To conclude, Mr. Chairman, my country is convinced that regional arrangements can help generate trust, confidence and stability. We believe that both the ABACC and Tlatelolco Treaty models could be sources of inspiration for the Middle East and South Asia in the establishment of zones free of nuclear weapons.

Such zones cannot however be considered an end in themselves, but part of systematic efforts towards the prohibition and elimination of all nuclear weapons around the globe, in an irreversible, transparent and verifiable manner.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.