Many thanks, Mr. Chairman,

Firstly, I would like to stress the importance given by my Country to the Non-Proliferation of WMD not only at a global but also at a regional level to promote international peace and security, as an objective firmly shared by us.

Mr. Chairman,

In its insertion in the world peaceful nuclear market Argentina has constantly applied an extremely prudent policy, conscious of the commitments assumed in the field of non-proliferation and safeguards. My country, as the only G77 and GRULAC Member State which is part in the four major Exports Control Regimes deems very important domestic
and Exports controls of goods under licensing requirements. In different opportunities, we have chaired several of these mechanisms as the MTCR and the NSG and we have very actively worked along as friendly nations in this field, not only in technical issues but also in outreach.

Mr. Chairman

Much work rests to be done in the field of non-proliferation vis à vis the destructive capacities shown by international terrorism. In this regard, it is high time we consolidated IAEA's work and its ongoing activities in the field. So it is highly important to provide the Agency with the resources needed in these endeavors as our Ministers have committed themselves in the Declaration negotiated during the Conference on Nuclear Security held in December last year.

Mr. Chairman,

The Middle East is a matter of utmost priority for many Delegations and which presents some urgency in spite of the elapsed time without solution.
This region has found itself for several decades in a crossroad which deserves an answer from not only the States of the region but also from the whole International Community.

We think that the solution should be based in concrete steps, realist but ambitious at the same time and which inevitably will come from an ambitious and inclusive consensus. In this regard, gradual approaches should not be overlooked if these led to the same objective shared by all of us. The participation by all States of this region would favor the full achievement of these aims which are broadly shared by the International Community.

In this regard, the establishment of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone, including Nuclear Weapons, in the Middle East under the principles established by SSODI and UNDC in 1999 should recognize the importance and the utility of these mechanisms to consolidate peace and security and under no circumstances should these factors be set aside.

Therefore we note with satisfaction all the initiatives on the establishment
Mr. Chairman,

My country is also conscious of the necessity of keeping a trustworthy verification regime to avoid the development of nuclear programs with defense implications and protect peaceful uses of nuclear energy as a Humankind common good. IAEA's safeguards system has become in this sense in a fundamental pillar of the international non-proliferation regime.

Safeguards create a positive environment to enhance peaceful nuclear cooperation. Its implementation must be guided by Article IV of the NPT and the IAEA's Statute to preserve its credibility, effectiveness and integrity and a strictly technical ground and effective transparent non-discriminatory and objective.
My country considers that no concept must be introduced without having held an adequate, open and active consultation process with Member States. Moreover, the introduction of any further obligation in terms of safeguards than the established in the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements must depend upon the final sovereign decision of Member States.

My country agrees with the importance of solving all cases of non-compliance with nuclear safeguards in conformity with IAEA’s Statute and the legal obligations accepted by its Member States. They are cases which were frequently marked by conflicts and past lack of confidence over non-peaceful nuclear activities which endangered international peace and security. Regrettably some of them are still unresolved and create concerns.

Mr. Chairman,

As we said last Tuesday, Argentina and Brazil are celebrating the 25\textdegree{} anniversary of the creation of the Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accountability and Control of Nuclear Materials, the only bi-national
system which put nuclear installations subject to mutual inspections within a quadripartite Agreement with the IAEA.

ABACC is a clear example of bilateral and regional safeguards providing with assurances in the field of non-proliferation and playing a key role in the promotion of transparency and mutual trust, especially between neighboring countries. Therefore, we believe that safeguards implementation at this level could be useful in trust building processes and in contributing to preserve regional stability and international peace and security in crucial areas.

Mr. Chairman,

Nuclear Weapons Free Zones play a key role and could have even a larger one in the promotion of safeguards implementation throughout the different regions of the world, especially when they are created through a free arrangement by the States of the interested region and with conformity to the UNDC guidelines approved in 1999.

NWFZ have become in different parts of the world a matter of mandatory
reference when we speak about trust building processes at regional level.

In this regard, and in a paradigmatic way, Latin America and the Caribbean paved the way for due to the pioneers of Tlateloco whose spirit is visible in the text of the Treaty bearing that name.

Facing the skepticism often characterizing the discussions on non-proliferation, I would like to recall that it took 27 years to obtain the critical ratifications by States of our region to make the Treaty of Tlatelolco enter into force. Furthermore, it is useful not to forget that it included flexible clauses which consolidated the regime while political conditions matured.

This might led us to keep our optimism towards the entry into force of the CTBT and may serve as a parameter to begin patient negotiations about the establishment a Zone of this nature in the always complex Middle East.

Mr. Chairman,

The Agreement reached within the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
between the EU 3 + 3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the
peaceful nature of its nuclear development implies a remarkable step
forward in the dialogue process in favor of non-proliferation and
international security. This is a highly sensible matter which has concluded
after more than 10 years of active work.

Although this agreement is limited in its reach and time scope, Argentina
agrees with the concrete steps already implemented which constitute a way
forward in the integral solution to this differendum over Iran’s nuclear
program and a contribution in favor of non-proliferation and international
security.

Argentina underscores that this Agreement preserves the principle that any
violation of the NPT or any new attempt to develop Nuclear Weapons will
not be accepted by the International Community.

Argentina reaffirms time and again the intrinsic value of peaceful
settlement of controversies through dialogue and diplomacy as tools to
reach an enduring solution. In this regard, Iran’s active cooperation in
submitting all the necessary information and the adoption of the required
measures about its nuclear program is essential to ensure the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions and to enhance trust in the peaceful nature of its nuclear program.

Mr. Chairman,

I would not like to conclude without mentioning the deep concerns held by my Government regarding the continuous provocative conduct by the Democratic and Popular Republic of Korea in its permanent improvement of its growing but illegal nuclear program. Each of the nuclear tests conducted has been of increasing power, and each consolidates further DPRK nuclear capacity. The latest event has shown potency in the neighborhood of that of the artifact that destroyed Hiroshima. Here we can see, also, the capacity to mount a nuclear head on a ballistic missile which, coincidentally, continue to be tested and developed, and triggered an strong denunciation by the Security Council.

Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, the statements of condemnation that we are hearing in this meeting, and other fora throughout the world, fail to be totally convincing when considered with the fact that the international
community has not been able to achieve the entering into force of the Treaty that bans altogether these nuclear tests.

The DPRK continues such practices while the legal tool that would outlaw them altogether is not yet in force.

It is hard to understand which is it, the right that countries are protecting when they choose not to ratify the Treaty on a Nuclear-Test-Ban.

Is that perhaps the same “right” that the DPRK put into execution twice last year?

With a Treaty in full force, the strength of our condemnation would be fully backed by international law. It would be possible to put in place an on-site inspection. All of that is not possible today. We will witness once again the words of condemnation, but those words, Mr. Chairman, need to be followed by concrete action.

We can only hope that this grim event will become a decisive call to action so that –once and for all– we make the comprehensive ban on nuclear testing a consolidated, indisputable and operative norm in international
law.

Many thanks, Mr. Chairman