Tlatelolco and Regional Non-Proliferation initiatives
Dr. John R. Redick*

INTRODUCTION.

This paper considers the implications of the Tlatelolco Treaty and the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone for other regional situations, specifically the South Pacific, Africa, and the Middle East. The paper also addresses the role of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), and suggests possible avenues for its continued evolution.

(1) Tlatelolco: The Motivation and the Meaning.

In September 1962, prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Brazilian representative to the U.N. General Assembly, Ambassador Alfonso Arines de Melo Franco (who also chaired the Brazilian delegation to the Committee on Disarmament), proposed that a U.N. General Assembly resolution for the denuclearization of Africa be expanded to include Latin America. The interest of African nations in a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the African continent had been stimulated earlier by French nuclear testing in the Sahara, and subsequently by growing evidence of South African nuclear weapons development. Following the October 1962 Missile Crisis, Ambassador de Melo Franco returned to Rio and encouraged the Brazilian foreign ministry (Itamaraty) to take the lead in an effort to achieve a latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone. This initiative fit well with Brazil's "independent" foreign policy and interest in nurturing ties with African nations which had contributed much to that nation's cultural heritage.

The Mexican ambassador to Brazil at this time was a distinguished diplomat, Alfonso García Robles. Having observed the discussions within Itamaraty, García Robles convinced his foreign minister, Manuel Tello, of the importance of a Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone. Consequently, Mexican President Lopez Mateos extended an invitation (March, 1963) to the presidents of Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Bolivia to join Mexico in an effort to create a Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone agreement.

What followed is a matter of public record: Tlatelolco was carefully negotiated in Mexico City between 1964 and 1967, and the late Alfonso García Robles ultimately received the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts, an honor he richly deserved. Two quotations, however, capture some of the spirit of the moment on February 14, 1967, when the Tlatelolco Treaty was completed.

"We have worked for the benefit of not only our own countries and of Latin America but also, in this world of interdependence in which we live, for the good of mankind."

Alfonso García Robles

No treaty is consummated in a vacuum; its surroundings must have their effect upon its deliberations. Likewise, the individuality and character of the participants may play a role above and beyond that of the positions they take and the statements they read. The observer remembers the solid and courtly figure of UN Ambassador Leopoldo Benitez of Ecuador, pulling together the raveling threads of thought; and the pellucid and measured Spanish of Commission President García Robles who is rightfully called the father of the treaty; the truly Latin Atmosphere, the cordial abrazos and handshakings, the endless rounds of coffee, Coca-Cola and whisky passed by silent waiters, the meetings starting a full hour or two behind schedule and occasionally continuing into the early hours of the morning. ("Why are they late today?"--the working sessions have concluded." "They are busy with the denuclearization of Cuernavaca!"--this is on a particularly beautiful weekend.)

In the midst of this scene a plaque commemorating Cuahtemoc, the last of the Aztec kings, who fell defending Tlatelolco against the power of Cortes, is inscribed: "No fue triunfo ni derrota...." "It was neither a triumph nor a defeat" but the painful birth of the mixed people who are the Mexico of today.

And so with the treaty, negotiated and signed on the same spot four and a half centuries later; it was neither a triumph nor a defeat but a painful birth.

Linda Eder in The Nation

In truth Tlatelolco is a triumph (even if it experienced a difficult birth) and the precedent-setting nature of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a populated area is self-evident. Other Tlatelolco lessons are also important, including: the early cross-fertilization from Africa, the initial support of democratic (non-military) Latin American governments, and the leadership of individuals fully committed to overcoming bureaucratic and diplomatic obstacles. However, the most important Tlatelolco lesson having relevance to other regional situations is the motivation of the parties. Tlatelolco was an affirmation of Latin American foreign policy independence, and an expression of opposition to foreign intervention in the region. Tlatelolco was more than a nuclear non-proliferation initiative or a regional NPT. (Tlatelolco preceded the NPT, and was more restrictive in its coverage, ie, no foreign controlled nuclear weapons permitted in the territory of the parties.) The assertion of regional commonality against non-regional interference was a central motivating factor of Tlatelolco, and continues to give the agreement particular importance to the parties. It is also a feature of particular relevance to other regional situations.

(2) The South Pacific (Treaty of Raratonga).

The South Pacific nuclear-free-zone treaty was signed on August 6, 1985, and entered into force December 11, 1986. In 1994 there were twelve parties to the South Pacific zone, with the most significant nations being Australia and New Zealand. The Raratonga Treaty establishes the world's second nuclear-weapon-free zone in a populated area and is closely modeled on the Tlatelolco Treaty. The principal motivation for the zone was the interest of the regional nations in stopping French underground nuclear testing and preventing radioactive waste disposal in the region.

Raratonga's central provisions are identical to Tlatelolco: acquisition, manufacture, testing or stationing of nuclear weapons in the region is prohibited. Tlatelolco, however, covers a densely populated continent, ocean, and several nations with nuclear weapons potential. In contrast, Raratonga encompasses an immense oceanic area, a sub-continent, and many lightly populated islands. No Raratonga parties possess significant nuclear facilities.

The Raratonga Treaty established no administrative secretariat analogous to Tlatelolco's OPANAL. Instead, such responsibilities are left to an intergovernmental coordinating mechanism, the South Pacific Forum. Also in contrast to Tlatelolco, Raratonga's connection to the NPT is explicit in that its parties must conclude IAEA safeguard agreements "equivalent in its scope and effect to an agreement required in connection with the NPT" (Article 8, Annex 2, Paragraph 1). In addition, Raratonga includes a provision, absent in Tlatelolco, prohibiting the dispersal of nuclear waste, by parties and protocol nations, in the zone.

Both Raratonga and Tlatelolco allow parties to grant transit rights or port visits in their territory to foreign ships which may carry nuclear weapons. Raratonga explicitly bans all nuclear explosives, whereas Tlatelolco's ambiguities on "peaceful nuclear explosives" have led, in the past, to differing interpretations among some Latin American parties and nuclear-weapon states. Interestingly, the amendments proposed in 1990 by Argentina, Brazil and Chile to facilitate their Tlatelolco membership did not address this issue. Instead, Argentina and Brazil dealt with this issue outside the context of Tlatelolco.

Other distinctions between the two agreements include: a longer withdrawal notification period for Raratonga parties (twelve months, rather than three); and that a Raratonga party must require full-scope IAEA safeguards by a state to which it is exporting nuclear material or equipment. Both treaties include protocols for nuclear-weapon states, and external states having territorial interests in the region, to guarantee the nuclear-weapon-free status of the zone. Unlike Tlatelolco, Raratonga's protocols also outline measures which may be taken to verify the activities of nuclear-weapon states in the zone.

Unfortunately, despite the indigenous nature of the Raratonga Treaty and the fact that it enjoys the unanimous support of the South Pacific nations, three nuclear-weapon states have failed to adhere to the protocols: France, Great Britain, and the United States. This is in contrast to Tlatelolco, which has received unanimous support from the nuclear-weapon states, and those nations having territorial interests in the Americas. Recent changes in the international situation, including the informal nuclear test moratorium and growing momentum for a comprehensive test ban (CTB) agreement, may enhance prospects for external support of Raratonga.¹

In the meantime, it may be observed that the South Pacific nuclear-weapon-free zone has already made valuable contributions to international peace and security. For example, support by the regional nations for Raratonga would seem to assure that the nuclear-weapon states will not store nuclear weapons in their territories situated in the zone. In addition, by directing adverse attention to the nuclear testing programs in the region, Raratonga helped encourage the current French nuclear test moratorium, thereby enhancing the likelihood of a CTB. Finally, like its Latin American predecessor, Raratonga may help simulate additional regional non-proliferation arrangements. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which is somewhat similar to the South Pacific Forum, has expressed interest in the Raratonga model and the possibility of an analogous South East Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone. Australia is an obvious "connecting link" between Raratonga and a possible South East Asian zone, and its support is likely to be viewed as quite important by another key regional nation: Indonesia.

(3) Africa.*

As noted earlier, the initial stimulation for an African nuclear-weapon-free zone was French nuclear testing in the Sahara Desert in 1960. In 1961 fourteen African nations sponsored a U.N. General Assembly resolution calling for the beginning of negotiations to establish such a zone. Three and a half decades later it appears that African nations will achieve their goal in 1995.

The 49th United Nations General Assembly is in the process of formally considering the draft treaty text (DOC A 149/436, September 27, 1994) and most likely will have given its approval by the time of this Seminar. The nearly-completed draft was agreed to by the African Group of Experts at its most recent meeting in May, 1994. The draft requires parties "not to conduct research on, develop, manufacture, stockpile or otherwise acquire, possess, or have control over any nuclear explosive device." As with the Raratonga Treaty, there are no ambiguities regarding so-called "peaceful" nuclear explosives: all nuclear explosives are prohibited. Three protocols for non-African states parallel the Tlatelolco and Raratonga requirements. In a similar fashion, the African treaty will be of unlimited duration. Yet to be fully resolved is the exact zone of application, including certain islands such as Diego García.

The conclusion of the African nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty will be a signal international event of great importance to all African nations and their peoples. On that occasion the Tlatelolco parties will uniquely share the joy and pride of their African colleagues.

(4) Middle East.

While significant progress has been achieved in recent years toward resolution of enduring disputes in the Middle East, the danger of a regional nuclear war persists. Israel has nuclear weapons, Iraq sought to develop them, and several other Middle East nations have devoted significant resources to building a civil nuclear infrastructure with military potential. Nearly all of the regional nations are heavily armed with conventional weapons, and some with chemical and biological weapons. Nowhere else in the world is there a greater need for innovative approaches to arms control and disarmament than in the Middle East. As indigenous regional arms control initiatives may contribute to the broader objective of Middle East peace and security, the successful Latin American effort should be assessed for its possible relevance.

Two approaches to regional nuclear arms control in the Middle East have generally received most attention: a nuclear-weapon-free zone and confidence-building measures. With respect to a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone, the concept was originally advanced by Egypt and Iran as early as 1974. Each year since 1974 the UN General Assembly has passed a resolution in support of the proposed zone. While Israel initially opposed the UN General Assembly resolution, since 1980 that nation has allowed it to be adopted without a vote. Despite this, Israel continues to maintain that such a zone can only be achieved as a result of direct negotiations among the states in the region. Arab states, in contrast, have emphasized the central role of the United Nations in helping establish a regional nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Interest in establishment of a Middle East zone has remained high. In 1989 the IAEA completed a technical study defining the process by which safeguards could be applied to a Middle East zone. In 1990 the definitive expert study on establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone (one of whose authors, Ben Sanders, is with us at this Seminar), was approved by the 45th UN General Assembly. In 1991, as part of his Middle East arms control initiative, former US President George Bush proposed "the eventual creation of a regional nuclear-weapon-free zone." As recently as April 1993 the Iranian foreign minister, in an address to the UN General Assembly, endorsed the Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone and called for a regional approach to nuclear arms control.

While relatively little progress has been achieved, there are now several fora for Arab-Israeli discussions on regional nuclear arms control, in addition to the UN General Assembly. The multilateral working group on regional security and arms control under the Madrid Conference Framework, has undertaken substantive, although as yet unproductive, discussions on nuclear issues, including the proposed zone. In addition, building on its 1989 study, the IAEA hosted a workshop of regional experts on the modalities of safeguards applications in a Middle East zone. The May 1993 meeting included discussion of existing zones, with particular emphasis on the Tlatelolco Treaty.

What is the relevance, if any, of the Tlatelolco model to the Middle East? First, let us consider the dissimilarities, which are important. As noted in a recent excellent study,² the geographical boundaries of the Latin American zone were relatively clear from the outset, whereas those for the proposed Middle East zone are far less apparent. For example, some states such as Iran, generally deemed essential to a Middle East zone, are not considered a part of the region by most definitions. Other non-regional nations, such as Pakistan, have unique cultural/religious ties to the region. Yet Pakistan's undeclared nuclear arsenal has significant implications to the strategic balance and long-term stability of the region.

Yet another distinction encompasses the political realities of the two regions. Latin American nations share certain historical, cultural and legal traditions, while lacking the deep, seemingly irreconcilable, divisions which prevail in the Middle East. These divisions have raised questions regarding the legitimacy and very existence of some regional states, resulting in wars and violence on a scale unknown in Latin America.

Finally, the lack of nuclear symmetry among the states of the Middle East is an important obstacle to creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. In Latin America, while there are clear differences among the regional states in the level of nuclear development, the two nations with the most advanced nuclear programs, Argentina and Brazil, have relative nuclear parity. Consequently, the Latin American effort was able to focus on preventing the development or introduction of nuclear weapons into the region, somewhat divorced from other issues. In the Middle East the differences in the level of nuclear development, including the existence of a nuclear-weapon state, have greatly complicated nuclear arms control activities. That is, all such efforts to restrain nuclear arms are inextricably linked to other issues, including the acquisition of chemical, biological, and missile delivery systems.

Despite formidable obstacles to a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone, and the very different circumstances between the two regions, the Tlatelolco experience does have relevance. For example, the creation of a negotiating commission, (COPREDAL) of all nations from the Latin American region, with expert assistance from the UN and the IAEA, is a process worth careful consideration by Middle East nations. This negotiating process extended over three years, thereby allowing full and fair discussion of all relevant issues. Moreover, the process included a procedure for continuous consultations with the nuclear-weapon states and other nations having interests in the region. By this method, the concerns of non-regional states were understood and given due consideration, without those nations becoming direct parties to the negotiations. The Tlatelolco experience suggests that the final product is a durable agreement of long-standing relevance to the interests of the parties.

Another Tlatelolco Treaty feature which could contribute to a Middle East zone is the phased entry-into-force procedure. While Tlatelolco's Article 28 was an act of creative diplomatic expediency fashioned by García Robles, the results were particularly fortunate for the long-term efficacy of the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone. That is, the procedure allowed certain Latin American nations (Argentina, Brazil, Chile) to retain an organic relationship to the treaty, while delaying its entry-into-force for their territory until they judged that circumstances would permit it. The concurrent obligation assumed by these nations was that they would take no action contrary to the objectives of the treaty during that period in which the agreement was not yet in force for them.

The relevance of this to the Middle East is that it suggests a process by which nations having various levels of nuclear capability can be incorporated into, and actively engaged in , a long-term process to complete a nuclear-weapon-free zone. As was the case in Latin America, the zone could be established among some Middle East states, while allowing others to delay entry-into-force. The important point is that those nations delaying entry-into-force be firmly linked to the treaty, and committed to taking no additional action contrary to its objectives. This procedure, for example, might allow a country such as Israel to relate to a Middle East zone, while engaging in discussions to curtail and perhaps eliminate its nuclear arsenal. In this regard the interesting Tlatelolco innovation of "Signatory States" vs "Contracting Parties" deserves particular study.³

One additional feature of the Tlatelolco Treaty of possible relevance to the Middle East is challenge or special inspections. The original treaty language included a procedure (Article 16) by which the IAEA or OPANAL's Council (ie, five members elected by the General Conference of all Contracting Parties) could conduct special inspections. In the case of the IAEA, such inspections could be undertaken in the context of Article 13, by which Tlatelolco parties were to negotiate bilateral or multilateral safeguard agreements. The special inspections of OPANAL's Council could be carried out at the request of any Contracting Party. This inspection by demand, by which all Tlatelolco parties agreed to provide "full and free access to all places and all information as necessary", was considered a unique and important Tlatelolco contribution to nuclear arms control.

In 1992, in order to facilitate the adherence of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, the Contracting Parties agreed to amend Article 16 by vesting operational responsibility for special inspections solely in the IAEA. OPANAL continues to have an important role, however, as such inspections are to be triggered by a request to the IAEA by a Tlatelolco party with the concurrence of the Council.⁴ The relevance of this formula to the Middle East is its interesting balance between regional and multilateral prerogatives. The regional nations and machinery, in effect, retain the responsibility to initiate special inspections which are then conducted by a multinational authority. While such an inspection could legally be initiated from outside the region, the IAEA will, in all likelihood, defer to the regional parties and the regional authority to trigger such an inspection. Such a formula could be attractive to parties of a future Middle East zone.

A second approach to progress on Middle East nuclear arms control is confidence-building measures. Many observers believe that confidence-building measures, designed to address the nuclear issue, could make a genuine contribution to efforts to reach a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement at the present time. By this reasoning, Israel is currently well-positioned to initiate a nuclear confidence-building process. Israel possesses a signifi- cant nuclear arsenal while, as yet, no Arab nation has developed nuclear weapons. Moreover, as a result of recent accords with the Palestinians and Jordan, Israel's security position is much improved. Accordingly, it has been suggested that Israel might unilaterally adopt a temporary moratorium on plutonium reprocessing by closing its Dimona production facilities. This temporary cap on the Israeli nuclear program could precipitate reciprocal Arab actions, such as support for the indefinite extension of the NPT or adherence to the chemical weapons treaty.

Such a process could ultimately expand into a regional agreement to prohibit production of plutonium or highly enriched uranium under IAEA safeguards. In order to overcome Israel's distrust of the IAEA, however, a multilateral arrangement of this nature would need to be augmented by bilateral agreements. To this end, the bilateral accounting and control system (SCCC) established by Argentina and Brazil deserves careful study. The SCCC is administered by the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), with a Secretary, professional staff, and approximately sixty inspectors (30 from each nation which inspect the opposite nation). More relevant, ABACC is independent of the IAEA, but coordinates its accounting and inspection activities with that agency. The bilateral machinery has the confidence and ownership of those nations directly affected by its activities, while the international community is assured by the relationship between the IAEA and ABACC (confirmed by a Quadripartite Agreement among Argentina, Brazil, ABACC and the IAEA). Despite the vast differences between the South American and Middle Eastern situations, there is a pattern in this arrangement which may be applicable to the Arab-Israeli nuclear situation. In addition, there are certain lessons which may be drawn from the long nuclear confidence-building process undertaken by Argentina and Brazil which could have relevance to the Middle East. These include: technical exchanges between nuclear energy commissions, joint nuclear research and safety projects, reciprocal (and highly symbolic) head-of-state visits to nuclear facilities, advance notification of significant civil nuclear activities, and creation of a standing joint nuclear policy committee composed of representatives from the foreign ministry, nuclear energy commissions and the military.⁵

In conclusion, the Latin American experience suggests an implicit interrelationship between nuclear-weapon-free zones and nuclear confidence-building efforts. That is the Tlatelolco Treaty established a regional non-proliferation framework and defined an overall goal of complete prohibition of all nuclear weapons. The completion of the nuclear-weapon-free zone, however, was accomplished only as a final step or culmination of a long nuclear confidence-building process between the region's two historic rivals, Argentina and Brazil. Finally, the Latin American experience suggests one other enduring lesson for the Middle East and elsewhere: that, with dedicated leadership, progress on sensitive nuclear issues can not only contribute to solutions, but may even accelerate the broader efforts toward peace.

(5) OPANAL and the Future.

As the Tlatelolco Treaty approaches universal membership, OPANAL is entering a new and challenging period in its development. During nearly three decades of existence OPANAL has been fortunate to have highly capable leadership, especially former Secretary General Hector Gros Espiell of Uruguay. Now, under the leadership of Ambassador Enrique Román-Morey, OPANAL is poised to evolve into important new responsibilities, if provided sufficient resources and political support by Latin American and other nations.

(A) Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. Article 7 of the Tlatelolco Treaty defines the principal purpose of OPANAL as: to "...ensure compliance with the obligations of the treaty...." However, the treaty's Preamble implies another potential OPANAL role of helping to assure the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy to all Latin American nations:

...that the foregoing reasons, together with the tradtional peace-loving outlook of Latin America, give rise to an inescapable necessity that nuclear energy should be used in that region exclusively for peaceful purposes, and that the Latin American countries should use their right to the greatest and most equitable possible access to this new source of energy in order to expedite the economic and social development of their peoples....

Most regional cooperative efforts in the nuclear energy field are currently administered by the IAEA through ARCAL (Regional Co-operative Arrangements for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America). Created over a decade ago, ARCAL is financed by its Latin American member nations, and by voluntary contributions from non-Latin American nations, including Germany, the United States, the European Economic Community, Canada, France and Italy. ARCAL projects include support of basic nuclear research and education, nuclear medicine and human health, radiation safety, and agricultural and animal sciences. In addition, the IAEA, through its Division of Nuclear Power, provides useful analytical support to Latin American nations investing in nuclear power (nuclear energy currently supplies approximately 2.2% of Latin America's power from plants operating in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico).

Tlatelolco parties have long recognized the desirability that OPANAL might assume an important role in helping plan and systematize Latin American efforts for the full and effective peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As an indiginous regional agency, OPANAL has inherent advantages over a European-based multilateral agency. It is also appreciated, however, that the IAEA is presently the only organization having the technical expertise and experience to undertake such regional efforts. In order to enhance the overall effectiveness of efforts to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Latin America, it would seem desirable that systematic cooperation between OPANAL and the IAEA be encouraged. A first step in this direction could be a scheduled program of exchanges between OPANAL and IAEA personnel. Tlatelolco Protocol states can also play a particularly important role by sharing information and resources, thereby permitting OPANAL to enhance its activities in this field.

(B). Environmental and Security Protection. The benefits of nuclear energy are accompanied by a dark side: environmental degradation and the security dangers of wide-spread availability of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium. Chernobyl and other examples of hemorrhaging, unsafe power reactors in East Europe and elsewhere, have provided a warning of things to come in the absence of careful planning. The problem of nuclear waste storage and disposal (addressed in one manner by the Raratonga Treaty) needs to be considered carefully--and perhaps in a cooperative manner--in Latin America. Finally, the issue of civil use of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium raises important issues of possible theft and nuclear terrorism. Thus far, Latin American nations have chosen not to produce enriched uranium above the 20% level or to reprocess plutonium for recycle into existing reactors or for export. Unfortunately, other nations, notably Japan, France and Great Britain, are continuing programs encouraging plutonium use in civil commerce.

OPANAL could assume a very important educational role in simulating regional discussion and by distributing information on these topics. Regional seminars and research projects in cooperation with ABACC, the IAEA , the U.N. and non-governmental organizations would seem a promising approach.

(C). Regional Non-Proliferation Education. OPANAL's experience in establishing and administering a nuclear-weapon-free zone agreement is rich with lessons for other regional situations. In the future OPANAL could become a global resource for information and education on regional approaches to non-proliferation. To this end, enhanced cooperation between OPANAL and ABACC is essential.⁶ A periodic newsletter, commissioned studies, and seminars for experts and officials from other regions represent a few of the initiatives which could be implemented, assuming adequate support.

Finally, OPANAL could assume an important leadership role in helping establish a complete South Atlantic nuclear-weapon-free zone. This concept of a Southern Hemisphere web, linking the Latin American and forthcoming African nuclear-weapon-free zones, was overwhelmingly approved by the 49th U.N. General Assembly. It represents a next and logical evolutionary step in a process anticipated by the father of the Tlatelolco Treaty, Alfonso García Robles when he called for

...a gradual broadening of the zones of the world from which nuclear weapons are prohibited to a point where the territories of powers which possess these terrible weapons of mass destruction will be something like contaminated islets subject to quarantine.

NOTES

* As the Chief Expert Advisor to the Experts Group, Dr. Ogunsola Ogunbanwo, will be addressing the Seminar on the topic of the African nuclear-weapon-free treaty, this section will be quite brief.

1. The recent US declaration that it will not send nuclear-armed naval vessels to New Zealand may be indicative of a shifting US perspective regarding the South Pacific nuclear-weapon-free zone.

2. Avner Cohen, "Rethinking the Nuclear Equation in a New Middle East", Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, August, 1994 (unpublished manuscript).

3. During the Tlatelolco negotiations, Latin America's two most advanced nuclear-capable nations, Argentina and Brazil, sought to prevent reservations in protocol guarantees by non-regional nations which might alter the basic tenets of the treaty in a manner prejudicial to their interests. In addition, Brazil, with the tacit support of Chile, sought to promote a special treaty status of "Signatory States." Signatory States were defined as those which had ratified the treaty without waiving the provisions of Article 28, Paragraph 1. While such states had a unique relationship to the treaty, the agreement was not yet in force for them. Brazil attempted to go one step further by advocating that Signatory States have a co-equal role with Contracting Parties (those states for which the treaty is in force) in the amendment process (see COPREDAL document GT 1/Rev, February 6, 1967, p. 14). This was resisted by the majority of the Tlatelolco negotiating parties, led by Mexico and Ecuador, resulting in a compromise (Tlatelolco's Article 6) which allows meetings of Signatory States to be convened to consider questions which could affect the treaty, including amendments. Thus, a Signatory State (such as Brazil and Chile, until recently) had a formal mechanism to advise and influence the treaty, while the final responsibility rested with the Contracting Parties. A similar two-tiered relationship could provide a creative way of linking all Middle East nations to an ongoing process to complete a regional nuclear-weapon-free zone.

4. The 1992 Tlatelolco amendments are discussed in John R. Redick, "Creacíon de Confianza Nuclear en la America Latina," Revista Occidental, Estudios Latino Americanos, Ano 10, Number 3, 1993.

5. The Middle East nuclear situation is discussed by John R. Redick in "Regional Nuclear Restraint in the Middle East", Middle East Insight, January-February, 1995.

6. While ABACC is beyond the scope of this paper, the importance of this Brazilian-Argentine bilateral mechanism cannot be over-emphasized. Some of the implications of this agreement are assessed in John R. Redick, Julio C. Carasales, and Paulo S. Wrobel, "Nuclear Rapprochement: Argentina, Brazil, and the Non-Proliferation Regime", The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1, Winter 1995.

* Biographic Note

John R. Redick is Associate Professor and Program Specialist Division of Continuing Education, the University of Virginia. He received his PhD in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia.

Mr. Redick's research and writing has focused on nuclear proliferation with a particular emphasis on the latin american region. He currently directs the Argentina-Brazil Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project in cooperation with an argentine and a brazilian expert, with a support of the Rockefeller Foundation.

Mr. Redick is author of a number of articles and monographs on nuclear proliferation.