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Special Reference to the Establishment of an
African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
Dr. Sola Ogunbamwo *
1. Introduction
As Ambassador Enrique Roman-Morey and Dr. John Redick will address the Seminar on the subjects of the Treaty of
Tlatelolco, the Treaty of Rarotonga as well as the Proposed Middle East NWFZ, my paper will deal mainly with the
topic of an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (African NWFZ Treaty). Appropriate references will however
be made to Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and the Middle East in my paper.
At the ouset, it should be stated that in peparing an African NWFZ Treaty, lessons were drawn from the 1967 Treaty
of Tlatelolco (Prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), as well as from the 1985 Treaty
of Rarotonga (Prohibiting nuclear weapons in the South Pacific). Since there are dissimilarities in the motivations
of the Parties, disparities in the degree of their industrial development (particularly in the nuclear field),
as well as differences in the strategic importance of the regions concerned, the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga
served as models only to some extent.
2. 1964 OAU Cairo Declaration on Denuclearization of Africa
The genesis for the preparation of an African NWFZ Treaty is undoubtedly the OAU Declaration on the Denuclearization
of Africa. That Declaration was adopted by the OAU Heads of State and Government at their very first Summit Conference
in Cairo in July 1964. The 1964 OAU Declaration has two basic obligations namely, concluding an international treaty
under 'United Nations auspices' not to manufacture or control nuclear weapons and calling on the Nuclear Weapon
States to respect the Declaration. In 1965, the United Nations General Assembly (U.N.G.A.) endorsed the Declaration
and called upon all states to desist from testing, manufacturing or deploying nuclear weapons in Africa.
Before discussing the prospects for the implementation of the Declaration, it is pertinent to explain the motives
of the African States in embarking on the idea of denuclearizing Africa, as well as the advantages that will accrue
to them for the establishement of an African NWFZ.
3. African NWFZ Treaty: Motives and Advantages
The most pressing historical motive (which is no longer relevant) was the need to stop France's nuclear test explosion
in the Sahara Desert. France announced its intention to conduct such test in 1958 and carried it out in 1960. All
African States independent at the time opposed the test. Morocco sent five protest notes to France. Nigeria took
the further step of breaking diplomatic relations with France in 1960. Other similar historical motives were the
need to stop colonial powers from using their former African colonies for nuclear testing, the need to prevent
Africa from being drawn into the Cold War, and the need to struggle against the nuclear weapon capability of South
Africa.
In addition to those historical motives which belong to a particular era characterized by a particular situation,
African States were motivated by their desire to contribute to international peace and security through the curbing
of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thus in the Preamble to the 1964 OAU Cairo Declaration, the Heads of State
and Government declared their consciousness of their responsibilities towards peoples and their obligations under
the U.N. Charter and the OAU Charter to excert every effort to strengthen international peace and security, and
their determination that conditions conducive to international peace and security should prevail in order to save
mankind from the scourge of nuclear war. It is pertinent to recall OAU Council of Ministers' resolution of August
1963 entitled `Disarmament and Nuclear Testes'. In that resolutions, the Ministers reaffirmed their determination
to prevent the storage and dissemination of nuclear arms that threaten the security and prosperity of mankind,
welcomed the conclusion of the 1963 Moscow Partial Test Ban Treaty as a first step towards general and complete
disarmament, and expressed the conviction that differences impeding the agreement banning all tests in all environments
could be resolved.
Finally, and perhaps a very compelling motivation was the need to prevent the diversion of human and material resources
away from development projects towards nuclear arms race. Indeed, the challenge facing Africa today is surely not
over the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Indeed, African security does not need nuclear weapons, whether for prestige,
national self-image, deterrence or securirty. Other challenges facing the Continent are numerous including economic,
social, environmental and political misfortunes. It would therefore be beneficial if the scarce and dwindling African
resources are used in the greater interest of economic growth and development.
Having identified African States motives, it will be worthwhile to mention some of the advantages that will accrue
to them for the establishment of an African NWFZ. An African NWFZ Treaty could provide additional assurance that
South Africa has abandoned any nuclear ambitions, help to allay concerns that some States are pursuing nuclear
weapon capabilities despite their NPT obligations, strengthen Africa's non-nuclear status, generate concerted efforts
to use nuclear energy more effectively to meet Africa's development needs, and serve as another forum for working
out regional tensions and suspicious, thus serving as an added confidence-building mechanism. Furthermore, though
the establishment of an African NWFZ, African States will (a) enhance African security, (b) receive Negative Security
Assurances (NSA) from the five Nuclear Weapon States as they have given to the Parties to Tlatelolco. NSA was not
given in the NPT and there are still lingering questions about the adequacies of U.N. Security Council resolution
255 of 1968, and the Unilateral Declarations of security guarantees given by the five Nuclear Weapon States, (c)
ensure the application of the African NWFZ Treaty by any extra zonal States that control territories in the area
covered by the Treaty to all such territories.
4. Prospects for implementing the 1964 OAU Declaration
African characteristic is such that all nuclear power plants are in one State, South Africa, which is the only
State that has today the technical capability to make nuclear explosive devices; only four African States have
research reactors; no extra zonal States control territories in mainland Africa; since early 1960s no nuclear tests
have bveen conducted in Africa or contemplated by any Nuclear Weapon State. Therefore, the conditions are good
for the Nuclear Weapon States to agree to the nuclear tests ban in the zone and to respect the nuclear free status
of Africa.
As of today, almost all African States have acceded or ratified the NPT, thereby creating a de facto nuclear-weapon-free
zone in Africa. In this connection, we have just heard during this Seminar that Algeria has deposited its instrument
of ratification of the NPT. There are only four African States (out of the 54 OAU Member States) that have not
yet ratified the NPT (i.e. Angola, Djibouti, Comoros and Eritrea).
As noted earlier, the OAU Cairo Declaration was adopted in 1964. The delay in transforming the Declaration into
Treaty form was due to the shifting focus as well as African States' lack of strategy on how to capitalize on the
historic OAU 1964 Cairo Declaration, including their lack of strategy on how to determine the necessary and appropriate
procedures to define and implement such nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. Therefore, no concrete steps were
taken until 1990, when as a result of the dramatic changes that took place in the international and regional scenes,
it was felt that the time had come when Africa could pursue in a concrete manner the idea of the denuclearization
of the continent. In the African context, the first significant change was the fact that South Africa became a
party to the NPT and concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Other significant factors relate
to the political changes that have taken place in the Southern African sub-region, and in South Africa itself,
including the disclosure by President de Klerk of the existence and destruction of South Africa's nuclear explosive
devices, and subsequent verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
In addition to the above-mentioned positive developments relating to South Africa, a major step was taken in 1990
when the African States at the United Nations in New York met in a strategy meeting. As a result of that meeting,
a draft resolution sponsored by the African States was approved by the U.N.G.A. as U.N.G.A. resolution 45/56A of
December 4, 1990. It reads in part as follows: "Requests the U.N. Secretary General to provide all necessary
assistance that the Organization of Africa Unity may seek regarding the convening, at Addis Ababa during 1991,
of a meeting of Experts to examine the modalities and elements for the preparation and implementation of a convention
or treaty on the denuclearization of Africa." In accordance with that mandate, a Group of Experts was constituted
including experts from the various sub-regions of Africa, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations,
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), South Africa (was invited to join the Group from 1993 onwards). A representative
from the Treaty of Rarotonga and a representative from the Treaty of Tlatelolco were invited to join the Group
so that Africa could benefit from the experiences and operations of existing nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties.
Mandated by the OAU and U.N., the Group of Experts identified above prepared the draft texts of an African NWFZ
Treaty with the assistance of the U.N., OAU and IAEA secretariats. The Group of Experts had alredy held five meetings
(Addis Ababa in 1991, Lome in 1992, Harare in 1993, Windhoek and Addis Ababa in 1994).
The current draft text of an African NWFZ Treaty adopted in May 1994 by the Group of Experts was submitted and
discussed at the June 1994 OAU Summit in Tunis. There is a possibility that the final text of the Treaty will be
adopted by the OAU Summit in 1995. Therefore, the process that began in 1964 is at last on the way to fruition.
5. Preparatory work leading to the conclusion of the Treaty
At their Addis Ababa and Lome meetings in 1991 and 1992, the Group of Experts, having examined all the elements
that should form part of the Treaty, recommended that work should commence on its drafting.
By a joint decision of the OAU and the United Nations, the task of the actual drafting of an African NWFZ Treaty
began in Harare in April 1993 during the third meeting of the Group of Experts. At that meeting, the Experts made
substantial progress and were able to adopt a partially complete draft text of an African NWFZ Treaty. Just as
the Experts were preparing to go to the Harare Meeting, President de Klerk disclosed on March 24, 1993, that South
Africa had worked in the past on a limited number of nuclear explosive devices with six of the seven devices having
been completed. That disclosure did imply that the Treaty to be drafted should not only ensure that no new nuclear
weapons were introduced, but that those already developed by South Africa were destroyed together with the facilities
for their production. In the above-mentioned disclosure, President de Klerk assured Africa and the world that the
relevant facilities, equipment and materials have been subsequently dismantled, destroyed or converted to peaceful
uses. To its credit, South Africa is the first State to voluntarily dismantle its nuclear explosive device capability
and announce the precise details of why the programme was initiated and then terminated. Apparently South Africa's
accession to the NPT did nor require it to make an announcement about its prior nuclear operations, rather the
NPT looks forward to its future behaviour as a non-nuclear weapon State, which it announced that it was at the
time of accession to the NPT. The visits already made by IAEA Inspectors indicated that the Inspectors were convinced
that South Africa's fissile material production and the quantities that were produced have been accounted for.
The significance of this is that nuclear weapons cannot be made without fissile material and no amount of non nuclear
weapon components or design bleu-prints can enable a State to produce nuclear weapons if it does not have access
to such materials. There is no doubt that South Africa's nuclear transparency has created a climate conducive to
the establishment of a NWFZ in Africa. The Harare meeting was historic in that a representative of the South African
government was invited for the first time to participate in the meeting of the Group of Experts. For an African
NWFZ Treaty to be credible and effective, South Africa had to be a party to it. The first drafting session of the
Group of Experts in Harare marked a watershed in the evolving structure of African security based on transparency,
mutual confidence and cooperation. No more relevant and appropriate area could have been chosen than the nuclear
field for the negotiating contact between the Group of Experts and Experts from South Africa. The experience of
Harare showed how immensely beneficial it was that the conjuncture of circumstances has made it possible to have
the valuable contribution and viewponts from South Africa at this crucial stage of the denuclearization of Africa.
At its fourth and fifth meetings in Windhoek and Addis Ababa in March and May 1994 respectively, the Group of Experts
adopted the first complete draft text of an African NWFZ Treaty. At the request of the Group, representatives of
the five nuclear weapon States participated in a special meeting of the Group on 22nd March 1994 in Windhoek. The
meeting provided an opportunity for the Experts to ascertain the viewpoints of the nuclear weapon States regarding
the Protocols to the Treaty which are addressed to them.
By drafting the African NWFZ Treaty under "United Nations auspices", the OAU is in fact satisfying the
spirit of an element contained in the 1964 OAU Declaration, namely concluding an international treaty under United
Nations auspices not to manufacture or control nuclear weapons. In effect, the Declaration has chosen the goal
(i.e. Nuclear Weapon Free Africa) and the means (i.e. assistance of the United Nations). The preparation of the
Treaty has shown the crucial and important role of the United Nations, such as that played in connection with the
sessions of the UN/OAU Group of Experts (in Addis Ababa, Lome, Harare and Windhoek), as well as in encouraging
and attaining the desired goal of non-proliferation. In addition, all the sessions of the UN/PAU Group of Experts
have been financed by the UN General Assembly through the Regular Budget of the United Nations. The preparation
of the Treaty also reveals the longstanding and mutually beneficial cooperation between the United Nations, the
OAU and the IAEA in promoting the goals of non-proliferation.
By way of contrast, the treaties establishing the Latin American and South Pacific NWFZs were drawn up at conferences
of the prospective parties. The Tlatelolco Treaty and the Rarotonga Treaty conferences considered drafts prepared
mainly by Mexico and Australia respectively. The point of departure for the efforts to transform Latin America
into a nuclear-weapon-free zone was the April 1963 Declaration on Denuclearization of Latin America by five Latin
American Presidents (those of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico). The prospective parties later established
a Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, known as COPREDAL (acronym for Comisión
Preparatoria para la Desnuclearización de la América Latina), and instructed it to prepare a preliminary
draft treaty. On the other hand, the preparatory work for the Treaty of Rarotonga was carried out within the framework
of the South Pacific Forum, an organization comprising the independent States of the South Pacific region.
6. Analysis of an African NWFZ Treaty
Essentially, the African NWFZ Treaty will fulfil the function of preventing a nuclear arms race in the continent;
It will prevent the danger of exposure to atomic radiation; In addition to these non-proliferation and environmental
protection measures, the Treaty will explicitly promote African cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Thus the Treaty will represent an important contribution to the concept of a hollistic approach to African security.
The Treaty will prohibit the research on, development, testing, manufacture and storage of nuclear explosive devices.
The Treaty will prohibit the stationing of any nuclear explossive device in a State Party's territory.
The Treaty will prohibit the testing of nuclear explosive devices in the zones territory.
Parties to the Treaty will undertake not to dump and not to assist others in dumping radioactive materials in the
African NWFZ. This provision reflects the growing concern of the African States that their continent should not
be used a dumping site. To this end, the Parties will undertake to support effective implementation of and apply
measures equivalent to those contained in the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control
of Transboundary Movement and management of Hazardous Wastes.
In the light of the nuclear technology programmes of South Africa and certain other African countries, the Treaty
will have provision for the declaration of capability for manufacturing and stockpiling of nuclear explosive devices.
It will also have provision for dismantling and destruction of any nuclear explosive devices that might have been
manufactured prior to the coming into force of the Treaty, as well as destruction of production facilities.
The Treaty will have elaborate provisions on peaceful uses of nuclear energy not found in either the Treaty of
Tlatelolco or Rarotonga. The Parties will undertake to promote "individually and collectively" the use
of nuclear science and technology for economic and social development. Furthermore, the Parties will be encouraged
to make use of the programme of assistance available in IAEA and, in this connection, to strengthen cooperation
under the African Regional Cooperation Agreement for Research, Training and Development related to Nuclear Science
and Technology (AFRA).
For the purpose of ensuring compliance by Parties with their obligations under the Treaty, provision will be made
for the creation of a small body (Afican Commission on Nuclear Energy - AFCONE) that will be responsible for supervising
the implementation of the Treaty, i.e. to perform verification, management and promotional tasks. The body will
be composed of 12 members who will be elected in consideration of their expertise and with due regard given to
equitable geographical representation and advancement in the development of nuclear technology. After the entry
into force of the Treaty, the process of setting up the AFCONE will begin. For this purpose, a conference of all
Parties will be convened by the Depositary as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force to elect the
members of AFCONE and determine its headquarters. The AFCONE has a Bureau consisting of the chaimain, the vice-chairman
and the executive secretary. The executive secretariat consists of the executive secretary, who is the chief administrative
officer of AFCONE, and of such staff as AFCONE may require. The AFCONE (which is to some extent similar to OPANAL)
is responsible for the review of the operation of the Treaty and, in particular, for (a) collating the annual reports
to be submitted by each Party on all their nuclear activities, (b) encouraging regional programmes for cooperation
in the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology, promoting international cooperation with extra-zonal States
on this issue and receiving annual reports on the activities of AFRA, (c) Arranging consultations in respect of
the verification measures, (d) convening conference of Parties, (e) reviewing the application to peaceful nuclear
activities of safeguards by IAEA as elaborated in Annex II to the Treaty, (f) bringing into effect the complaints/verification
proceduure, (g) making sure that radioactive wastes are not dumped within the zone of application of the Treaty.
A basic assumption is that Parties to treaties will implement the provisions of those treaties in good faith. However,
as former President Reagan once said 'trust but verify'. The African NWTZ Treaty will have strict verification
measures designed to ensure that prohibited activities are not undertaken, as well as to ensure that peaceful uses
of nuclear energy are undertaken under IAEA safeguards. In this connection, the Parties undertake to conclude a
comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The verification role of the IAEA will be enhanced under the
Treaty. It is envisaged that the IAEA may be requested by the AFCONE to conduct special inspections. The AFCONE
may also designate its representatives to accompany IAEA's inspection team.
Africa has significant uranium reserves and there is a need to fit its producers into the system of transparency
and monitoring of uranium movements. The Treaty therefore bans the export of source or special fissionable material
for peaceful purposes to any Non-Nuclear Weapon State unless subject to a comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded
with the IAEA.
Each party undertakes not to take, or assist, or encourage any action aimed at an armed attack by conventional
or other means against nuclear installations in the African NWFZ.
The Treaty will request the Parties to maintain the highest standards of security and physical protection of nuclear
materials, facilities and equipment.
In Protocol I to the Treaty, the five Nuclear Weapon States will be asked not to use or threaten to use a nuclear
explosive devices against the Parties to the Treaty.
In Protocol II, the five Nuclear Weapon States will be asked not to test any nuclear explosive device within the
zone.
In Protocol III, extra-zonal States that are internationally responsible for territories within the zone will be
asked to apply the provisions of the Treaty in respect of such territories.
The treaty provides for the definition of the zone which includes the continent of Africa, Island States Members
of the OAU, and certain other adjoining islands.
The Treaty is open for signature by any State in the African NWFZ and will enter into force, following its ratification
by 28 regional States.
Concluding remarks
The history of the efforts to prepare an African NWFZ Treaty holds vital lessons for other regions or sub-regions
embarking on the extablishment of similar NWFZs, in particular the Middle East:
The NPT continues to provide an indisputable framework for the global non-proliferation efforts. As of today,
almost all African States have acceded or ratified the NPT, thereby reinforcing its objectives. Once the African
States have concluded their Treaty on a NWFZ in Africa, it will be a significant African contribution to the logic
of non-proliferation, and will contribute to a positive envirnoment for the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.
1995 has been used in the context of NPT Review and Extension Conference. But 1995 is also the 50th Anniversary
of the United Nations. The establishment of an African NWFZ in 1995 is increasingly being seen by African States
as an example of Africa's contribution to the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations.
* Biographic Note:
From 1979 to present time, he has actively followed the work of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) at Geneva.
He has been studying the problems of global arms regulation and disarmament including regional security since 1976,
followed disarmament negotiations and deliberations in Geneva and New York in different capacities. He was formally
an Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs.
Dr. Sola Ogunbamwo has university degrees in International Law and International Affairs [Doctor of Laws (International
Law) from Leyden University (Leyden, Netherlands), Master of Laws (Space Law) from McGill University (Montreal,
Canada)].
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