Implementation of Article III of the NPT
Dr. Prof. Jozef Goldblat *

International agreements—especially those dealing with arms control—are usually achieved through mutual, roughly equivalent concessions of the negotiating parties. However, in the case of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the concessions made by the parties were clearly asymmetrical: an overwhelming majority of states undertook to forgo the most destructive weapons yet invented, while tolerating possession of the same weapons by a handful of states for an undefined period of time. Despite this asymmetry, most non-nuclear-weapon adherents to the NPT see the Treaty as an instrument serving their national interests: the Treaty prevents other non-nuclear-weapon parties from acquiring nuclear weapons; fosters peaceful uses of nuclear energy; promotes nuclear trade under international control which impedes misuse of nuclear materials; and facilitates reductions of nuclear armaments by the nuclear-weapon-powers. Hence the record number of parties to the NPT. However, the mechanisms established to check compliance with the parties’ non-proliferation commitments suffer from certain shortcomings. The purpose of this paper is to point out these shortcomings and to suggest remedial measures which could reinforce the non-proliferation regime and secure its durability.

1. Verification

Verification of the NPT is performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The safeguards system applied by the IAEA consists of nuclear material accountancy, containment and surveillance to monitor the movements of nuclear material and equipment, and on-site inspection.

1.1 Functions of safeguards

The safeguards adopted by the IAEA before the conclusion of the NPT were to ensure - in accordance with the Agency’s Statute- that nuclear items obtained by non-nuclear-weapon states, with the help of the IAEA or under its supervision, were not used in such a way as to further any military purpose. However, the 1971 NPT Model Safeguards Agreement made an allowance for the withdrawal from international control of nuclear material destined for non-explosive military purposes. This has created a loophole: enriched uranium used for the propulsion of ships, especially submarines, is often the same as that used in nuclear weapons. Parties to the NPT should, therefore, consider returning to the original stated goal of the IAEA.

Precise time-limits are stipulated in the NPT for the initiation of negotiations for, and the entry into force of, safeguards agreements between non-nuclear-weapon parties and the IAEA. However, several dozen parties (over one-third of the total NPT membership) have not yet concluded the required agreement; most of them have not even started negotiations. In a few cases, when the relevant treaty provision had been ignored, suspicions arose that the basic non-proliferation obligations were being ignored as well. Thus, when North Korea, which is engaged in significant nuclear activities, refused, under varying pretexts, first to negotiate and later to agree to comprehensive controls over these activities, its refusal was interpreted by many as an attempt to conceal a nuclear weapon development programme. North Korea eventually concluded the required agreement, but doubts persist as to whether it had not taken advantage of the several years-long delay to extract a substantial amount of plutonium from the nuclear fuel irradiated in one of its reactors and hide it away for weapon purposes. There is no specific clause in the NPT to deal with such a situation. The parties could, nevertheless, decide to exert a concerted pressure on states which have not fulfilled the relevant Treaty obligation.

The NPT safeguards have been so designed as to enable the IAEA to detect timely the diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, as well as to deter diversion by the risk of early detection. “Significant quantity” has been defined as the amount of material that a state would need to make its first nuclear explosive device - namely, 8 kg of plutonium, or 25 kg of uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in uranium-235, or 8 kg of uranium-233. In the opinion of the US Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) experts, these thresholds, set years ago, should be considerably lowered. The proposed new values - 1 kg of plutonium or uranium-233 and 3 kg of high-enriched uranium- are based on the assumption that the proliferator is technologically sophisticated, but advanced methods of assembling a nuclear explosive device are now known to many.

As regards “timely” detection, the IAEA relates it to the estimated time that would be needed to convert diverted material into components of a nuclear explosive device. This time, which would vary according to the nature of the material, has been set at: 7-10 days for plutonium or high-enriched uranium in metallic form (the so-called “direct-use” material); 1-3 months for plutonium in spent reactor fuel; and about one year for natural or low-enriched uranium. Also in this case the thresholds should be lowered, because non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons could be prepared secretly in advance, so that the weapon itself would be completed almost instantaneously once the nuclear component became available. Considering that the growing stockpiles of readily accessible weapon-usable nuclear material - especially plutonium separated from nuclear power reactor fuel- are difficult to safeguard because of measurement uncertainties, more rigorous controls than those practiced hitherto are needed. The IAEA Statute requires that any excess of special fissionable materials over what is needed for peaceful purposes by member states be deposited with the Agency. Proposals for setting up an international plutonium storage or management system, in compliance with this provision, should be given urgent consideration.

Unlike the pre-NPT safeguards - which apply to both nuclear materials and facilities - the NPT safeguards apply only to nuclear materials. States may thus build or import facilities and equipment associated with nuclear materials without informing the IAEA. They must provide design information of the facilities to make subsequent application of safeguards easier, but they are obliged to do so only shortly before the material subject to safeguards is introduced into the facility. In 1992, the IAEA Board of Governors decided that parties to comprehensive safeguards agreements, those concluded under the NPT, should provide preliminary design information as soon as the decision to construct, to authorize construction or to modify a nuclear facility has been taken, and that further information must be given as the designs are developed. The IAEA Board decision remains to be implemented through a lengthy procedure of amending the subsidiary arrangements supplementing each state’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA. To further increase nuclear transparency, the IAEA Board recommended that all imports and exports of nuclear materials as well as equipment relevant to nuclear activity be reported on a voluntary basis to the IAEA. It would be useful to transform this recommendation into a formal obligation of the parties to the NPT.

1.2 Ad hoc and routine inspections.

Having verified, through ad hoc inspections, the information contained in the initial reports of the parties on nuclear material subject to safeguards, the IAEA proceeds to routine inspections. The latter are intended to check whether subsequent reports are consistent with the nuclear plant’s operating records; verify the location, identity, quantity and composition of all nuclear material subject to safeguards; and verify information on the possible causes of material unaccounted for, shipper/receiver differences and uncertainties in the book inventory. The frequency of these inspections is determined by the amount of nuclear material in a given facility.

IAEA routine inspections are normally confined to a limited number of so-called “strategic points” of the declared nuclear fuel cycle- that is, only those parts of the nuclear plant which are considered essential for safeguarding the flow of nuclear material. To prevent such cirumvention of the non-proliferation obligations, the inspectors should have access to the entire nuclear plant, and also be allowed to use enviromental monitoring technics. Moreover, the frequency of routine inspections should be determined by the amount of nuclear material in the country as a whole rather than the amount of material in a single facility.

1.3 Special inspections

Routine NPT inspections may be sufficient to verify that no weapon-usable material has been diverted from the declared peaceful nuclear programme. They are not likely detect a secret military programme and make sure that no undeclared sensitive nuclear facility is in place. This is why the NPT Model Safeguards Agreement provides for special inspections to be conducted by the IAEA when questions arise about the commitment of a party to the non-proliferation objectives of the NPT or about the safeguards coverage of nuclear fissionable material. An inspection is considered “special” when it is either additional to the routine inspection or involves access to information or locations in addition to the access specified in the Agreement for routine inspections.

Until recently, the IAEA had restricted its control activities to locations or facilities declared by the parties as containing safeguarded materials. Therefore, Iraq -party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty- was able to embark upon a substantial nuclear weapon programme in undeclared facilities often located in the vicinity of the regularly inspected objects. It could thwart the purpose of the Treaty without being hampered by IAEA controls.

According to the rules in force, only the IAEA - not parties to the NPT - may formally initiate visits to undeclared sites in countries suspected of non-compliance with the non-proliferation commitments. To initiate such special inspections, the IAEA must first detect suspicious activities, but it may be unable to do this unless it obtains relevant information from national intelligence agencies. Such information may or may not be provided and, if it is, it may be deliberately misleading or given only in exchange for some confidential data possessed by the IAEA, which would be inadmissible. Moreover, if the information upon which the IAEA request for special inspection is predicated comes only or mainly from one source, the IAEA risks becoming or being seen as an organization serving the interests of just one state or a group of states; this could undermine its integrity. The IAEA Secretariat must, of course, be in a position to identify instances in which the available information about a state’s nuclear activities appears inconsistent with its declaration, and keep the IAEA Board adequately informed. Nevertheless, formally asking for a special inspection - whatever the justification - is a challenge of a political nature. This would better be done by governments of states party to the NPT rather than an international technical agency. The state requesting a special inspection would have the right unilaterally to withdraw the request or agree to delaying its implementation. If, however, it is the IAEA that orders the inspection, any separate inspection arrangement agreed between the suspected party and any other party without prior explicit consent of the IAEA Board (as was the case with the 1994 agreement between the United States and North Korea) is bound to weaken the authority of the Agency.

To reduce the risks of abuse of the procedure suggested above, the IAEA Board should be entitled to decide that a special inspection requested by a party would not be carried out if the request appeared frivolous; a provision to this effect figures in the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. It could also be decided that the costs of the special inspection should be borne by the requesting party or parties, as was originally envisaged in the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco.

The Model NPT Safeguards Agreement implies the right of the suspected state not to agree to special inspections. No violator state would permit inspection of facilities in which it was conducting the prohibited activities. A refusal to permit inspection could therefore be treated, a priori, as a breach of the NPT, and not only as an act of non-compliance with the safeguards agreement. This does not mean that the IAEA should be given an absolute right to inspect at any time any place on the non-nuclear-weapon parties’ territory. (The situation in Iraq was exceptional, because the 1991 UN Security Council cease-fire resolution had given the Agency the authority to conduct an unrestricted country-wide search of illicit activities - an authority which under normal circumstances would be unacceptable to a sovereign state.) The suspected party might be allowed to restrict access to certain particularly sensitive sites, if it could provide a convincing proof that the reason for the restriction was legitimate. Even then, it would have to demonstrate, although by other means, that it remained in compliance with the assumed obligations.

The efficiency of safeguarding operations is also affected by the requirement to obtain consent of the inspected party to the designation of inspectors. Taking advantage of this requirement, many governments apply restrictions related to the nationality or linguistic qualifications of inspectors. Among other inconveniences, this practice has caused a waste of manpower, unnecessary expense and an unbalanced distribution of inspectors’ nationalities. The present limitations on the movements of inspectors must therefore be removed or at least alleviated, as has been repeatedly requested by the IAEA Secretariat. Following the example of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, a list of names, nationalities and ranks of the inspectors and their assistants should be agreed in advance. NPT parties would have to provide each inspector with visas as well as other documents - valid for several years - which may be necessary to carry out their duties.

1.4 Problems with full-scope safeguards

For many years, the NPT clause, which sets forth the safeguards requirement, had been applied in a way that led to an absurd situation: the non-nuclear-weapon parties to the NPT, those that have formally undertaken not to acquire nuclear weapons, were subject to safeguards covering all their nuclear activities, both current and future, whereas the nuclear activities of states refusing to join the NPT and keeping their nuclear weapon option open were controlled only partially. Safeguards applied to the latter category of states covered exclusively imported nuclear material and equipment to ensure their non-diversion to prohibited purposes. Consequently, a significant part of the nuclear fuel cycle of non-parties could remain unsafeguarded. Several countries concerned about the dangers of nuclear proliferation inherent in this unjustified distinction between foreign and indigenous technology had been seeking to impose on non-parties full-scope safeguards - as extensive as NPT-type safeguards - as a condition for nuclear trade. A few suppliers, however, in pursuit of their commercial interests, continued providing nuclear material and equipment to countries accepting safeguards only on imported items. They may have thereby contributed, consciously or unconsciously, to the recipients’ capabilities to produce nuclear weapons.

In April 1992, an international group of nuclear suppliers adopted a common export policy. They agreed that transfer to a non-nuclear-weapon state of nuclear facilities, equipment, components, material and technology, as specified in the so-called trigger list, should not be authorized, unless that state had brought into force an agreement with the IAEA requiring the application of safeguards on all source and special fissionable material in its current and future peaceful nuclear activities. This agreement was formally recorded in 1993, but not all exporters of nuclear items have subscribed to it. They must be urged to join.

2. Protection of nuclear material

2.1 Protection in international transport

A major step towards reducing the risks of diversion of nuclear material to non-peaceful purposes was made in 1980 with the signing of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. This Convention - in force since 1987 - obliges the parties to ensure that, during international transport across their territory or on ships or aircraft under their jurisdiction, nuclear material for peaceful purposes, as categorized in an annex, is protected at the agreed level. Thus, for example, trasportation of 2 kg or more of plutonium or of 5 kg or more of enriched uranium must take place under constant surveillance by escorts, and under conditions which assure close communications with “appropriate response forces”, as was the case with the 1992 shipment of plutonium from Europe to Japan.

Furthermore, the parties have undertaken not to export or import nuclear material or allow its transit through their territory, unless they have received assurances that this material will be protected during international transport in accordance with the levels of protection determined by the Convention. The parties have also agreed to share information on missing nuclear material to facilitate recovery operations. Robbery, embezzlement or extortion in relation to nuclear material, and acts without lawful authority involving nuclear material which cause or are likely to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to property, are to be treated as punishable offenses. Each party must inform the depositary of its laws and regulations giving effect to the Convention. So far, not all parties to the NPT have joined the Physical Protection Convention. The reasons for this abstention are not clear; protection of nuclear material forms part of the non-proliferation regime and should be of general interest.

2.2 Protection in domestic activities

Within states, the responsibility for physical protection of nuclear material and facilities rests with the governments of these states. However, such protection is a matter of worldwide concern. There is a need for international co-operation in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one state depends on measures taken by another state. The possibility exists that the theft of plutonium or high-enriched uranium would lead to the construction of an explosive device capable of causing mass destruction. Moreover, an act of sabotage against a nuclear facility - nuclear reactor, separate irradiated fuel storage site, reprocessing plant, fuel fabrication facility utilizing plutonium - or against a shipment of nuclear material within one country could create a radiological hazard to the populations of other countries. To deal with these problems, the IAEA has published recommendations as to what member states can do to establish national systems for the protection of nuclear facilities and of nuclear material in use, transit and storage, or to improve the quality and the effectiveness of the existing systems. These recommendations should be incorporated in a legally binding international instrument, and the IAEA should be given the responsibility to verify compliance.

There are no means to prevent nuclear weapons, especially nuclear warheads, from falling into the hands of sub-national political groups or foreign governments when law and order in a nuclear-weapon state break down. Full awareness of the danger of nuclear terrorism or an accidental nuclear explosion could speed up further substantial cuts in nuclear arsenals. The remaining weapons should be all fitted with a mechanism rendering their unauthorized use impossible.

2.3 The problem of smuggling

The disintegration of the Soviet Union brought about the loosening of nuclear export controls in the former Soviet republics. These circumstances have created conditions facilitating thefts and smuggling abroad of nuclear material from military or civilian plants. The smugglers first offered very small quantities of plutonium or low-enriched uranium, probably as samples for possible customers, but from mid-1994 the police of several European countries has intercepted substantial quantities of plutonium and weapon-usable uranium. (Other intercepted radioactive materials prove unfit for weapon purposes.) However, in none of the known cases the amount of the material confiscated would be enough for an industrially underdeveloped country to manufacture a nuclear explosive device. It is even less likely that a terrorist group would have the capability to use this material for constructing a bomb.

It is difficult to identify governments as potential buyers of nuclear weapon-usable material. Those aspiring for a nuclear weapon status would most probably try to acquire a weapon-producing potential rather than a limited amount of material for a weapon or two. A real black market of plutonium and high-enriched uranium does not, as yet, seem to exist. To prevent its emergence and the dangers it would entail, all parties to the NPT and the nuclear weapon-free zone treaties must see to it that illicit trafficking is not taking place. But mere police action - even on an international scale- may not suffice. Governments must reinforce the surveillance of nuclear facilities and render border controls more effective.The IAEA should assist in determining the physical and chemical characteristics of the confiscated smuggled nuclear materials and elaborate ways of determining their origin.

3. Nuclear Supplies

Many componentes of nuclear weapons are available in international commerce. There is, therefore, a need for ever stricter measures of control over nuclear supplies.

3.1 London Guidelines

In 1977, a group of nuclear suppliers forming the so-called London Club drew up a list of materials, equipment and technology which should “trigger” IAEA safeguards when exported for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear-weapon state. The London Guidelines for Nuclear transfers -as then agreed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and as revised in 1993- require the recipients of trigger-list items to provide effective physical protection of these items and to pledge not to use them for the manufacture of nuclear explosives. The safeguards requirements apply to any “replicated” facility - that is, of the same type as the imported facility but constructed indigenously within a specified period. Retransfers of trigger-list items are to be subject to the same conditions as those attached to the original transfer. In the event of diversion or violation of the supplier/recipient understandings, the members of the Group are to consult promptly on possible common action. Most importantly, restraint is recommended in the transfer of technologies sensitive in terms of proliferation, including uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities, as well as heavy water production plants. This restraint has been so far understood to mean no transfer, but to avoid other, more lenient interpretations, it would be advisable to transform it into an outright ban.

3.2 Warsaw Guidelines

The NPT requires safeguards on equipment which has been especially designed for nuclear purposes. Dual-use items - those that might be used for both nuclear and non-nuclear ends - are formally free from controls. This loophole was taken advantage of by several countries. Access to developed states’ technologies and commodities has facilitated the threshold states’ progress towards building their own nuclear weapons. Eventually, the discovery of the Iraqi clandestine nuclear weapon programme, which was based on imports for ostensibly non-nuclear purposes, prompted the Nuclear Suppliers Group, meeting in Warsaw in April 1992, to adopt the Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material and Related Technology. The Warsaw Guidelines became effective in January 1993. The items subject to controls are listed in an annex.

The suppliers undertook not to authorize nuclear-related dual-use transfers for use in a non-nuclear-weapon state in a nuclear explosive activity or an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity or, in general, when there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to such an activity, or when the transfers are contrary to the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Export licensing procedures for the transfer of items identified in the annex, which are to be adopted by the suppliers, should include enforcement measures for violations. In considering whether transfers should be authorized, the most important factor to be taken into account is whether the recipient state is party to the NPT, or to a similar international, legally binding nuclear non-proliferation agreement, and has an IAEA safeguards agreement in force applicable to all its peaceful nuclear activities. Before authorizing a transfer, the supplier should obtain a statement from the end-user specifying the uses and end-use locations of the projected transfer, as well as an assurance that the transfer or any replica thereof will not be used in any nuclear explosive activity or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity. In case of transfer to a non-adherent to the Guidelines, suppliers should obtain an assurance that their consent will be secured prior to any retransfer of the relevant items or replica thereof to a third country. Each supplier country may apply the Guidelines to other items of significance in addition to those specified in the annex. It may also apply other conditions for transfer in addition to those provided for in the Guidelines. Licenses which have been granted or refused are to be notified to other countries, and rejections must be binding on all partners for a period of three years.

All the above-specified measures remain to be adopted by those parties to the NPT which are not members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It would also be worthwhile to render the nuclear export legislations as uniform as possible, and to do it in such a way as not to hamper the legitimate industrial development of the Third World countries.

4. Compliance

4.1 Possible IAEA Action

As envisaged in the IAEA Statute, cases of non-compliance with nuclear safeguards agreements are to be reported to the UN Security Council and the General Assembly. If corrective action is not taken within a reasonable time, the IAEA Board of Governors may direct curtailment or suspension of assistance provided by the Agency or a member-state, and call for the return of materials and equipment made available to the transgressing member. A non-complying state may also be suspended from exercising the privileges and rights of IAEA membership. (The Chemical Weapons Convention envisages similar action.) Since no country enjoys the right of veto in the IAEA Board of Governors, adoption of decisions to apply such sanctions cannot be ruled out, but their strength and effectiveness are doubtful for the following reasons.

The IAEA provides very little direct assistance to states -and certainly not for their nuclear power programmes. As regards possible curtailment of assistance provided by states, such a decision may be adopted by the Board, but it is not as unambiguously mandatory under the IAEA Statute as are decisions of the UN Security Council. Even if all the deliveries of nuclear items were actually cut off to penalize the offending state, that state might not feel significantly disadvantaged in a world where no country is exclusively dependent on nuclear power and where nuclear supply exceeds demand. Withdrawal of materials and equipment already supplied is not a realistic measure, because it would require the voluntary co-operation of the state being penalized - which is unlikely. Moreover, return of nuclear supplies may be both exceedingly expensive and dangerous, and the supplier may be unwilling to take them back. Suspension of IAEA membership does not seem to be an effective measure either. In concrete terms, it would involve: withdrawing the right to receive Agency assistance which, as explained above, is not an important sanction; barring access to information possessed by the Agency, which is available to non-members as well; and exclusion from Agency meetings, which cannot be particularly hurtful. Expulsion from the Agency is not provided for. The weakness of the IAEA enforcement mechanism has been best illustrated by the case of North Korea which could disregard with impunity the call for a special inspection at installations suspected of containing evidence of unreported nuclear material.

4.2 Possible UN action

In 1992, to deter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the President of the UN Security Council stated, on behalf of its members, that such proliferation would constitute a “threat to international peace and security”, and that appropiate action would be taken to prevent it. However, this statement of the President of the Security Council has no binding legal effect. It should be converted into a formal decision of the Council to have such effect. The Council would then be entitled to take coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

5. Summary of proposals

5.1 Regarding verification

* Nuclear materials may not be used by non-nuclear-weapon states for any (including non-explosive) military purposes.
* Pressure should be exerted on those NPT parties that have not yet fulfilled their obligation to conclude a nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
* The IAEA-established thresholds determining the “significant quantity” of nuclear material must be lowered.
* The requirements for the “timely” detection of diversion of nuclear materials to the production of explosive devices must be reinforced.
* An international plutonium storage or management system must be set up in compliance with relevant provision of the IAEA Statute.
* The IAEA Board decision to improve the provision by states of design information regarding nuclear facilities must be implemented.
* Reporting all imports and exports of nuclear material and relevant equipment, as recommended by the IAEA, must become a formal obligation.
* To increase the transparency of nuclear activities, entire nuclear plants, not only the “strategic points” of the declared nuclear fuel cycle, should be subject to routine inspections. The frequency of these inspections must be related to the amount of nuclear material in the country as a whole rather than a single facility.
* Requests for special inspections of undeclared facilities ought to be made by parties to the NPT rather than the IAEA. The Agency should be responsible only for the implementation of the requests.
* Existing limitations on the movements of inspectors must be removed or at least alleviated.
* All exporters of nuclear items must require the application of full-scope nuclear safeguards in the importing countries.

The 1971 NPT Model Safeguards Agreement has become obsolete; it cannot be satisfactorily mended by ad hoc decisions or understandings regarding administrative or technical innovations. The Agreement is not an integral part of the NPT but only an arrangement through which the obligations of the parties are being implemented. It can, therefore, be renegotiated without tampering with the language of the Treaty. The need for a new document, which would make safeguards more effective without excessive additional costs, could be recorded in the final declaration of the 1995 Review/Extension Conference. The safeguards which are now in force would remain valid until a new agreement is reached.

5.2 Regarding protection of nuclear material

* All parties to the NPT should join the 1980 Physical Protection Convention concerning nuclear material in international transit.
* IAEA recommendations concerning protection of nuclear material in domestic activities should be incorporated in an international treaty.
* All nuclear weapons should be fitted with a mechanism rendering their unauthorized use impossible.
* To prevent the smuggling of nuclear material, surveillance of nuclear facilities must be reinforced and border controls rendered more effective.

5.3 Regarding nuclear supplies

* Both present and potential nuclear suppliers should join the Nuclear Suppliers Group and abide by the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (the London Guidelines) as well as the Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material and Related Technology (the Warsaw Guidelines).
* Transfer of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities, as well as heavy water production plants, should be unconditionally prohibited.
* States’ nuclear export legislations should be made, as far as possible, uniform, without hampering the legitimate industrial development ot the Third World countries.

5.4 Regarding compliance

* Refusal to permit inspection must be treated, a priori, as a breach of the NPT, not only of the safeguards agreement.
* UN Security Council should transform the 1992 statement of its President into a formal decision to treat proliferation of nuclear weapons as a threat to international peace and security.

* Biographic Note

Jozef Goldblat has university degrees in international relations, law, economics and linguistics. He has been studying the problems of arms control since the 1950s, and has been involved in disarmament negotiations in Geneva and New York in different capacities, including service for the United Nations.

From 1969 to 1989 he directed the arms control and disarmament programme of studies at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). In 1980 he assisted the UN Secretary-General in preparing a report on a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

In 1984 he received the Pomerance Award in recognition of his scholarship in the field of arms control and disarmament.

Since 1989 he is Senior Lecturer and Research Fellow, Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies at the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies.