International Seminar on Disarmament
Lima, Perú
Dec-1999
SHORING UP COMMITMENT TO THE NON
PROLIFERATION TREATY BEFORE AND AFTER
THE 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE
Dr. Tariq Rauf,
Director, International Organizations & Nonproliferation Project
MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Introduction: Setting the Context
The Sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
will take place at the United Nations from 24 April to 19 May 2000. This will not only be the first multilateral
arms control conference of the new millennium but will also be the first of the strengthened review process agreed
at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC).
The NPT initiated the concept of regular periodic reviews but three of the five previous review conferences in
1980, 1990 and 1995Bfailed to produce final declarations assessing the implementation of the Treaty in the previous
five years and setting out general guidelines for the following quinquennial. The common reason for controversy
and failure at each of these events was bitter disagreement over the nature and pace of nuclear disarmament, in
fulfilment of Article VI of the NPT. The slow and uneven pace of progress regarding the implementation of Article
VI commitments has generated wide-ranging and deep-seated dissatisfaction among the preponderant majority of non-nuclear
weapon states (NNWS). Other factors contributing to this sense of mounting frustration include the failure of the
international system to persuade India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as NNWS; a slow-down in the
sharing of nuclear power generation technology between the technology holders and recipients, and the imposition
of ever stricter national and multilateral non-treaty based export controls in addition to NPT safeguards; and
an increasing sense of the ephemeral nature of the promises and commitments made in 1995 regarding progress in
nuclear disarmament, enhanced technology access, greater accountability by the nuclear-weapon states (NWS), and
a qualitatively strengthened review process to promote the full implementation of the Treaty.
Three sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 review conference held in 1997, 1998 and 1999Bmanaged
to agree only on procedure but not on substance, thus conveying a sense of failure regarding the implementation
of a strengthened review process. The 2000 Review Conference will open without the fulfilment of the programme
of action regarding the full realization and effective implementation of Article VI, agreed as part of the principles
and objectives at the 1995 NPTREC comprising (a) the completion of a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
by 1996 and utmost restraint in the meantime by the NWS; (b) negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally
applicable ban on the production of weapon-usable fissile material (FMCT); and ( c) determined pursuit by the NWS
of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of their elimination.
Within hours of the ending of the 1995 NPTREC, China had resumed nuclear testing and was followed in this activity
by France. However, testing moratoria came into play as negotiations continued in Geneva leading to a CTBT which
was opened for signature on 24 September 1996. But to date only France and the United Kingdom among the NWS have
ratified that Treaty. In a slap to the world community and with wanton disregard for NPT disarmament obligations,
in mid-October the United States Senate refused to ratify the CTBT. No progress has been made at the Conference
on Disarmament on starting negotiations on a FMCT. No new nuclear disarmament treaty has been signed since January
1993. And, while four of the five NWS, except for China, have continued with nuclear weapon dismantlements, the
pace has slowed down START II still remains to be implemented, the entire START process in under threat from unilateral
US plans to deploy anti-missile defences in violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, a new nuclear
real politik has been put in place expanding the missions of nuclear weapons, among other inauspicious developments.
Furthermore, another part of the integral package that made indefinite extension possible the Resolution on the
Middle East has also marked time since 1995, and one of its principal co-sponsors has given clear indications of
its waning commitment.
Other negative developments concern lack of final resolution of two instances of non-compliance Iraq and DPRK.
The UN Special Commission on Iraq was not only severely hampered by Baghdad but also subverted from within by the
intelligence agencies of the United States, among other factors. Regarding restoration of DPRK=s compliance with
NPT safeguards and resolution of outstanding inspections, the US-DPRK agreed Framework has sputtered along with
obstacles created by both sides.
External challenges come principally from the nuclear weapon tests initiated by India and then matched by Pakistan,
which seem to have been accepted by the NWS, and tacit recognition bestowed through dialogue on nuclear weapon
issues and continuation of peaceful nuclear cooperation. These developments have led some in thus far staunch NNWS
to re-consider, at least rhetorically, their continuing commitment to the NPT. Poorly conceived and badly executed
actions such as the expansion of NATO, offensive military actions by NATO in the Balkans without specific UN authorization,
non-compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention by the U.S. and Russia and by the latter with the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention, the highly emotive and politically charged spectre of terrorism with mass destruction
weapons, exaggerated threats from regional ballistic missiles, development and use of advanced conventional munitions,
proliferation of conventional arms by the principal producers, unilateral use of force, etc. have all conspired
to cast a pall over the prospects for the 2000 Review Conference and the future of arms control as well as hopes
of a post-Cold War wind down of the military-industrial infrastructure. (In fact, arms exports continue to play
a major role in the domestic economies and polities of many of the principal advanced industrial states. Ironically,
these events tend to provide incentives for further proliferation.)
The fractious nature of the debates on (lack of) progress in nuclear disarmament at the PrepCom sessions, in the
Conference on Disarmament and at the First Committee, together with setbacks to the CTBT ratification and entry-into-force
process, discord in US-Russia and US-China relations, US missile defense plans, and NWS obstructionism regarding
the implementation of the strengthened review process, indicate an inauspicious environment for a successful outcome
at the next review conference. In light of these negative developments, apparently fearing failure, South Africa
has withdrawn from the presidency of the 2000 review conferenceCan unprecedented move, as never before has a country
bailed out as conference president. Thus, the conference has already been orphaned, making it ever more important
to have leadership from key NNWS and flexibility on the part of the NWS, in order to salvage some modest success.
Given these developments described in summary form, the next 18-24 months will not bring major relief to an already
strained NPT and other arms control regimes. Presidential elections in the United States and Russian Federation
in 2000 have already ushered in a silly season as far as arms control is concerned. Domestically-focused, militaristically-oriented
rogue elements in the Congress and the Duma have hijacked arms control agendas. And multilateral arms control fora
continue to languish generating additional new linkages, e.g. FMCT to nuclear disarmament to preventing weapons
in space to security assurances.
National Security Interest
In general sovereign States join multilateral security regimes primarily out of narrow self interest not altruism.
Furthermore, the preponderant majority of States take their regime commitments seriously and in many instances
are prepared to continue to accept such commitments even when regime performance might be sub-optimal, provided
they reach the determination that the overall benefits of regime maintenance outweigh the disadvantages of withdrawal
or of regime collapse. However, if it is perceived that security regimes are not yielding expected or promised
results, and if some countries are perceived as being in chronic deficit regarding fulfillment of their obligations,
then it is inevitable that continuing commitment to such regimes is bound to falter or at least come under question.
I fear that the NPT may indeed have reached such a critical juncture.
NPT Bargain
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains a three-part bargain nuclear non-proliferation,
nuclear disarmament, and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under safeguards with each part retaining
equal importance. Controversy reigns over whether nuclear non-proliferation is a necessary and sufficient condition
for nuclear disarmament, or vice versa. Suffice it to note that the NPT itself does not refer to any pre-conditions
for either nuclear non-proliferation or for nuclear disarmament. Each of these goals can be pursued either separately
or in tandem with each other.
NPT Regime
Nuclear Non-Proliferation: For nearly three decades the NPT regime has survived despite its precarious existence.
On the non-proliferation side, the regime has been an unqualified success, attracting 182 NNWS as members and only
two of these parties has elected to violate the letter and spirit of the Treaty. These two instances of non-compliance
were detected in 1991 (Iraq) and 1994 (DPRK), respectively. Only one NPT State party DPRK has ever gone to the
extent of giving notice of withdrawal from the NPT (under Article X.1), but it eventually suspended the notice
on the 89th day of the 90-day advance notice period this situation continues to this day.
Failures on the non-proliferation side of the ledger include the lack of universality of the Treaty i.e. its inability,
thus far, to capture Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan as members. As three of these non-NPT states India, Israel,
and Pakistan have conducted nuclear test explosions, and because these countries are located in two areas of conflict
and tension, it has not been possible to convince these countries to accede to the NPT as NNWS the only possible
avenue open to them.
The so-called champions of nuclear non-proliferation do not have clean hands or consistent non-proliferation policies
with respect to these three proliferator states one country (Pakistan) has been disproportionately sanctioned,
another (India) minimally sanctioned or tolerated, and the third (Israel) not only tolerated, not sanctioned, but
actually rewarded with technological and economic largesse.
Another source of dissatisfaction and concern has been and remains an element of the activities of one of the NWS
i.e. stationing nuclear weapons outside national territory on the territorial space of allied NNWS, and so-called
nuclear sharing and training involving NNWS party to the NPT. While the NPT does not explicitly ban such activity,
Article I of the Treaty does stipulate that each nuclear-weapon State Party undertakes not to transfer to any recipient
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosives directly,
or indirectly... [emphasis added]. Such nuclear sharing activity is nevertheless perceived as being inimical to
the non-proliferation principle embedded in the NPT, as such arrangements involve NNWS handling and delivering
to target nuclear weapons during crises or in war-time. The NPT itself does not include any provision stating that
the Treaty would cease to remain in force during crises, wars or other forms of conflict other than the normal
withdrawal clause based on extraordinary events, related to the substance of this Treaty (Article X.1).
Nuclear Disarmament: As regards, nuclear disarmament the record has been decidedly mixed and subject to unending
controversy and differing interpretations. The NPT nuclear-weapon states (NWS) maintain that they have succeeded
in ending the nuclear arms race and are engaged in a systematic, phased, process of nuclear disarmament both bilaterally
(between the United States and the Russian Federation) and unilaterally (France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom
and United States).
On the other hand many NNWS argue that the NWS engaged in vertical proliferation and rather than ending the nuclear
arms race actually speeded it up during the first two decades since the Treaty entered into force, that the NWS
to this day continue to thwart any attempt in all multilateral fora (be it the NPT review process, the Conference
on Disarmament, the First Committee, Disarmament Commission or Special Sessions on Disarmament) to engage in multilateral
negotiation of measures on nuclear disarmament). They add, furthermore, that in accordance with the (1996) advisory
opinion of the International Court of Justice, the NWS have an obligation not only to negotiate in good faith but
also to reach a conclusion to such negotiations on nuclear disarmament. This debate has tended to focus on the
merits of a step-by-step phased approach to nuclear disarmament versus a steady process within a time-bound framework.
Recently, a new agenda has been outlined describing the steps and measures that could be agreed to achieve nuclear
disarmament.
In neither the United States nor in the Russian Federation is there evident any official interest in paying more
than lip service to the NPT=s nuclear disarmament obligations. Since the 1995 NPTREC, rogue elements in the US
Congress and the Russian Duma have opposed further nuclear arms reductions, sought to reverse previously agreed
arms control measures, pursued achievement of absolute comprehensive security irrespective of its non-proliferation
or arms race implications, and devalued multilateral approaches to security. The defeat of the CTBT on the floor
of the US Senate, and advancement of plans to either abrogate or violate the ABM Treaty in deploying missile defences,
are the most recent manifestation of this phenomenon.
What is clear however is that none of the NPT NWS is willing to contemplate a defence posture that is not based
on a reliance on nuclear weapons, and neither is any of them willing to consider a future security architecture
based on minimal overall numbers of nuclear weapons.
Sharing of Civilian Nuclear Technology: Cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under appropriate safeguards
has both flourished and floundered. Multilateral and national export controls have been perceived as hampering
the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy.
The Zangger Committee interpreted the requirements of Article III.2 and devised a trigger list of nuclear items
requiring safeguards. Over time this trigger list has gone through seven phases of refinement and further development
to cope with technological advances in the field of nuclear energy. The proliferation activities of a non-NPT state
the so-called peaceful nuclear explosion conducted by India in 1974Bled to the creation of an exporters cartel,
the Nuclear Suppliers Group or London Club, which also devised a trigger list that covered not only nuclear but
also dual-use items, and included NPT non-parties that were also nuclear suppliers (i.e. France).
The clandestine, parallel and illegal, nuclear weapon programme of Iraq discovered and eliminated in 1991 led to
a further strengthening of both safeguards and export controls. The discovery of DPRK=s unreported and unaccounted
for plutonium separation campaigns further poisoned the well of nuclear cooperation. For a number of years now,
a principle of presumption of denial has operated regarding transfers of nuclear items to countries not members
of the two nuclear export control arrangements, or which do not have full-scope safeguards.
Furthermore, some unilateral policies and actions serve to undermine multilateral arrangements. This politicization
of nuclear exports and export control arrangements is increasingly perceived by many developing NNWS as further
undermining multilateral arrangements and agreements (e.g. paragraphs 9, and 14 through 17 of the decision on principles
and objectives adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC).
Weakening Commitment to the NPT
The shortcomings and faults of the applied NPT regime together with discriminatory policies of key players in the
nuclear non-proliferation arena have contributed to the rise of a multiplicity of frustrations, irritations, opposition,
dissatisfaction, and unhappiness among a cross-section of NNWS.
In a growing number of NPT NNWS, in different parts of the world, there is an increasing questioning about the
security benefits conferred or accrued through membership of the NPT. What is problematic for supporters of the
NPT is that practically every dissatisfied NPT NNWS has different or unique motivations governing its decision
matrices. Which, in turn, makes it even more difficult to suggest palliative or ameliorative measures, common to
most (or all) members of the NPT. It is important to note that these problems are not easily amenable to routine,
simple or symbolic solutions what is required is a fundamental re-examination of the security benefits of the NPT
regime for states (both NWS and NNWS) and for these states to place global regime interests over narrowly defined
national or domestic interests. The leadership from the NWS required for such action is not visible, and any leadership
from the NNWS is routinely squashed by the NWS.
The list of countries harbouring grievances at one level or another regarding the NPT=s implementation is long
and extensive, however, the following notation includes (in no particular order) countries which might have reached
a critical level of dissatisfaction that could influence their decisions on whether or not to retain their full
and unequivocal commitment to the NPT:
Reasons for dissatisfaction:
¤lack of universality: Egypt and League of Arab States; Japan.
¤ inadequate level of nuclear disarmament: Mexico, Malaysia,
Indonesia.
¤ inadequate level of peaceful nuclear cooperation: Iran.
¤ nuclear proliferation by India and Pakistan: Iran, Japan.
¤ frustration regarding UN and/or US (and/or NATO) actions:
Iraq, FRY.
¤ PR Chinas reactive nuclear modernization/expansion (responding
to deployed US missile defences): Taiwan (China); Japan.
¤ lack of interest in regime, financial costs of IAEA membership:
some African states.
¤ collapse of Agreed Framework, external pressure, etc: DPRK.
¤ reaction to DPRK activities: RoK.
¤ walk-out under malicious influence: pressure from India: Bhutan,
Maldives, Nepal.
Motivations for Dissatisfaction with the NPT
Lack of universality: 1) Middle East since the 1995 NPTREC, all states in the region except for Israel have acceded
to the NPT. Only one state in the region Iraq was in non-compliance with the Treaty. Prior to the collapse of UNSCOM
inspections, the IAEA had eliminated the components of the Iraqi clandestine nuclear weapon acquisition programme
and only lacked detailed answers to some five questions regarding suppliers, personnel, etc. While continuity of
knowledge about Iraq=s nuclear activities has been lost for over a year, the credibility of intelligence reports
about a reconstitution of the nuclear weapon programme lack credibility. The Middle East Peace Process has suffered
setbacks since 1995 and may only now be recovering some momentum. While Israel agreed under US pressure not to
object to negotiations on a FMCT at the CD, there are compelling reasons to believe that it will not accept such
a negotiation to include existing stocks of weapon-usable fissile material. And it continues to oppose accession
to the NPT. The League of Arab States, with Egypt=s leadership, has long focused on Israel=s nuclear capabilities
in NPT fora. Prior to the 1995 NPTREC, Egypt publicly questioned the wisdom of its commitment to the NPT, if Israel
remained outside. At the 1995 NPTREC the Arab League was not prepared to support indefinite extension of the Treaty
without some commitments on Israel. Thus, through the mechanism of the ME Resolution the text of which was cleared
by both Washington and Tel Aviv the Arab League did not stand in the way of indefinite extension. Since then, Egypt
and other Arab states in Africa have also signed on to the Pelindaba Treaty, the NWS have signed its protocol on
security assurances, but the African NWFZ still remains to enter into force. The ME Resolution has been the focus
of heated debate at all three sessions of the PrepCom indeed the 1998 PrepCom collapsed due to US objections to
compromise language (coordinated by Canada), and the 1999 PrepCom witnessed intense debate until its final hours
when Egypt conceded not wanting to be blamed for the failure of the last PrepCom. There seem to be murmurings out
of Cairo regarding the value of the NPT. On the other hand, the US has preferred to play a high stakes game, believing
the Egypt was only bluffing and its salient posture on the matter had more to do with preserving its failing leadership
in the Arab League and with domestic considerations, than with real dissatisfaction with the NPT.
¤ While Egypt will continue to play hardball with the ME Resolution,
it will not withdraw from the NPT either before or after the 2000 RevConf. But might it give notice of re-examining
the benefits of the NPT if the United States does not bring pressure on Israel on the nuclear issue?
2) The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, and the tepid response of the international community together with
seeming tacit recognition by some of the NWS, has particularly perturbed several advanced industrial NNWS. In particular,
Japan which of late has marginally raised its previously non-existent profile on nuclear disarmament has begun
to question whether it should remain within the fold of the NPT. It might be recalled that Japan was late in ratifying
the NPT and concluding IAEA safeguards, it was also late in supporting indefinite extension in 1995. In the past
various political figures have raised the issue of nuclear weapons for Japan, but such calls were quickly stifled.
In the aftermath of May 1998, however, responsible officials have also begun to question the utility of the NPT.
Recently declassified documents have revealed that the US deployed nuclear weapons (minus cores) on Japanese territory
at least from 1954 to 1965, and that nuclear-armed ships and submarines berthed in Japanese ports all this despite
Japan=s three non-nuclear principles. The complicity of the Japanese government regarding such deployments and
visits may have some effect on public opinion. In mid-October, a vice-minister of defence called for an open debate
on nuclear weapons, and was forced to resign. Given developments in the Korean Peninsula, and in mainland China
and in Taiwan (China), together with perceptions of the acceptance of two new nuclear weapon states and stalemate
in nuclear disarmament, it is possible that the voices in favour of nuclear weapons might become louder and be
heard. On the other hand, anti-nuclear sentiments run deep in Japan, and nuclear accidents at two sites might yet
dampen such aspirations.
¤ Since Japan has the wherewithal for producing nuclear weapons,
only a political decision stands in the way. A resurgent Japan that can say no to the United States on a variety
of issues, may indeed reconsider its NPT obligations if new NWS are recognized, or if the NWS start a new arms
race. However, this would be a factor in the 2000-2005 time frame.
Lack of progress in nuclear disarmament: Mexico has historically been in the vanguard of NNWS pushing for nuclear
disarmament in NPT for a the 1990 Review Conference collapsed when the United States refused to accept Mexican
sponsored compromise language favouring a CTBT. Within the non-aligned movement (NAM), Indonesia and Malaysia have
been salient on this matter. Recently, a senior Mexican official bluntly asserted that his country could not indefinitely
accept an NPT if that meant that the NWS retained their weapons permanently. He added that Mexico could jettison
the NPT but still remain true to its non-proliferation credentials within the framework of the Tlatelolco Treaty.
¤ Nuclear disarmament has been one issue where Mexico has remained
persistent and consistent in its efforts it would be a grave mistake to continue to take Mexico for granted.
At the First Committee last month, Malaysia warned that the cavalier attitude of the NWS towards nuclear disarmament
made a mockery of NNWS commitment to non-proliferation and could raise doubts about the usefulness of the NPT.
¤ Given a decline in their relative influence with the emergence
of South Africa within the NAM, Indonesia and Malaysia might seek to be more assertive on disarmament matters and
like Mexico could think about reducing their commitment to the NPT as they would still remain members of SEANWFZ
(which has already entered into force).
¤ With the dismantling of the South African nuclear weapon programme
and its accession to the NPT, the raison d'être from many small African states to support the NPT vanished
many of these states do not participate in NPT fora and could consider departing from the Treaty for reasons of
disinterest or cost.
Reaction to NATO intervention: At a certain historical point in time, the nuclear programme in Yugoslavia had a
weapons orientation. The nuclear reactor at Vinca has some significant quantities (SQ) of fissile material of an
isotopic composition of potential relevance to a weapon programme. While the IAEA recently verified the presence
of the material, a defeated and humiliated FR Yugoslavia might have all the motivations to react to NATO intervention
by trying to reinvigorate an interest in nuclear weapons.
Walkout under Indian pressure: The Hindu nationalist (BJP) governments primary motivation for declaring India a
NWS was for international recognition as a power to be reckoned with. At NPT fora, while India unlike Pakistan
has never participated as an observer, it nevertheless has pursued its interest through proxies such as Bhutan,
Nepal and Maldives, which are all dependent upon India in one way or another. At the 1999 PrepCom, two of these
proxies objected to references critical of Indias nuclear tests. It cannot be ruled out that as a way of signalling
its new found power and damaging the hated NPT regime, and to gain leverage on nuclear weapon matters, India might
influence its proxies to consider leaving the Treaty or putting their membership in abeyance?
Salvaging the 2000 NPT Review Conference
In the four and a half years that have elapsed since the indefinite extension, and as states finalize preparations
for the next NPT review conference in 2000, differences are already rife over the meaning and interpretation of
the NPTREC decisions and on their implementation that have already cast a cloud over the new Treaty review process,
even before it gets underway. This was amply evident at the 1999, 1998 and 1997 sessions of the Preparatory Committee
(PrepCom), which were unable to reach any consensus on nuclear disarmament matters or on substantive recommendations
to the review conference (as called for at the 1995 NPTREC).
The failure of the 1999, 1998 and 1997 sessions of the NPT PrepCom to agree on recommendations dealing with substantive
matters, has reduced the scope of the strengthened review process. For the NWS, a strengthened review has come
to mean only a discussion of substance and drafting of recommendations to the 2000 NPT Review Conference, without
States Parties necessarily addressing issues of substance, or identifying agreed priorities for the implementation
of the Treaty and the NPTREC decisions, or even expressing views on current matters of importance to the Treaty.
What might be done to complete the preparations for the 2000 review conference, with a view to salvaging some vestiges
of a strengthened review? The only practical way forward seems to be that based on innovative yet practical initiatives
i.e. devising qualitatively new modalities to promote the review and implementation of the Treaty, in accordance
with the NPTREC decisions and resolution. These could include revitalized Presidents Consultations, issue-based
coalitions, revised review structure, and productive outcomes.
Presidents Consultations
Traditionally, Review Conference presidents have relied on consultation with a select, but geographically and politically
representative group of countries, informally referred to as Friends of the Chair. Such groups, which are necessarily
kept small in membership, are organized to assist in identifying and building consensus.
At the 1995 NPTREC, Ambassador Dhanapala pulled together Presidents Consultations involving 25 of the principal
players, that were instrumental in crafting the language for the package of extension decisions. The President
with the administrative help of the Secretariat played an important role in nudging and nurturing the Consultations
to reach consensus. He relied on the device of consultations to hammer out the details of the package of decisions
and resolutions that made indefinite extension possible. In choosing the participants to the Consultations, the
President was mindful to select a geographically and politically representative group, which also included the
leaders of the traditional political groupings.
In 1997, Ambassador Pasi Patokallio also convened an informal Chairmans consultations to which he invited some
22 states representing both a geographic and a political mix. At the 1997 PrepCom, the principal bargaining on
the structured and balanced review of the Treaty, and on the structure of the report and recommendations of the
PrepCom, all took place within the Chairman=s consultations. The draft of the Chairmans Working Paper was also
put together in such Consultations, which in general benefitted from the good will of States as none was interested
in making the first PrepCom of the strengthened review process a failure.
Ambassador Eugeniuz Wyzner convened an informal Chairmans consultations, at the 1998 PrepCom, to which he invited
some 23 states representing both a geographic and a political mix. However, this forum was supplemented by walk-ins
(about 10) and failed to serve its purpose as it became divisive and argumentative . These Consultations were unable
to resolve the deep differences that had appeared during the negotiations on the updating of the Chairmans Working
Paper. As good will and cooperative tendencies between various States and groups had been strained due to the argumentative
nature of the Consultations, and the perceived uncooperative behaviour of the NWS, the President=s Consultations
could not succeed in turning a sow=s ear into a silk purse.
In 1999, Ambassador Camilo Reyes engaged in careful advance preparations and consulted with many different delegations.
In a unique, and smart move, prior to the opening of the PrepCom he apparently got key states to give him their
bottom line positions. During the PrepCom itself he continued his practice of consultations with a number of individual
countries as well as the Bureau. In the end, despite grand standing by some delegations, he was able to hold them
to their earlier commitments and was successful in salvaging the PrepCom to at least agree on a procedural report
with recommendations on the outcomes of the review conference. At the final session, despite deep divisions on
substantive matters and the opposition of the NWS to accept anything except congratulatory language on nuclear
disarmament, States nonetheless wanted the PrepCom to succeed in at least completing the procedural arrangements.
In a break from previous practice, Ambassador Reyes after extensive consultations behind the scenes, held all negotiating/deliberative
sessions with the involvement of States present. He wisely withstood strong pressure from several states to retire
to a small room and start negotiation on the substantive recommendations.
While, on the one hand, the advantage of the mechanism of Presidents Consultations is that it is easier to reach
agreement among a small regionally and politically representative group; on the other hand, the vast majority of
states are shut out of the process. Such a process could work better if all of the group chairs would regularly
consult with their respective membership and keep it well informed.
At the 2000 Review Conference, given its heavy workload and expectations, it would be useful for the President
to convene Consultations involving the participation of some 25 States based on their track record of contributions
to the intellectual capital of NPT reviews, as well as geographic representation. In order to keep other delegations
informed and engaged, it would be useful for the President to hold periodic information sessions involving all
States present. It is likely that Main Committees II and III would be able to agree on reports, but not Main Committee
I. As such, the Presidents Consultations likely will have to bear the burden of drafting not only a new principles
and objectives, possibly an interpretation of the strengthened review process, but also pull together the report
of Main Committee I and the Final Declaration. However, not all of this work need be reserved for the President=s
Consultations, subsidiary bodies could be set up to produce drafts on certain issues that could then form a part
of the documents or outcomes of the Review Conference.
All this suggests that smaller delegations will necessarily be handicapped, as probably would even some of the
larger delegations. But then not all delegations necessarily need to be present or contribute to all aspects of
the deliberations. Many States have traditionally championed single issues or a few issues as such, these States
could still make their contributions in the appropriate areas.
Issue-Based Coalitions
Even though the Cold War has ended and the old ideological divisions have been transformed for the most part, on
international security issues the traditional regional groupings persist, despite their not being reflective of
the current status of the international community. It can be said that all three regional groupings are facing
internal stresses and strains. The Western group no longer represents a homogenous viewpoint, and within it a sub-group
the European Union has emerged as a force with its own interests. It has become difficult to engage the EU, as
its members are not keen to discuss substantive issues in depth prior to a common EU position being agreed; and
after such a position is agreed, EU members feel obligated not to deviate from it. But sometimes, frustration seeps
through when some EU members also make national statements, which routinely pay lip service to supporting the common
EU statement but then go on to make clear national priorities and preferences that the rest of the EU ignored.
Thus, the EU is being perceived as somewhat of a problem group this situation will only worsen with the realization
of the ESDI. Some non-nuclear-weapon states within the Western group, contrary to the preferences of their nuclear-weapon
states allies and other friends, favour not only continuing but achieving greater progress in nuclear disarmament.
A good example of this was at last year=s vote on the New Agenda Resolution, where despite the clear opposition
by the Alliance leader, 12 NATO states abstained rather than opposing the resolution.
The Eastern group rarely meets and it suffers from serious internal contradictions apparent to all. Furthermore,
given tensions between Russia and Ukraine, the Group in the past has faced difficulty in arranging meetings or
agreeing to a common position. And with Russia=s loss of influence and perceived common interest with the US, its
credibility within and outside the group has declined markedly. However, given recent differences with the US over
NATO bombing in Kosovo and US unilateralist tendencies on revising the ABM Treaty and the Senate defeating the
CTBT ratification, Russia might get its act together and work with the remnants of the Eastern Group to cobble
together some common positions? One specific contradiction is the continuing membership in this group of certain
former Eastern bloc or former Warsaw Treaty Organization members, which are now members of an expanded NATO--the
lynchpin of the Western group. In this regard, with Poland joining NATO and the Western Group, it will mean that
in practice the Western group will chair two Main Committees?
The non-aligned movement (NAM) continues in serious disarray to its own detriment and apparently while the NAM
has lost coherence, common interests might coalesce on general principles, though on balance NAM cohesion cannot
be counted upon. Reportedly, some 80 percent of group members reportedly do not actively participate in NAM deliberations.
Nonetheless, at the 1998 PrepCom, the NAM demonstrated new found solidarity and it will be interesting to see if
this continues and grows under South African chairmanship.
Given the unnecessary tendencies toward rigidity and confrontation emanating from the obsolete Cold War driven
group structure that still persists, interest-based coalitions could be formed on the basis of shared goals and
involving the participation and involvement of the great majority of NPT states from across the traditional regional
groupings to push for structural innovations as a means of promoting substance and efficiency in the work of the
Review Conference.
For example, in 1995 to develop further support for indefinite extension, Canada convened an informal ACosmopolitan
Core Group of States parties. This group was unique in that it transcended traditional blocs and promoted multilateralism
on the common cause of securing the global nonproliferation norm and building international security, together
with the concepts of "permanence with accountability." Canada also chaired an informal "co-sponsors
list management group" that held six meetings at the Canadian mission from 19 April to 10 May 1995. The members
were: the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, The Netherlands, and France. This group met informally
to coordinate strategy to attract additional co-sponsors, take note of whether co-sponsors' credentials were in
order should it be necessary to go to a vote, and exchange information on the status of various countries' support
for indefinite extension.
Chaired by Canada, the meetings aimed to: muster support for the President's draft decision on indefinite extension;
to organize and rally the co-sponsors in case the President's language failed to win the approval of all states,
necessitating a vote on the proposals from Mexico, Canada and the "like-minded" NAM states; and to provide
information and distribute Conference documentation to smaller delegations that did not have the personnel to cover
all Committees. Each of the two meetings attracted over 90 delegations, thus demonstrating that a solid majority
favoured indefinite extension and that this majority was willing to stand up and be counted should a vote become
necessary and provided an excellent example of an interest-based coalition.
Similarly, at the 1197, 1998 and 1999 sessions of the PrepCom, Canada worked with some cooperative and moderate
members of all three groups to develop draft common language on certain aspects of the Chairmans Working Paper
again this was an example of interest-based coalitions.
Interest-based coalitions will be key at the 2000 Review Conference, in order to produce balanced yet innovative
products promoting the review and full implementation of the Treaty, while trying to avoid the extremist positions
generally enunciated by some of the NWS and some from within NAM. If one can move away altogether from the irrelevant
political groupings at the 2000 Review Conference, this would be a great service to the cause of arms control in
the millennium.
Revising the structure of the Treaty review process
Since 1985, NPT review conferences have structured the review of the Treaty into three main committees broadly
dealing respectively with nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, safeguards and export controls, and cooperation
in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This three main committee structure was devised by the U.S., for the 1985
review conference, in part to provide a committee for the Eastern group to chair. The division of work between
the three main committees tends to overlap in places and has not proven especially efficient or conducive to generating
agreed reports. Indeed three of the previous five NPT review conferences have failed to agree on final documents,
while the 1985 conference only agreed on a report that reflected fundamental differences in views between States
parties.
NPTREC Decision 1, in its wisdom, retained the existing main committee structure but recommended discussion of
the issue of overlap, and also recommended the establishment within the main committees of >subsidiary bodies=
or working groups to provide focused consideration of specific issues. Decision 1 empowered the PrepCom to recommend
the creation of such subsidiary bodies for each review conference. This recommendation for subsidiary bodies merely
regularized past practice at review conferences, where working groups or friends of the chair would break off from
the main committees to resolve differences on specific items, such as rules of procedure, security assurances,
and export controls at the 1995 NPTREC. It was noteworthy that at the 1999 and 1998 PrepCom, the NWS rejected attempts
to draft recommendations on setting up such bodies at the 2000 review conference.
The 1997 PrepCom contributed to further complicate the structure of the review process by creating so-called clusters
based on the allocation of work of the main committees and then sub-divided the clusters according to the seven
headings under the principles and objectives. Instead of contributing to a structured and balanced review this
procedure introduced imbalances between the clusters even though each of the three clusters would be given equal
time leading inevitably to sterile, unproductive, debate as was evident in the 1998 and 1999 sessions of the Preparatory
Committee.
A practical, common sense, approach to a revitalized review of the Treaty suggests an article by article approach,
factoring in the relevant preambular paragraphs and NPTREC decisions (which would include items such as universality
and security assurances, as well). In this context, it would be useful to modify the existing Main Committee structure
and to re-organize the review process to deal sequentially with the articles and related preambular paragraphs
of the Treaty, factoring in as required the seven principal themes from the 1995 principles and objectives. Subsidiary
bodies, or working groups, could be established for the purpose of deliberation and drafting assessments and recommendations
for the final report on Treaty implementation. A preliminary breakdown of working groups could be as follows: A)
nuclear non-proliferation including universality, security assurances, nuclear-weapon-free zones, compliance);
B) nuclear disarmament including fissile material treaty, CTBT implementation, reduction and elimination of nuclear
weapons, compliance; C) safeguards and export controls including cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy,
compliance. Such an approach might facilitate a structured and balanced review of the Treaty and the NPTREC outcomes,
in addition to providing greater focus on those elements of the Treaty requiring further effort for full implementation.
Outcomes of the 2000 NPT Review Conference
The 2000 Review Conference could consider adopting at least three products or outcomes: a backward looking report
on the implementation of the Treaty and the NPTREC extension package between 1995-2000; a forward looking document
focusing on specific substantive recommendations for the period 2000-2005 on promoting the full implementation
of the Treaty and the 1995 package; a document further clarifying and interpreting the strengthened review process.
Additional documents dealing with the Resolution on the Middle East or special issues such as universality, security
assurances, or a fissile material treaty, could also be adopted.
The first task would involve a product, i.e. a final report, comprising an assessment of the implementation of
the Treaty, plus the 1995 NPTREC decisions and resolution, from 1995 to 2000. In addition the report would identify
the areas in which progress should be sought in the full implementation of the Treaty over the next review period
e.g., nuclear disarmament; strengthened safeguards; nuclear-weapon-free zones and the means through which e.g.,
ratification and implementation of START II; negotiation, ratification and implementation of START III & IV
involving the participation of all five NWS; negotiation, ratification and implementation of a fissile material
treaty involving the five NWS, India, Israel and Pakistan; negotiation and implementation of INFCIRC/540 Additional
Protocol by all NPT NNWS; negotiation of a NWFZ in Central Asia; and entry-into-force of the CTBT, Bangkok and
Pelindaba NWFZ treaties. This document the final report of the 2000 Conference could be structured either along
traditional lines, based on the reports of the three Main Committees, comprising both an evaluation of past implementation
and recommendations for future progress; or could be based on an article-by-article review of the Treaty factoring
in the 1995 NPTREC decisions and resolution.
The second task would involve the drafting and adoption of a Year 2000 Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament (Y2KP&O), comprising specific recommendations and milestones directed at strengthening the
full implementation of the Treaty and the 1995 NPTREC decisions and resolution. This Y2KP&O could either emulate
the structure of the1995 P&O, or alternatively it could reflect the articles and preambular paragraphs of the
Treaty plus universality and security assurances. A Y2KP&O should strive to better reflect the structure of
the Treaty and in this context to lay out the preferred goals and strategies for the next five year period. As
such, the document while being substantive, pragmatic and results oriented, should also be concise and avoid unnecessary
platitudes.
Other tasks could include a document clarifying and interpreting the strengthened review decision of 1995, given
the amount of controversy and disagreement that was evident during the PrepCom sessions; a document dealing with
the 1995 Middle East Resolution, providing updated understanding on its content and implementation; and possibly
documents on nuclear disarmament, fissile material cut-off treaty and/or security assurances.
Adopting these products either by consensus or without a vote would be a worthy goal to strive for in 2000. However,
given the present penchant of the NWS to minimize the scope of the 1995 NPTREC decisions and resolutions and that
of some members of the NAM to push grandiose disarmament schemes, it is unlikely that harmony will prevail at the
2000 Review Conference. In the event that neither consensus nor agreement without a vote is achievable, it might
be worthwhile for the Chair in consultation with an extended bureau and the AFriends of the Chair to find an appropriate
mechanism for capturing the views of an overwhelming majority of States present, rather than risking yet another
failed NPT meeting.
Conclusion
While NPTREC Decision 1 clearly established that the purpose of the Preparatory Committee meetings is to undertake
both preparatory and substantive work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in keeping with article VIII,
paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPTREC, it became painfully
evident at the PrepComs in 1998 and again in 1999 that the NWS have scant interest in or commitment to ensuring
a qualitatively new strengthened review process that goes beyond tedious statements on matters of substance. They
clearly opposed the preparatory committee becoming a on-going review mechanism for ensuring permanence with accountability.
During the 1998 PrepCom, speaking to NGOs, Dhanapala cautioned that the strengthened review process must be more
than a mere talk shop. Though the NWS have signed off on devoting at least fifty percent of the PrepComs working
time to statements on substantive matters, by the same token they do not want the PrepCom to engage in any substantive
work other than procedural preparations and drafting a list (whether agreed or not) of recommendations to the review
conference. It would not be a surprise, if at the 2000 Conference, the NWS insisted on allocating time to go through
the verbiage generated by the PrepCom and resisted or delayed the formulation of a new document on principles and
objectives. Again, as Dhanapala has noted:
The leverage that the NNWS may have lost by agreeing to an indefinite extension does not have to be regained through
confrontation or the extreme step of exercising their rights under Article X.1.... Initiatives must also come from
the NWS to stimulate the review process in the same way that the decision to negotiate a CTBT paved the way for
the success of the 1995 NPTREC. The review process must be given a fair chance to prove itself and realize its
potential.
The package of inter-related extension decisions adopted at the 1995 NPTREC were the means by which NPT parties
agreed without a vote to indefinitely extend the Treaty. The decisions were the product of both compromise and
expectation. Compromise to make the NPT permanent as it enhanced the security of all states. Expectation that the
decisions would help establish new parameters of discourse on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, beginning
with the April 1997 session of the Preparatory Committee. It is somewhat disturbing that the political milieu in
which the 2000 Review Conference will convene does not look particularly hospitable to a harmonious and productive
ushering in of the much vaunted strengthened review process, as not unexpectedly the NWS are seemingly striving
to deflect attention from the lack of substantive new progress on nuclear disarmament while the NNWS will attempt
to hold the feet of the weapon states to the fire. As aptly noted by Ambassador Hasmy bin Agam of Malaysia: AA
new phase of persuading and prodding nuclear-weapon States to rethink their nuclear policy in the post-cold war
era must begin.
The burden on the shoulders of the President of the 2000 Review Conference will be both heavy and shifting. With
South Africa=s withdrawal from the presidency, rumours abound that Algeria is in the running as a replacement.
However, South Africa will be approached to re-consider its decision. Other options might include Nigeria, if the
presidency remains in Africa; or Colombia could be approached in light of its success at the 1999 session of the
PrepCom? It is vitally important that the first conference of the strengthened process establishes a positive and
constructive precedent for future reviews of the Treaty. The main challenge likely will be that of the high expectations
and ambitious agendas of many non-nuclear weapon states, that will be pitted against the conservatism and obstructionism
of most of the NWS.
In the end, politics will prevail as NPT reviews have always been intensely political affairs and will remain such
due to the very nature of the issues discussed, as at its heart the NPT is a security bargain. It must not be forgotten,
however, that unless states parties are willing to demonstrate the same shared sense of purpose and compromise
that delivered the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, they risk undermining the very Treaty that provides
for their own and for global security. If the NPT is undermined, or if some or a group of states threaten to leave
the Treaty citing their dissatisfaction with the way in which the package of extension decisions is being implemented,
the results would be disastrous--not only would proliferation dangers increase but the present climate for nuclear
disarmament could be severely disrupted. It is up to all NPT parties to ensure that the indefinite extension of
the Treaty and its effectiveness is buttressed by the full implementation of the NPT in the context of the decisions
of the 1995 NPTREC, and that this is manifested through a successful 2000 Review Conference that reaches consensus
agreement on a new principles and objectives as well as a final declaration, in addition to other products.
Reinforcing Commitment to the NPT
Three sets of complementary measures might contribute to improving the atmosphere and the prospects of the 2000
Review Conference.
Measures that might be considered prior to April 2000 include:
¤ implementation of agreed bilateral nuclear disarmament measures,
additional unilateral steps;
¤ initiation of substantive discussion on nuclear disarmament
in multilateral for a, such as the CD;
¤ facilitation of peaceful nuclear cooperation under IAEA safeguards,
as well as promoting the acceptance and implementation of strengthened safeguards in NNWS;
¤ reinvigoration of the strengthened review process;
¤ enhancement of regime reinforcement through strengthened IAEA
safeguards and technical assistance, increase in IAEA safeguards budget;
¤ retirement of erstwhile cold warriors in senior foreign and
defence policy sectors in NWS;
¤ investment in regional security architectures, especially
in South Asia;
¤ reassurance of Arab League states about working to effectuate
a zone free of mass destruction weapons in the Middle East.
At the Review Conference itself, states might consider:
¤ substantive and transparent discussion on nuclear disarmament;
¤ agreement on a new version of a principles and objectives;
¤ greater transparency in export controls and enhanced interaction
between suppliers and recipients;
¤ interpretation and clarification of strengthened review process;
¤ interpretation and clarification of the 1995 Middle East Resolution.
Following the 2000 Review Conference, additional items could be considered for making progress:
¤ development of an instrument on security assurances;
¤ institution of a Anon-proliferation test for defence policies,
in particular for missile defences, conventional forces;
¤ establishment of an arms control mechanism in the Security
Council, under the presidency of a non-permanent member, holding the P-5 veto in suspension;
¤ engagement in substantive discussion on nuclear disarmament
in the preparatory process beginning in 2002.
All efforts must be made to reinforce the security benefits of the NPT regime while at the same time working to
bring about its full implementation in all three of its dimensions as well as universality of membership. Anything
short of this risks the future well-being of the NPT the foundation stone of post-World War II nonproliferation
architecture.
Monterey: 21 November 1999.
