International Seminar on Disarmament

Lima, Perú
Dec-1999

Statement by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Mikhail Berdennikov
Assistant to the Deputy Director-General of the OPCW

Mr. Chairman,

It is an honor for me to represent the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) at this distinguished gathering. I would like to take this opportunity to thank Ambassador Enrique Román-Morey and the Government of Peru for the opportunity to be part of these thought-provoking discussions.

Proceedings over the past three days enabled the participants to discuss in a comprehensive and in-depth manner a broad range of issues comprising the regional disarmament and security agenda.

In this regard our discussions would have been incomplete without touching upon one integral element of this agenda - the problem of elimination of chemical weapons and of the maintenance of the non-proliferation regime designed to ensure that these weapons do not re--emerge anywhere in the world.

The UN Under-Secretary-General rightly mentioned in his opening statement that the Chemical Weapons Convention was one of the most significant disarmament achievements of the 1990s. A number of treaties justifiably claim to have been "the first" in various aspects of disarmament. The Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT indeed established important milestones in the disarmament history. The CWC in its turn had set its own unique precedent - it became the first global disarmament and non-proliferation treaty designed to rid the world of an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. The Convention is equipped with a stringent verification regime to monitor progress toward these goals.

The CWC does not feature as a separate item on the agenda of these discussions even though it was mentioned by a number of speakers. This is evidently a reflection of the commonly held view that the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention is currently proceeding without major glitches and that Governments could therefore focus on other more pressing security issues.

This is indeed true as regards the functioning of the OPCW verification regime. In two and a half years since the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention the OPCW has conducted more than 600 inspections - an average of five inspections a week. OPCW inspectors have observed the destruction of 3600 tons of chemical agents and about one million munitions and containers. Three of the four chemical weapons possessors have now started destruction of chemical weapons. In keeping with its obligations under the CWC your northern neighbor - the United States - has already destroyed more than 10% of its declared chemical weapons stockpile.

This is not to say that there are no clouds on the OPCW horizon. Cloudless skies would be something quite uncharacteristic of The Hague. The OPCW is currently particularly concerned about:

· Unavoidable delays in the destruction of chemical weapons in Russia;
· The need to reconcile the wishes of its Member States for a lean budget and a minimal verification burden with the overriding requirement to maintain a credible verification regime; and
· The need to restore equilibrium in the chemical industry verification burden which will only become possible when the US finally submits its long awaited industry declaration next year.

The OPCW is part of the global disarmament family. As such, along with the others, it is concerned about the lack of consensus among major players on key components of a future disarmament agenda. We recognize that this temporary impasse is further exacerbated a number of domestic political factors and that these factors are likely to remain at least in the short term. We are worried about possible negative consequences of an emerging domestic debate about the future role of multilateral disarmament institutions in the maintenance of international peace and security and by temptation in some quarters to revert to unilateralism instead of continued reliance on the collective wisdom of the International
Community. While all of these questions still await their resolution one thing seems to be clear. In the absence of an agreed disarmament agenda for the future it is all the more important to uphold and strengthen existing and functioning multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation mechanisms.

The OPCW has been fortunate to enjoy strong political support from its Member States including those in Latin America and the Caribbean. The OPCW's first Director-General, Ambassador Bustani, whom most of you know very well, comes from this region. The most recent demonstration of political support to the OPCW from the Government and chemical
Industry of Brazil was the decision by a private chemical company - Formil Quimica - to host mock challenge inspection at one of its plant sites. The region maintains strong interest in the implementation of the CWC which is manifested by its active participation in the work of the OPCW policy-making bodies and by a considerable number of regional seminars held in the past, most recently in Saint Lucia. You have also been informed of the plans to hold a meeting of National Authorities of Latin American countries in the spring of 2000. This meeting will be co-sponsored by the UN Regional Center for Peace, Disarmament and Development.

The ultimate success of the CWC depends upon achievement of universality. Today 128 States have ratified the Convention - an impressive one third increase in membership since its entry into force in April 1997. An additional 42 states have signed the Treaty.

30 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have signed the CWC. 19 out of 30 have ratifies it. The latest country in the region to join the ranks of the OPCW is Nicaragua. The Convention will enter into force for Nicaragua two days from now - on 5 December 1999. However, eleven states in the region have yet to make the next logical step after signature and ratify the Convention.

We feel that the reasons to join the Convention are compelling from both - political and economic perspective. In April 2000 restrictions on trade in chemicals listed in Schedule 2 of the Convention will enter into force. In April 202 Member States will consider whether to extend these restrictions to chemicals listed in Schedule 3 of the Convention. Such restrictions may impact significantly on the imports by non-member states of some essential chemicals, including many with a wide range of commercial applications. Both exporters and importers of these products should seriously consider the impact of these restrictions and consequently of non-ratification on trade.

In addition to global international organizations - such as the UN and the OPCW - regional mechanisms could be more effectively used to promote universality of the CWC. The Organization of American States could play a particularly useful role in this regard by encouraging countries in the region which have not yet acceded to the CWC to do so without further delay. Politics is the art of the possible. It will not be unrealistic to aim at achieving universal regional participation in the CWC well in advance of the First CWC Review Conference to be held sometime after May 2002. This could be one "quick win" for the disarmament agenda for the new millennium. The OPCW is ready to continue to provide to countries outside the CWC regime expert and technical advice in the preparation their initial declarations.

Treaties are signed and ratified to be implemented. Full compliance with disarmament treaties is the only real test of their credibility. While Latin American countries can justifiably claim considerable successes with regard to compliance with their obligations under the CWC some ground still needs to be covered. Two and a half years since the entry into force of the Convention 12 CWC Member States in this region out of 19 have submitted their initial declarations to the OPCW. 3 Latin American and 3 Caribbean countries have yet to do so. The initial declaration by Nicaragua is not yet due. Initial declarations, of course, form the basis of all OPCW verification activities. They are also the cornerstone of the confidence-building regime of the Convention and are vital to its ultimate success. Submission of outstanding declarations by Member States of the OPCW could be another "quick win" for enhanced stability and security in the region.

Let me conclude by saying that progress toward achievement of these two practical goals -universal regional participation in the CWC and full compliance with its reporting requirements - would be entirely consistent with the spirit embodied in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and with a long-standing and rich disarmament tradition in this important area of the world.

Thank you.