EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH OTHER NUCLEAR-WEAPONS-FREE ZONES
(Africa, Middle East, South Asia, South East Asia)
Ms. Jan Priest

1. Although nuclear non-proliferation regime is practically universal, regional non-proliferation arrangements, such as Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs), still have an important role to play. By satisfying specific concerns and needs, bilateral or regional arrangements provide assurances within and between the parties drawing them up. In this way they complement global non-proliferation arrangements including the nuclear verification implemented by the IAEA.

2. As you may remember, the importance of NWFZs was recently reiterated by participants at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference whose report, in the relevant section about NWFZs, reads that:

“... the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, particularly in regions afflicted with conflicts, enhances regional and global peace and security and contributes to the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. ..... such zones constitute an important disarmament measure which greatly strengthens the international non-proliferation regime in all its aspects”.

3. Despite the fact that the existing NWFZs have arisen from unique historical processes, the basic objectives and principles underlying these zones are quite similar. I shall now attempt to describe some of those objectives and principles, as I see them and will then say something about the efforts to establish NWFZs in Africa, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and South Asia. As a scene setter I will start with a few words on historical aspects.

COMMON GROUND

4. All existing NWFZs have their roots in the Cold War. However, although some of them (covered by Tlatelolco and Rarotonga) developed in spite of the Cold War, others (Africa and Southeast Asia) have been made possible largely because of its demise. NWFZs represent the “step by step” approach to arms control and disarmament. When thinking about NWFZs first became current in the 1960s, this approach came to predominate over more comprehensive objectives relating to general and complete disarmament on the grounds that taking limited steps was better than waiting for major breakthroughs in long drawn-out negotiations. The early fruits of the “step by step” approach are reflected in important agreements reached in the 1960s e.g. the Partial Test Ban Treaty 1963, and the Treaty of Tlatelolco 1967.

5. Through NWFZs, Member States aim at greater security by reducing the threat of their involvement in nuclear conflict. Thus, in general terms, each NWFZ treaty prohibits the possession, development, acquisition or (unlike the NPT) the deployment of nuclear weapons everywhere within the area of the treaty’s application. Also, NWFZ “architects” have traditionally seen “negative security assurances”, i.e. pledges by the nuclear-weapon-states (NWS) not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Member States of the Zone, as an essential component of increased security. Here, the NWS have given security assurances on several occasions in public fora. Most recently, just before the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference got underway, the NWS gave concerted security assurances to all NNWS Parties to the NPT through(UNSC/Res.984/95). Here it is worth mentioning, however, that NPT assurances are not of the same legal nature as the protocols of the different NWFZs. Just last month, the Governments of France, the UK, and the US added their signatures to those of Russia and China to the Protocol on security assurances to the Rarotonga treaty.

6. Another common feature of NWFZs is the recognized need to verify that Member States are meeting their respective treaty obligations. Thus, parties to existing NWFZs are required, in the non-proliferation context, to submit all their nuclear materials to IAEA safeguards. Effective safeguards reassure the international community about the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear material and activities and makes far more difficult any undetected diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful use to weapon use. Thus effective safeguards contribute to the security and the stability of individual States, and to the international community generally. Although the specifics of the “control systems” established vary from one NWFZ arrangement to the other, effective verification by the IAEA of ‘peaceful use’ pledges is a commonly regarded as an essential requirement.

EARLY PROPOSALS FOR NWFZs

(A) CENTRAL EUROPE

7. The first proposal for a NWFZ covering a densely populated area was advanced in 1958, when Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki proposed the denuclearization of Central Europe, i.e. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East and West Germany. Over the next decade, proposals were advanced for the establishment of other NWFZs e.g. Romania proposed the denuclearization of the Balkans; the Soviet Union called for a NWFZ in the Mediterranean; Iran first proposed the idea of a Middle Eastern NWFZ; China sponsored a plan to create a NWFZ in Asia and the Pacific Region; and Finland proposed a Nordic NWFZ. Why didn’t these NWFZs materialise? Largely because of the tangled political and strategic web in which they were first mooted.

8. The Rapacki plan is an example of how difficult it can be to establish a NWFZ. When Foreign Minister Rapacki made his proposal, Poland belonged to the Warsaw Pact. The proposal must therefore be looked at as reflecting the prevailing security concerns of the Warsaw Pact States, among which were minimising US presence in the region, and West Germany possessing nuclear weapons.

9. From certain perspectives the Rapacki proposal looked to be a fair exchange: by forgoing the right to station nuclear weapons in West Germany, NATO countries were to receive guarantees that three Eastern Bloc States: Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, would also remain nuclear weapon free. However, NATO saw its nuclear arsenal as an important counter-weight to the Warsaw Pact’s conventional superiority. Thus, the Rapacki plan was declined on the grounds that the creation of the NWFZ envisaged would have skewed the balance of force in the region in favour of the East. Rapacki later refined his proposal to include drawing down conventional forces in the region. However, for several reasons, including the fact that NATO still thought of itself as vulnerable to a quick and decisive conventional attack from the East, the Western alliance continued to reject the proposed Zone.

10. Although a Central European NWFZ never got off the ground, the presence of nuclear weapons in the region, and thus the potential threat of nuclear conflict, has now diminished considerably: the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, signed by Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev in December, 1987 has eliminated all missiles with a range of more than 500 km. Improved relations between the US and Russian Federation has resulted in further substantial cuts in their respective arsenals, with others in prospect.

(B) THE NORDIC COUNTRIES

11. Proposals for other NWFZs suggested early on also became victim to Super Power rivalry. A Nordic NWFZ for instance; the first proposal submitted by a State within the Nordic region was made in 1963 by Finnish President Kekkonen. In proposing that Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden should establish a NWFZ, Kekkonen’s starting point was none of these states owned nuclear weapons or had them stationed on their territory.

12. Although the Nordic Countries have common values and ties they have opted for different security choices. Thus a Nordic NWFZ has never materialised. Finland and Sweden made clear that they would not accept nuclear weapons on their territories under any circumstances. However, Denmark, Iceland and Norway were founding members of NATO - and despite their previous reservations about NATO’s common nuclear policy, did not want to undercut that policy with a treaty prohibiting the stationing of nuclear weapons in any circumstances. In 1978, new weapons developments (neutron bombs, cruise missiles, etc.) gave further impetus to the idea of a Nordic NWFZ, and Finland advanced a variation of its 1963 proposal, which was to be accompanied by security guarantees from NWS. But this effort too, for the reasons mentioned above, failed to get off the ground.

13. Having listed a few failed attempts to create NWFZ, I should remind you that there are, of course however, some remarkable success stories, one of which is the NWFZ established by the Tlatelolco Treaty - the first such Treaty to be opened for signature covering a populated region. Another success story is the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, which entered into force in 1986. You have already heard excellent presentations on each of these NWFZ arrangements. I should mention also here treaties establishing NWFZs in uninhabited territories: the Antarctic Treaty (1959); the Outer Space Treaty (1967) and the Seabed Treaty (1971).

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

14. What about recent developments? There are two particularly worthy of note: the African NWFZ Treaty and the Treaty to establish a NWFZ in Southeast Asia.

(A)AFRICAN NWFZ

15. The treaty to create a NWFZ in Africa, known as the Pelindaba Treaty, hinged substantially on the end of the Cold War. Only then could the vision of a nuclear weapon free Africa, initially mooted in 1964 at the First Ordinary Session of the OAU Summit, be realised. The concept of the NWFZ could be translated into reality, post 1991, essentially because the Cold War threats which South Africa had seen to her security no longer pertained - she had renounced nuclear weapons, joined the NPT and put all her nuclear material under IAEA safeguards.

16. The Pelindaba Treaty was endorsed last Summer by African Heads of State and, has since been endorsed by the UN General Assembly. The Treaty was opened for signature in Cairo on 11 April 1996 and both the IAEA Director General and the Assistant Director General for External Relations, with us today, were present on that important occasion.

17. The IAEA was more closely involved in the crafting of this NWFZ Treaty than with any other so far concluded. As first requested by the UN Secretary-General in 1993 and regularly since, and with the endorsement of the Agency’s policy making organs, a senior Agency representative participated in meetings of the Group of Experts drawing up the Treaty. Thus, our Assistant Director General for External Relations helped with the drafting of the verification provisions. These, inter alia, entrust the Agency with the task of verifying compliance with the peaceful use undertakings of the Member States. These are seen in the usual kind of NWFZ provisions barring nuclear weapons possession, development, acquisition or stationing and prohibiting any nuclear explosive testing. But the Treaty goes further than earlier NWFZ models in that is specifically addresses issues such as prohibition of armed attack on nuclear installations; the physical protection of nuclear material; prohibition of dumping of nuclear waste; and regional preoccupations such as the possibility of hitherto undeclared nuclear explosive devices (in Article 6) and the destruction or conversion to peaceful uses of facilities for manufacturing such devices. Such provisions represent the political and security preoccupations of the 1990’s which in some respects (nuclear trafficking; the possibility of “another South Africa” in terms of nuclear capability etc.) are different from earlier concerns.

18. The Treaty’s verification and complaints provisions are based essentially on Rarotonga, but go further in some ways. Thus, they assign to the IAEA not only the “traditional” INFCIRC/153-type safeguards rights, and obligations, but also functions such as verifying, with the African Commission on Nuclear Energy foreseen in Article 12 of the Treaty, the destruction or dismantling of any nuclear devices and the destruction or conversion of relevant production facilities. Of course, the case of South Africa set a precedent in these respects. Also, greater interaction than in previous arrangements is prescribed between the IAEA and the African Commission on Nuclear Energy. The new Commission will, amongst other things, obtain from each Member State on an annual basis a copy of the overall conclusions of the most recent report by the IAEA on its inspection activities in that Member State’s territory. The complaints procedure, (Annex 4 of the Treaty) similarly to Rarotonga, gives the regional body the responsibility for requesting “special” inspections. These are in order to look into complaints as a last resort in the event that lower key investigations are unsuccessful. The new Commission may request that the IAEA conduct “special” inspections, when needed, and will receive reports of the Agency’s findings in these instances (although the Commission may nevertheless send its own representatives to accompany the Agency’s inspection team and may also establish its own inspection mechanisms). Here, it is significant that “special” inspections under the Pelindaba Treaty are foreseen as a means of investigating any possible violations of the Treaty. The Treaty also actively promotes peaceful nuclear activities (Article 8) and encourages parties to make use of the programme of assistance available in the IAEA.

(B) SOUTH EAST ASIA NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE (SEANWFZ)

19. The SEANWFZ Treaty, signed in Bangkok last December, to some extent took the Agency by surprise. Although the Agency had been asked, informally, to comment on an earlier draft, we were not subsequently asked to help over the document finally signed. Since then however, during the course of a visit by the Assistant Director General for External Relations to Thailand, the Thai authorities (Thailand is the depositary for the Treaty) have provided some helpful clarification.

20. Like others before it, the SEANWFZ originates in the Cold War and reflects the ASEAN States’ perception of political, economic and security challenges. The Kuala Lumpur declaration of 1971 marked the ASEAN States’ determination to secure the recognition of and respect for Southeast Asia as a “Zone Of Peace, Freedom And Neutrality” (ZOPFAN) devoid of interference by outside powers. In 1984, Indonesia first formally raised the SEANWFZ concept within the context of ZOPFAN - though not without reservations on the part of others. However, the 7 Members of ASEAN (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam) plus Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar have now signed the SEANWFZ Treaty. There appear, however, still to be problems on the part of NWS about certain points and terminology in the text of the associated Protocol.

21. The Prime Minister of Thailand explained in Bangkok last December that the Treaty is designed to contribute to nuclear non-proliferation - specifically the NPT regime - at the global level. The control system foreseen is apparently modelled on Rarotonga but goes further than either that Treaty - or Pelindaba. Thus, “fact-finding missions” to clarify and resolve situations “which may be considered ambiguous or which may give rise to doubts about compliance with the provisions of this Treaty ...” are foreseen as a matter of course to consist of three IAEA inspectors.

22. Article 4 of the SEANWFZ Treaty makes the unprecedented requirement that Member States must subject their peaceful nuclear energy programmes to a strict nuclear safety assessment conforming to IAEA recommended guidelines and standards, and further requires Member States to dispose of radioactive wastes and other radioactive material in a manner consistent with IAEA standards and procedures.

PROSPECTS FOR NWFZs

(A) THE MIDDLE EAST

23. There is general agreement that the establishment of a Middle East NWFZ (MENWFZ) is key to ensuring against nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, and would constitute an important step toward the creation of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. Why then has a NWFZ in the Middle East not yet materialised? Important here, amongst other things, have traditionally been the differing security perceptions of Israel and its Arab neighbours; defining the boundaries of what “the Middle East” would consist of for NWFZ purposes; differing views as to the time of creation of a NWFZ (e.g. as a preface to or as part of an overall peace settlement) and very importantly, failure so far to remove incentives to the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons. However, if the Middle East peace process gains impetus on the Syria/Israel and Lebanon/Israel bilateral tracks, it offers more hope than ever before for a MENWFZ.

24. Security-related verification arrangements need to be the most intense in areas marked by deep conflict and mistrust. Also, the more dimensions there are to a problem the harder it is to solve. In this respect alone the Middle-East is a particularly hard nut to crack. Not only is there the dimension of long-lasting hostilities between Israel and its Arab neighbours but also problems between some of those neighbours themselves and between States in the Arab/Israel sub-region and others outside. Such a catalogue would seem to point to rigorous, intrusive verification covering declared and any possible undeclared nuclear activities.

25. What those arrangements will actually consist of is for the parties to a future NWFZ to decide. To them also fall the material obligations to be assumed and on which the verification arrangements will be based.

26. Against this background, the IAEA has been discharging the mandate conferred by its policy making organs (1) to take such measures as are necessary to facilitate the early application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region; and (2) to prepare model agreements as a step towards the establishment of an NWFZ. The Agency continues to be involved in consultations with Middle East States on these and related issues including through visits by the Director General.

27. States of the region agree in principle on the need to apply IAEA safeguards to all nuclear material and facilities in the Middle East. But of course differences remain on whether this should precede or be part of an NWFZ agreement. As for the development of model verification agreements, these obviously hinge on the material obligations to be verified. In this context, the Agency is actively seeking better to acquaint the relevant States with the wide range of material obligations available and the verification modalities and scenarios which could flow from them. In addition to the visits already mentioned, the Agency has organised specific activities relevant to verification modalities, such as a Middle East verification workshop in Vienna and, with the European Atomic Energy Community, presentations and a demonstration of nuclear verifications techniques covering co-operation arrangements between the IAEA and regional verification systems. The IAEA still needs further clarity from some of the Middle East States about their preferences with regard to material obligations and without such clarity, cannot meaningfully embark on preparing the model verification agreements foreseen. But what is already clear is that, for the Middle East, the Agency’s global verification arrangements will have to be supplemented by very stringent intrusive regional arrangements. These could involve, for example, regional inspectors working additionally to or in parallel with Agency inspectors. Whatever the case, the IAEA should be able to cut the suit to fit the cloth. Flexibility is a hallmark of IAEA verification. The Agency’s Statutory mandate to apply safeguards leaves considerable room for flexibility to accommodate fresh tasks and challenges.

(B) SOUTH ASIA

28. Like the Middle East, South Asia is marked by mistrust and conflict. Though the Cold War has ended, bilateral relations between key states in the region e.g. India/Pakistan, India/China have not improved commensurately. Indeed, over the past two decades, India and Pakistan have each acquired more sophisticated conventional forces, and are on record as engaged in missile development.

29. India and Pakistan state that their nuclear programmes are only for peaceful purposes, and are on record as strong supporters of nuclear non-proliferation. However, neither is party to a legally binding comprehensive non-proliferation instrument.

30. After India’s nuclear test of 1974, Pakistan submitted several draft resolutions to the UN General Assembly on establishing a NWFZ in South Asia as a means to prevent nuclear proliferation and ensure that nuclear energy is used only for peaceful purposes. In 1986, Pakistan asked the UN Secretary General to determine the views of states in the region and other concerned states on exploring “the best possibilities of furthering the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia”.

31. Pakistan has said it will accede to the NPT and join a South Asian NWFZ provided that India does the same. However, India takes the view that nuclear disarmament must be dealt with at the global, not the regional level, and that lasting peace can only be built on the basis of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. India also maintains that it could be party to a NWFZ Treaty only if China were also party. In the near term, this seems unrealistic. In June 1991, Pakistan proposed a conference on the issue of nuclear proliferation in South Asia. While there has been little movement on this issue since, if such talks were to succeed, it could be an important step on the road to creating a NWFZ.

CONCLUSION

32. In conclusion, regional non-proliferation arrangements, such as NWFZs, will in my view continue to make a valuable contribution to regional and global security by banning possession, development, acquisition and stationing of nuclear weapons in entire region. They thus add in the shorter and medium term to the value of arrangements, including those in the NPT, which aim ultimately at the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

33. Also the new NWFZs, i.e. those covering Africa and Southeast Asia, increasingly take account of other issues which concern us all i.e. those related to the environment and to the safe uses of nuclear energy. This reflects, amongst other things, different preoccupations than those which States had when earlier NWFZs were first mooted and different perceptions of how States now define “security”. All the activity which has taken place in recent years and as described in this and earlier presentations attests to the value which States ascribe to NWFZs in the context of their own, regional and international “security”. Here “security” has a wider sense than simply the military sphere - although the latter, on which States’ very existence can depend - clearly remains of fundamental importance.

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