NUCLEAR VERIFICATION IN THE YEARS AHEAD: NEW ROLES
AND NEW INITIATIVES
Mr. Richard Hooper

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the cold war, the world has witnessed a remarkable series of events demonstrating that universal adherence to the principles of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament is no longer a utopian dream. South Africa has disclosed the existence of a previous nuclear weapons programme, destroyed all its nuclear weapons, joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and co-operated fully with subsequent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection and verification measures. Argentina and Brazil have opened their nuclear programmes to joint inspection and have accepted comprehensive IAEA safeguards. Nuclear-weapon-free zones tied to the IAEA verification are poised to come into being in Africa and into full force in Latin America and the Caribbean. Some progress toward the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East is also being made through the region's peace process. The dissolution of the Soviet Union resulted in three new independent States with nuclear weapons on their territories. All three, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapon States and have accepted comprehensive IAEA safeguards. A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which is being negotiated under the auspices of the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, is nearing completion, and that same Conference has been given a mandate to negotiate an agreement to cut-off production of fissile material for weapons. In May 1995, meeting at UN Headquarters in New York, the 178 States party to the NPT decided to extend the treaty indefinitely and confirmed that nuclear disarmament is an inherent treaty commitment by the nuclear weapons States.


Not all the news is good news. Despite the Framework Agreement through which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has "frozen" its nuclear programme and the continuous presence of IAEA inspectors to verify the freeze and implement safeguards, the DPRK remains out of compliance with its safeguards agreement, and concerns remain regarding the completeness of the DPRK's initial nuclear material declaration. After more than four years of the most extensive inspection regime in history and the discovery, mapping and destruction of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme, revelations continue regarding Iraqi plans to accelerate the programme in the months prior to the beginning of the Gulf War.

Some important pieces are still missing with respect to the NPT and the cessation of testing. Three States with significant nuclear programmmes have not adhered to the NPT or accepted full-scope IAEA safeguards. Two nuclear weapons States, China and France, have resumed testing although both indicate that they will commit to the CTBT when it is concluded.

Against this backdrop, the Member States of the IAEA are taking steps to better equip the IAEA Inspectorate to safeguard declared nuclear material in a more cost-effective way and to deal with the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities. The major effort in this undertaking is the IAEA Secretariat's programme (Programme 93+2) for assessment, development and testing of a comprehensive set of measures for improving the implementation of safeguards. The objective of the proposals developed under Programme 93+2 is to ensure that the IAEA has greater access to relevant information and sites. Programme 93+2 has proceeded with the direct involvement of a number of Member States in testing the proposed measures.

THE PROGRAMME 93+2 APPROACH

Throughout the 1990s, extensive efforts have been directed at strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system. In this context, effectiveness reflects the extent to which IAEA verifications achieve non-proliferation objectives, and efficiency reflects the productivity of IAEA safeguards, i.e., how well available resources (staff, equipment, money) are used to fulfill stated objectives.

The major elements of Programme 93+2 are directed to both declared and undeclared activities, while allowing for an assessment of possible trade-offs and synergies in the overall approach. The criterion for inclusion of a measure in Programme 93+2 was that it be identified as having potential for one or more of the following:

o reducing the cost of implementing safeguards while maintaining or improving safeguards effectiveness;
o increasing the assurance of non-diversion provided by safeguards;
o improving the capabilities of the Agency to detect undeclared nuclear activities;
o increasing the effectiveness and/or efficiency of safeguards through greater co-operation with State Systems of Accounting and Control (SSACs);
o improving the effectiveness and/or efficiency of the acquisition, processing and analysis of safeguards relevant information; and
o improving the capabilities of inspectors, other Agency safeguards staff and SSAC staff to carry out new measures as required for field testing and implementation.

At its March 1995 meetings, the Board of Governors considered progress made under Programme 93+2 and reiterated that, under comprehensive safeguards agreements, verification by the Agency should be so designed as to cover the correctness and completeness of States' declarations, so that there is credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of any undeclared nuclear activities. The Board endorsed the general direction of "Programme 93+2" for a strengthened and cost-effective safeguards system. It was noted that a strengthened safeguards system would benefit from technological development and would require that the Agency have greater access to relevant information and greater physical access to relevant sites, this access to be provided either on the basis of existing authority in comprehensive safeguards agreements or on the basis of complementary authority to be conferred by the States involved.

In June 1995, specific proposals for a strengthened and cost-effective safeguards system were submitted for the Board's consideration in a document consisting of two parts: Part I included those measures which could be implemented under existing legal authority and which it would be practical and useful to implement at an early date; and Part II included those measures which the Secretariat proposes for implementation on the basis of the granting of complementary authority. The Board approved the Secretariat's proposal to proceed immediately with the implementation of the Part I measures. Measures requiring additional authority will be taken up by the Board in December.

MAIN AREAS OF EMPHASIS

The conceptual development of Programme 93+2 is based on the view that the level of assurance provided by a safeguards system depends ultimately upon two fundamentally important attributes of the system. The first of these is coverage - the extent to which safeguards-relevant materials and events are effectively subject to verification. The second is continuity - the extent to which the status of the whole continuum of relevant materials and events can be inferred at any given moment from verification of single parts, carried out at points of time or space selected according to random sampling procedures.

The Programme 93+2 approach to a strengthened and more cost-effective safeguards system builds on the current system of material accountancy and control by integrating elements of increased access to information and its effective use by the Agency, elements of increased physical access for Agency inspections, and optimal use of elements of the present system. It is possible to view new proposals together with measures already adopted in clusters that relate to three main areas of reform: (1) measures to strengthen the Agency's access to information, which could contribute to making safeguards more effective; (2) measures related to increased physical access to sites and to the effectiveness of that access; and (3) measures that are best termed rationalization and administrative streamlining.

1. Access to information

Measures taken in this area in recent years include early provision of design information on declared facilities, greater use of data on nuclear activities that are available publicly (in-house or otherwise), improved analysis and evaluation of all relevant information available to the Agency, and the reporting scheme on export and import of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, and specified equipment.

The major new elements proposed in this area are:

o broader information on States' nuclear activities, resulting in greater nuclear transparency; and
o the use of environmental monitoring techniques.

2. Access to sites and the effectiveness of the access

Actions recently taken are the IAEA Board's expressed positions regarding special inspections, and voluntary offers by some governments to accept Agency visits "any time, any place".

Developments in this area are:

o unrestricted access at nuclear and nuclear-related sites;
o access beyond nuclear and nuclear-related sites, arranged case-by-case, to follow up on information or to implement technical measures; and
o utilizing the existing right to access on short notice or no-notice during routine inspections.

3. Rationalization and administrative streamlining

Measures already taken include the expanded use of the IAEA's two regional safeguards offices in Toronto and Tokyo, the partnership agreement with the Euratom Inspectorate, the proposal for simplified designation procedures for inspectors, and computerized log sheets.

Further measures being considered in this area are:

o reduction in the inspection frequency at light-water reactors;
o greater use of unattended measurement and surveillance equipment with remote transmission of data, in lieu of some inspections;
o additional regional safeguards offices to save travel costs and facilitate short notice/no-notice safeguards;
o multiple-entry visas for inspectors;
o expanded capability for inspectors to communicate with headquarters;
o expanded training of inspectors; and
o joint use of equipment and laboratories by the IAEA and State Systems of Accountancy for and Control (SSAC) of nuclear materials.

ACCESS TO INFORMATION

Expanded declaration

States with comprehensive safeguards agreements currently provide the IAEA a declaration covering nuclear materials (from the point that the material is in a chemical form and purity suitable for reactor fuel or enrichment), associated processes (to the extent that process-related information is needed to safeguard the nuclear material), and nuclear facilities or other locations containing or expected to contain declared nuclear material within a State's territory or under its jurisdiction or control. Conventional nuclear material safeguards is a complex verification system based on nuclear material accountancy. The system requires the concerted action of nuclear facility operators, State authorities and the IAEA inspectorate. In general terms, assurances that declared material is accounted for derive from a series of time dependent and technically interrelated verifications. These are verifications that (i) facility design is in accordance with the design declared and the corresponding safeguards approach; (ii) facility operations are as declared (e.g., through surveillance records review); (iii) facility material accountancy systems conform to prescribed standards; (iv) facility operator's measurement systems perform according to international standards; (v) verification measurement performance, the performance of individual facility accountancy systems and the accumulated performance of accountancy systems across facilities within States are in good statistical control over time; and so on. The safeguards conclusions, and related levels of assurance for a given period of time, derive from an integration of the results obtained through the various verifications and analyses.

The Expanded Declaration of a State's nuclear activities, which is proposed under Programme 93+2, will provide - in addition to information on all nuclear material - information on all other nuclear and nuclear-related activities of the State, with a description and the location of all nuclear-related processes (including closed-down facilities and those under construction), production, research and development, and training. The Expanded Declaration requests information about activities and equipment functionally related to the operation of the State's fuel cycle - things which indicate the presence of nuclear material and/or constitute important elements in the nuclear fuel cycle infrastructure.

The overall rationale for the Expanded Declaration is directly related to greater nuclear transparency and the need to establish a basis for a wider range of verifications, a range that includes nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear R&D and related activities in addition to nuclear material. In a manner analogous to the examples given above, accumulating assurances regarding the absence of undeclared activities and thus undeclared nuclear material derive from verifications that (i) the declared present and planned nuclear programme is internally consistent; (ii) the nuclear activities and types of nuclear material utilized at declared locations are in accordance (e.g., through the collection and analysis of environmental samples) with those declared; (iii) imports and internal manufacture of specified equipment and non-nuclear materials are consistent with the declared programme; (iv) the operational status of closed down or decommissioned facilities and LOFs is in conformity with the State's declaration; (v) nuclear fuel-cycle related research and development (nuclear R&D) is generally consistent with declared plans for future development of the fuel cycle; and so on. Clarification would be sought from the State to resolve any apparent inconsistency among information provided by the State through an Expanded Declaration, information obtained by the Agency through other means and information generated through verification activities (including on-site activities). As above, assurances regarding the correctness and completeness of States' declarations derive from an integration of results obtained across this broad range of evaluations.

Environmental sampling

Any production or manufacturing process loses some small fraction of the process materials to the immediate environment. The extent of the loss depends upon a wide variety of factors, including the nature of the process, the material, the control measures to limit losses and the migration of losses beyond the immediate process location. The processing of nuclear material is no exception, and even though great care is taken to prevent losses, small losses inevitably occur and migrate beyond the immediate environment where the loss took place. Further, nuclear materials have specific physical properties (e.g., radioactivity) that make it possible to detect and characterize losses that may be present in the environment in only very small quantities. This capability, together with the possibility of unambiguously correlating specific signatures with specific nuclear processes, is why environmental monitoring is a useful tool for the detection of possibly existing undeclared activities.

The collection and analysis of environmental samples is a key technical measure in a strengthened safeguards system. The IAEA, in co-operation with Member States, has engaged in a series of field trials to evaluate environmental monitoring as a potential measure for the strengthening of safeguards, in particular for the enhancement of the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities. The goal of the environmental monitoring field trials was to demonstrate the utility of environmental monitoring methods for safeguards application.

These field trials covered the following types of nuclear facilities and activities: power reactors; uranium enrichment facilities involving various processes; research facilities with research reactor operations, isotope production, fuel fabrication and post-irradiation examination of spent fuel; and reprocessing facilities handling power and material testing reactor fuel. Sample collections (surface swipes, vegetation, soil and water) were made in the vicinity of nuclear facilities in 11 countries.

The samples from the field trials were distributed to specialized laboratories in several IAEA Member States, including Australia, Canada, Finland, Hungary, the Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States. IAEA Member States hosting environmental monitoring field trials were invited to participate in the analysis of parallel samples.
Member States' assistance was crucial in the development of training courses for IAEA staff, in the provision of tested sampling materials and protocols, and in the provision of substantial analytical services, mostly at no charge to the Agency. A wide range of sample analysis techniques was utilized, both by the IAEA laboratories and by the participating Member State laboratories. Analytical techniques ranged from simple screening methods to state-of-the-art methods offering the ultimate in sensitivity for the detection of extremely low concentrations of the analytes studied.

Environmental monitoring field trials performed under Programme 93+2 have demonstrated that these techniques are extremely effective for detecting undeclared activities at declared sites, and that, in particular, on-site swipe sampling provides unambiguous information about the full range of past and current nuclear activities at locations tested.

Improved information analysis

Effective verification depends on the availability of reliable information about nuclear activities in the countries being inspected. Information could come from IAEA databases and from open sources, e.g., media reports and scientific publications. Internal sources comprise safeguards inspection data, information received on imports and exports of nuclear material and exports of specified equipment and non-nuclear material, and the Expanded Declaration described above. Regarding open sources, the IAEA has established a computerized system for storage and retrieval of safeguards-relevant information. The system incorporates selected information from existing IAEA databases on power reactors, research reactors, and nuclear fuel cycle facilities. It also contains a broad spectrum of information on States' nuclear regulations, energy requirements, production and resources, nuclear and nuclear-related programmes, international co-operation, and companies, firms, and organizations working in the nuclear field. The system also considers public commercial information on nuclear material, technologies, facilities, and equipment, including dual-use items.

The IAEA has developed a proliferation critical path to identify what information is needed and how that information is best structured for analysis. This path can be represented graphically as a series of increasingly specific and detailed levels of all known processes (pathways) for the production of weapons-usable material and weaponization. The first and top level contains the main steps, e.g., enrichment, reprocessing, etc. Each block in this first level is broken down into more specific routes or processes. For example, the enrichment block is broken down into nine possible processes (gas centrifuge, electromagnetic, aerodynamic, gaseous diffusion, molecular laser, atomic vapour laser, plasma separation, chemical exchange, and ion exchange), which then form the second level of the proliferation critical path model.

Each process in the second level is characterized by indicators which are associated with the existence or development of the process, such as specialized equipment, dual-use equipment, nuclear and non-nuclear materials, training, and environmental signatures. These indicators form the third level of the proliferation critical path. As an example, some of the indicators related to gaseous diffusion enrichment would be diffusion barriers, gas blowers, uranium hexafluoride, chlorine trifluoride, fluorinated compounds and heat releases in the environment, and large power lines. The weaponization-related activities, which appear in the top level, are limited to certain production processes (e.g., tritium, enriched lithium and alpha-emitting radionuclides) and the procurement of high technology equipment such as X-ray flash photography.

The proliferation critical path model provides a structure for organizing and analyzing all available information regarding a country's nuclear programme, and a number of software tools are being developed to aid the analyst. The indicators provide the means to achieve a logical closure between the model on one hand and the information requested (e.g., the Expanded Declaration) and collected (e.g., on-site inspections and open source searches) on the other.

ACCESS TO SITES

Inspector access has been a key issue since the beginning of safeguards. For routine inspections under a comprehensive safeguards agreement, access is provided to specific points (called "strategic points") deemed necessary to enable the IAEA to meet its safeguards obligations related to material accountancy. Broader access is fundamental to a strengthened safeguards system.

Increased access to locations, as proposed, would involve broad access to nuclear and nuclear-related locations identified in the Expanded Declaration (with "managed" access where commercial or other sensitivities are a concern) and voluntary arrangements with the State to facilitate access to other locations when the Agency has identified an interest.

Increased physical access to a number of different types of locations is being assessed in the field trials under Programme 93+2. The concept of increased physical access includes the provision to the Agency of access to: (1) any location on the sites of nuclear facilities and LOFs (locations other than facilities where nuclear material is present); (2) locations described in the Expanded Declaration which either do not contain nuclear material or contain only small amounts exempted from safeguards, but which contain or have contained nuclear-related activities; and (3) locations other than those identified in the Expanded Declaration, where the request for access would be prompted by specific information or by the need to implement a technical measure, e.g., environmental monitoring. The first two types of locations listed above include all nuclear and nuclear-related locations identified in the Expanded Declaration.

Another element of increased access is that, when useful, it may take place without prior notice ("no-notice") to the State. "No-notice" is taken to mean no advance notification regarding the timing, activities, or locations of an inspection. In practice this means that the State is informed of the IAEA's intention to perform such an inspection when its inspector arrives at the entrance to the site in question.

RATIONAL USE OF RESOURCES

Cost analysis of present safeguards

Programme 93+2 includes an assessment of the costs of implementing safeguards as a function of the magnitude of the technical safeguards parameters (timeliness, significant quantities or SQ, and probabilities of detection). The specific implementation costs associated with current values of these parameters and the cost sensitivity to changes in the values have been determined. A reasonable range in the value of each parameter has been defined for this cost assessment. In parallel to these studies, the technical cases are being considered for changes in these parameters, e.g., for changing the timeliness goal for metallic plutonium/highly enriched uranium and for changing the conversion time/timeliness goal for depleted, natural, and low-enriched uranium. The financial aspects, as well as the inherent technical merits, are addressed. Most of the cost-reduction measures outlined here are considered to fall within the IAEA's existing authority.

Increased co-operation with State Systems

Co-operation between an SSAC and the IAEA is a necessary condition for achieving effective safeguards implementation. Traditionally, the SSAC's role in such co-operation has been limited to the provision of information required under the safeguards agreement with regard to inventories of nuclear material and their changes, the securing of access to facilities and to nuclear material, and the establishment of an accountancy system at facility and State levels. A higher level of co-operation between the SSAC and the IAEA will be needed to facilitate the measures implied by increased access and transparency. This co-operation may also permit reductions in the costs for safeguarding declared nuclear material, while the IAEA continues to meet the requirement to draw its own independent conclusions.

The experience gained in developing the New Partnership Approach with Euratom has been useful in this regard. Technical elements from the NPA constituted an important part of the integrated approach tested in Sweden and Finland. A model pattern of increased co-operation has been derived by identifying all candidate activities which an SSAC could perform, either by itself or jointly with the IAEA, in order to increase the efficiency of IAEA verification activities, and hence to reduce the IAEA's costs or the extent of its activities.

Cost savings in traditional safeguards activities

Major cost sectors associated with the implementation of traditional safeguards, and thus the areas targeted for potential cost savings, are staff, equipment, and travel. As the number of facilities and the quantities of nuclear material under IAEA safeguards continue to increase, reduction in trained staff is not realistic. However, more efficient use of staff and travel resources may be achieved through use of modern technology, through economies in the way safeguards operations are carried out, by enlarging existing field offices or establishing new ones, and through efficient use of office automation equipment. Cost savings in the equipment sector may be achieved through greater standardization and by sharing with the operator the use and costs of equipment and analytical services. Many possibilities were identified and analyzed in detail as part of Programme 93+2.

Programme 93+2 also addresses the question of whether, if an increased assurance about the absence of undeclared activities were to be achieved through some strengthening measures, it would be possible for elements of the present safeguards system (e.g., timeliness inspections for irradiated fuel) to be done differently, less often, or not at all.

Cost of implementation

The full implementation of the measures proposed under Programme 93+2 is anticipated to result in cost neutrality, i.e., the newly optimized safeguards system will ultimately cost about the same as the current safeguards system. During the transition period amounting to a few years, it is expected that the implementation of the new safeguards measures will lead to cost increases, primarily associated with the fixed costs of running the new Clean Laboratory that is scheduled to begin operation at the end of 1995 and with variable costs related to sample analysis. However, once the start-up costs have been met, the efficiencies which are expected to flow from the new safeguards system should lead to cost neutrality.

IMPLEMENTING THE NEXT STEPS

The measures put forward under Programme 93+2 - the expanded declaration, broader physical access, no-notice inspection, increased co-operation with SSACs and advanced technology - combined with elements of the current system, all have the objective to greatly improve coverage, continuity and cost-effectiveness. Each of the proposed measures has value in its own right. However, the partitioning of the measures for implementation according to their legal basis that was presented to the Board of Governors in June 1995, and the proposal to proceed immediately with the implementation of those measures that are within existing authority, were made for pragmatic reasons only. This mode of implementation is not designed to diminish in any way the integrated nature of the entire Programme 93+2 package. The full benefits in strengthened effectiveness and efficiency will be derived only from full implementation of all of the measures of both Parts I and II.

At the conclusion of the June Board, it was decided that actions to implement the measures presented in Part I will proceed immediately. Finalization of the measures presented in Part II, the implementation of which requires complementary legal authority, and the associated draft legal instrument, will proceed through close consultations with Member States and the further development of certain technical details, culminating in the Board's consideration of the Part II measures in December, 1995.

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