REGIONAL VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS
Dr. Jorge A. Coll

ABACC AND THE STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE SCCC AND INFCIRC/435

1. Introduction

Nuclear co-operation between Argentina and Brazil began during the 1960s and remains in full force today. Although during the 1960s and 1970s this co-operation was not as intensive as could be wished, it nevertheless grew strongly after 1980, when the political conditions established by the resolution of controversies over the use of water resources led to the signature of an Agreement on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy between the two countries.

As a natural outcome of this co-operation and the wish to endow their nuclear programs with transparency, many commitments on the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy have been undertaken by Argentina and Brazil.

These commitments were formulated in various joint declarations on nuclear policy by the Presidents of Brazil and Argentina: Foz de Iguaçú, 1985; Brasilia, 1986; Viedma, 1987; Iperó, 1988; Ezeiza, 1988; and the Joint Statements of Buenos Aires, 1990, and Foz de Iguaçú, 1990.

The policies outlined in these declarations finally led to the signature on 18 July 1991 of a Bilateral Agreement on the Exclusively Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. This Bilateral Agreement entered into force on 12 December of the same year, after ratification by the Congresses of both countries. It should be noted that this ratification implies the Agreement’s promulgation with the force of law and that this law imposes mandatory common compliance on both countries.

The Bilateral Agreement sets up the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC), and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).

On the basis of this Bilateral Agreement, a Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement was signed in December 1991 by the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the ABACC. This Agreement determines the application of full scope safeguards.

During the period of negotiation and implementation of the Bilateral Agreement, Argentina and Brazil started negotiations, together with Chile, aimed at proposing amendments to the Tlatelolco Treaty so that the three countries could be able to fully adhere to the Treaty. After the acceptance by the OPANAL Council of the amendments to the Treaty proposed by the three countries, and having fulfilled all legal requirements in Argentina and Brazil, the Treaty of Tlatelolco came into force for these two countries in January and May 1994, respectively.

2. The Bilateral Agreement

The basic undertakings of the Bilateral Agreement are:

(a) To use nuclear materials and facilities under the signatories’ jurisdiction or control exclusively for peaceful purposes.
(b) To prohibit and to prevent in the signatories’ respective territories, and to abstain from carrying out, promoting or authorizing directly or indirectly, or from participating in any way in:
- the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means of any nuclear weapon; and
- the receipt, storage, installation, deployment or any other form of possession of any nuclear weapon.

As a basic control undertaking, the Parties agreed to submit all the nuclear material in all nuclear activities carried out in their territories or anywhere under their jurisdiction or control to the SCCC.

The Agreement also establishes that any serious non-compliance by either of the Parties gives the other Party the right to withdraw from the Agreement, with the obligation to notify this fact to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States.

3. The Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC)

The Agreement establishes the SCCC with the purpose of verifying that nuclear materials in all nuclear activities of the Parties are not diverted to uses not authorized under the terms of the Agreement.

The SCCC consists of the General Procedures and an Application Manual for each installation.

The General Procedures specify the basic criteria and the requirements of the SCCC. Chapter I contains the criteria and the provisions for the starting point, exemption and termination of safeguards. It also includes the general rules for establishing adequate levels of accounting for and control of nuclear material. These levels shall later be detailed in the Application Manual for each facility or other locations, taking into account the usual parameters (nuclear material category, conversion time, inventory or annual throughput). Chapter II establishes the requirements regarding relevant information for the SCCC (records, physical inventory and traceability of the measurement systems). Chapter III describes the procedures for the applications of the SCCC at the State level.

The provisions for the application of the SCCC by ABACC are in Chapter IV. It includes the requirements of the relevant information that shall be provided to ABACC (technical questionnaires (TQ), inventory change report (ICR), material balance report (MBR), physical inventory list (PIL), and notification of transfers from, to or between the States Parties. Additionally, Chapter IV describes in a general way the purpose of the inspections, the scope of the inspections, the access for and the notice given for inspections. The general provision for the evaluation of the shipper-receiver differences and the material unaccounted for (MUF) are also included in this Chapter.

Chapters V, VI, VII, VIII and IX refer to designation and conduct of ABACC inspectors, routine communications, revision of the document, transitional arrangements and definitions.

The General Procedures are supplemented by two Annexes giving the Report Forms and the Basic Schedule for Routine Communications.

4. The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC)

For the purpose of applying the SCCC in both countries, the Bilateral Agreement also establishes the ABACC.

The Agreement endows the ABACC with the characteristics of an international agency, and its employees assume the status of international staff. Their privileges and immunities are established in an additional protocol to the Agreement, in the corresponding Headquarters Agreement signed with the Government of Brazil, and in a special Agreement signed with the Government of the Argentine Republic.

The organs of the ABACC are the Commission, its governing body, consisting of four members appointed by the Parties, each Government appointing two, and the Secretariat - its executive body.

The decisions of the Commission may only be taken by unanimous vote of its members.

Any anomaly noted as a result of the inspections or through the appraisal of the national records should be reported by the Secretariat to the Commission, which should urge the Party concerned to rectify the situation.

The Secretariat consists of a Secretary and a Deputy Secretary (who take in turns each year to act as Secretary of the ABACC) and a staff of currently 8 senior Technical Officers (four for each Party), two Administrative Officers, five Administrative Auxiliaries, and about 70 part-time inspectors provided by the Parties (thirty five from each country) who only report to the ABACC while carrying out their inspection duties.

The Agreement establishes that the Brazilian installations must be inspected by Argentine inspectors and vice versa.

The inspectors are experts usually working for the national authority or some other official organization in each country, and they are convoked by the ABACC Secretariat whenever necessary. It should be emphasized that the inspection staff comprises not only experienced people who perform inspections at a national level but also experts in several areas of safeguards’ interest (non-destructive testing, destructive analysis, design and nuclear installation operations, etc.).

The organic structure of the Secretariat consists of a Technical Unit and an Administrative-Financial Unit. The former includes the following areas:

- accounting of nuclear materials;
- planning and evaluation;
- operations;
- technical support.

The annual budget of the ABACC is around US$ 3 million; this does not include the wages of the inspectors and consultants, which are borne directly by the countries; nor does it include the purchase of equipment, which is carried out under special arrangements.

The two Governments contribute equally to the ABACC’s financial support; this is a legal obligation for both Parties, enforceable by law.

5. Implementation of ABACC and of the SCCC

The Secretariat of ABACC started its operations in July 1992. The Initial Report on the inventories of nuclear material in all nuclear activities in each Party was received in September this same year. Considering that both countries had at that time nuclear material under IAEA safeguards (INFCIRC/66 type agreements), the Secretariat decided to concentrate the initial efforts on the control of nuclear materials submitted only to the SCCC.

At present, the geographical distribution of safeguards activities in Argentina and Brazil are shown in the map bellow.

The present number of facilities and/or locations outside facilities (LOFs) are described in the following table.

Type	Argentina	Brazil	Total
Conversion facilities	5	1	6
Enrichment facilities	1	2	3
Fuel fabrication facilities	4	1	5
Power reactors	2	1	3
Research reactors	6	3	9
R&D facilities	2	3	5
Critical/sub critical units	-	3	3
Storage facilities	3	2	5
LOFs on fuel research	4	5	9
LOFs on reprocess research	-	1	1
LOFs analytical laboratories	3	2	5
Other LOFs	7	6	13
Total	37	30	67

The activities performed until December 1995 can be summarized as follows:

- Accounting: When ABACC began its activities the records and reports system in use by the Parties was compatible with INFCIRC/66. The changing from the previous system to the one foreseen in the SCCC (compatible with INFCIRC/153 type agreements) was made gradually and by March 1994, was fully implemented. Since then some improvements were introduced to the accounting data-base through the addition of various functions that the program could not handle previously, such as automatic generation of MBRs. A start was made on implementing two new data-bases for registration and control respectively of the punctuality and errors detected in reports received by ABACC. The inspection data-base is being kept up to date with some changes in the inspection charts to be brought into effect during 1996.

- Design Information Verification: By year-end 1994 ABACC had forwarded to the IAEA the DIQs for all facilities subject to safeguards. These documents are analyzed by both agencies and comments are forwarded to the corresponding national authorities. The first cycle of DIQ verifications was completed in October 1995, covering all facilities. Practically all DIQs were verified, making it possible to speed up negotiation of the Facility Attachments. The task of verifying will continue throughout 1996, supplementing this information and when necessary re-verifying it due to the new criteria adopted by the IAEA for strengthening safeguards.

- Inspections: The table bellow presents the number and type of inspections that were carried out by ABACC in compliance with its objectives.

Type of Inspections	1992	1993	1994	1995
DIQ verification	6	11	73	5
Initial inventory and interim verifications	5	24	113	139
Total number of inspections	11	35	186	144
Inspection efforts (persons-day)	28	106	562	683
Inspectors (persons-day)	114	373	1506	1489

A great increase in the number of inspections can be noticed in 1994, compared to the results of the previous year. This fact is mainly due to the verifications of the Initial Report and of DIQs as a consequence of the coming into force of the Quadripartite Agreement in March 1994. It is expected that inspection efforts will stabilize over the next few years at levels close to those of 1995, as no major increase is foreseen in the number of facilities under safeguards. It is believed that the rationalization drive introducing more advanced safeguards methods and concepts may well enhance the effectiveness of safeguards and reduce current inspection efforts.

A data-base that organizes the principal inspection data in order to streamline the preparatory work for the inspections as well as inspection reports was set up, ensuring rapid access to data from earlier inspections. This data-base is in the test phase, and is being used by some inspectors at the experimental level.

- Technical support: Portable equipment for inspection was procured by the end of 1992. This initial inversion was expanded during 1993 and 1994. Also, a system for using metallic seals was implemented. Studies for the procurement of specific equipment for each facility started in early 1994 and, in some cases, a conceptual design was elaborated. The system for destructive analysis was set up based on a network of laboratories in Argentina and Brazil. Additionally, reference material and standards for both destructive and non-destructive analysis were procured and/or developed. The quality of the analysis of samples is verified periodically by means of a laboratory inter-comparison program. Advanced optical surveillance equipment has recently been purchased and will be deployed in the field during 1996.

- Training: A seminar for ABACC inspectors was carried out in each country in the second half of 1992. In June 1993, a training course was organized by the Argentine national authority, supported by ABACC. Another training course sponsored by ABACC was organized in September 1994 by the Brazilian national authority. These training activities were carried out mainly by experts from the national authorities and ABACC officials, with the participation of guest lectures from other countries (USA and France) and safeguards organizations (IAEA and EURATOM). In addition to these courses, the Secretariat of ABACC is promoting a program of specific workshops that started in 1994. Yet another training course for Argentine and Brazilian inspectors was held with the support of the national authorities of both countries in 1995. The purpose of this course was to guide inspectors in the procedures for verifying records and filling in record auditing charts. Under the auspices of the cooperation agreement signed between the Department of Energy of the United States and ABACC in April 1994, a first workshop took place at a fuel fabrication plant in Argentina in February 1995. This workshop fostered interaction between Argentine and Brazilian inspectors who, due to the practice of each inspecting the facilities in the other country, never work together, thus allowing them to exchange experiences accumulated during their inspections. In March 1996, another inspector training course for enrichment measurement using high resolution equipment was performed by both DOE and ABACC personnel.

- Technical Co-operation: Technical co-operation with nuclear organizations in Argentina and Brazil, and outside organizations is particularly relevant for fulfilling the purposes of ABACC, as it has decided to use the technical capacity and facilities of both countries or even third parties wherever possible. Co-operation with other nations or international organizations also helped enhance the technical abilities available to ABACC. Technical co-operation has taken place through formal co-operation agreements, such as those with the Argentine and Brazilian national authorities, and with the Department of Energy of the United States, or through complying with specific demands of ABACC. As far as the co-operation with the Department of Energy is concerned, the activities carried out involve training courses, laboratory inter-comparison, workshops on advanced measurement techniques, remote monitoring, and development and evaluation of advanced containment and surveillance technologies.

- Planning and Evaluation: The assessment of the results of inspections is continuously performed. The activities in this area were initially concentrated in the discussion of basic criteria and guidelines aimed at supporting design verification and inspections. In 1993, the Application Manuals (equivalent to the Facility Attachments) were negotiated. The process was interrupted after the entry into force of the Quadripartite Agreement, in order to accommodate the coordination with the IAEA. The main activities in 1994 were the drafting of Facility Attachments, the beginning of discussion on the coordination of activities with the IAEA, and bilateral and trilateral discussions on “ad-hoc” procedures for the enrichment facilities. At present, the Planning and Evaluation area concentrate its effort on the coordination of activities between the IAEA and ABACC, negotiations of “ad-hoc” safeguards procedures and negotiation of Facility Attachments.

The ABACC safeguards approach is generally based on the verification of the operator’s declarations and, in particular, on physical inventory and inventory changes during a material balance period using containment and surveillance as supporting means.

The level of control for each facility, including the frequency of inspections, is established considering the following variables: characteristics of the facility, nuclear material category (taking into account the relevance of isotopic composition), conversion time, inventory and production time (related to the facility throughput). The frequency of inspections and/or the scope of the inspections may be affected by the quality of measurement system by the application of containment and surveillance and by the accessibility of the material.

The optimum number of inspections is usually determined by considering the type of facility (item or bulk) and the maximum inventory or throughput.

The intervals of time between inspections are established considering the nuclear material production time, the conversion time and the safeguards approach for each facility. In addition, ABACC carries out systematic re-verifications of the validity of the design information.

The first evaluation of the result of an inspection is performed by the inspectors themselves. The inspection report shall contain the inspectors’ comments and conclusions about the verification activities, including their perception of the appropriateness/relevance of these activities and of the safeguards approach, as well as recommendations on resolved and unresolved discrepancies. The inspectors shall also recommend additional actions whenever necessary. For ABACC this is a fundamental stage in the control system and requires technical skill and judgment capacity from the inspectors. ABACC has always been fully aware of the key role played by well trained inspectors in the field.

A second stage of evaluation is performed at ABACC headquarters, which includes the overall assessment of the inspection report/results with two basic purposes:

(i) to assess the material balance for a given period, specially in case of relevant bulk facilities, through already known methods (MUF evaluation, SRD, etc.);
(ii) to analyze the conclusions about the verification activities for an individual MBA in the context of the conclusions obtained from other MBAs, specially in case of MBAs that have close relationship, and globally for each country.

After having made these evaluations, the national authority is notified about the conclusions of the verification activities.

Whenever justified, a deep consistency evaluation is made for a specific facility for a given period of time. This evaluation takes into account inspection reports and results, accounting reports, characteristics of the facility and the fuel cycle.

All discrepancies are considered immediately with an urgency that depends on the type and quantity of the nuclear material involved and the strategic importance of the facility (or facilities) concerned. Unresolved discrepancies may constitute an anomaly and, in such a case, it triggers a specific sequence of actions. An anomaly is reported to ABACC’s Commission.

6. The Quadripartite Agreement

The Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy was complemented by a Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil the IAEA and the ABACC, concluded on 13 December 1991, and in force since March 1994, by virtue of which the IAEA also assumes the responsibility of applying full scope safeguards in both countries.

The basic undertakings of this Agreement are the acceptance by the States Parties of safeguards, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, on all nuclear materials in all nuclear activities within their territories, under their jurisdiction or carried out under their control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other explosive devices.

The Quadripartite Agreement is similar to INFCIRC/153, with some particularities that were introduced mainly due to the existence of the SCCC and ABACC.

The General Part of the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Quadripartite Agreement entered into force on the same date of the Agreement. Some particularities can also be found in this document such as the provision for ABACC to send periodically to the IAEA, information on the scope of its inspections, inspection reports, etc. There is an entire code that covers arrangements between ABACC and the IAEA for co-operation in the application of safeguards under the Agreement.

In implementing the Agreement, both agencies shall be guided by the following principles:

(a) the need to reach independent conclusions;
(b) the need to coordinate to the extent possible their activities for the optimum implementation of the Agreement and, in particular, to avoid unnecessary duplication of ABACC’s safeguards; and
(c) when performing their activities, ABACC and the IAEA shall work jointly, whenever feasible, according to compatible safeguards criteria of the two organizations.

The verification of the Initial Report by the IAEA started in June 1994, after several coordination meetings aimed at establishing “ad-hoc” rules to facilitate these activities. For most of the facilities previously under IAEA safeguards (INFCIRC/66), ABACC carried out the verification of the initial inventory simultaneously with the IAEA. This activity was performed by several teams of inspectors working in both countries. By March 1995, practically all the initial inventory had been verified.

To the extent possible, the verification of the Design Information Questionnaires (DIQs) was combined with that of the Initial Report. Current conditions make it possible to speed up Facility Attachments’ drafting and negotiations. Some draft Facility Attachments were discussed in 1995, although no final text has been agreed. ABACC has provided the IAEA with a draft Facility Attachment for almost all facilities and LOFs which were not under IAEA safeguards prior to the entry into force of the Quadripartite Agreement. Eleven draft Facility Attachments received from the IAEA were analyzed and discussed at several bilateral and trilateral meetings, as well as at working group levels. These activities also included an analysis of the DIQs and the results of their verifications, as well as visits or technical discussions in certain cases, and the use of inspection results. ABACC proposed the inclusion of a specific item in the Facility Attachments covering joint activities by the two agencies, as established in the General Part of the Subsidiary Arrangements. In parallel, discussions are under way with the IAEA of the general principle for coordination between the two agencies for safeguards activities.

Having almost completed the verification of the Initial Report, a regime of “ad-hoc” inspections has been implemented. Almost all inspections are carried out on coordinated dates by both organizations and some practical arrangements in the field have been implemented.

Several levels of coordination are considered in the General Part of the Subsidiary Arrangements, that when fully implemented - and we don’t see why they shouldn’t be so in a very near future -, will allow an effective application of safeguards by both agencies, avoiding the unnecessary duplication of efforts.

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