The Treaty of Tlatelolco, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Nuclear Non-Proliferation: An NGO's View

Hon. Ben Sanders
Chairman of the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN)

This chapter discusses how the activities of certain non-governmental organizations (NGOs) concerned with nuclear non-proliferation relate to the creation and the functions of nuclear-weapon-free zones and in particular to the aims and activities of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The effort to establish such nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) is a relatively recent phenomenon among the various measures that have been adopted to deter the spread of nuclear weapons. Even the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which has become the classic example of an NWFZ, is only thirty years old and, as of the time this piece was written, had not yet entered into force for all states of the region which it covers. Similarly, the activities of NGOs in this context are a relatively new phenomenon, which is not widely recognized. It may be worthwhile to examine in some detail the practical and the potential interaction between the two concepts, and particularly of some ways in which an NGO may help to promote the purposes of the NWFZ. That is done here on the basis of the experience gained by one specific member of the NGO community: the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN), with which the author has been associated since its establishment in early 1987. PPNN's mandate focusses on strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, within which treaties to keep specific geographic regions free from nuclear weapons have come to play a crucial role.

The Tlatelolco Treaty and the organization created for its implementation, OPANAL, lend themselves admirably for a discussion of this kind. OPANAL and PPNN are in close touch. The two bodies have many interests in common and the contact between them has received particular impetus from the fact that OPANAL's Secretary- General serves in a personal capacity as a member of PPNN's Core Group, which is at the heart of that body's operations.

With some notable exceptions, it has mainly been through deliberations in the framework of the United Nations, and through specialized conferences and meetings sponsored by the UN, that NGOs have been able to achieve their present involvement in issues of nuclear-arms limitation and disarmament. It therefore seemed appropriate to begin this chapter with a brief sketch of the history of the Tlatelolco Treaty as that has been reflected in the deliberations of the United Nations on those issues.

The idea of establishing geographic zones from which all nuclear weapons would be banned was first raised in the 1950s and has since become a reality which plays an increasingly important part in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Besides being of direct relevance in a variety of regions, it is now seen more and more as a primary element in the world-wide non-proliferation system, as well being an important factor in global moves towards the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

It was in 1978, at its first Special Session devoted to disarmament, that the United Nations General Assembly for the first time unanimously expressed its recognition that "[t]he establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure." The Final Document of the Special Session goes on to say that the process of establishing such zones should be encouraged; that the characteristics of each region should be taken into account; and that the states participating should comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones so that they are genuinely free of nuclear weapons. The Final Document calls on nuclear-weapon states to respect the status of the nuclear weapon-free zone and to provide negative security assurances¹.

The formulation used in the Final Document was adopted at the end of a long and difficult debate and it bridges wide differences of view, which adds to its importance as a statement of international principle. The text specifies the norms with which a zonal denuclearization arrangement must comply to be a legitimate NWFZ. The features listed were not invented on the occasion of the Special Session. They are all based on the example of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. That treaty has not only created the earliest instance of an NWFZ covering an entire populated region and generated the first instance of such an arrangement being implemented in practice, but it has for many years been recognized as the prototype of what an NWFZ could and should be.

The injunction that "the characteristics of each region should be taken into account" may be the element that lends the greatest attraction to the concept of NWFZs. It reflects the recognition that the zonal agreement can be tailor-made to suit the specific needs of the states of the area in question. No two zonal treaties are exactly alike. To give one example from among many possible ones: the Treaty of Pelindaba, which makes Africa into an NWFZ, contains a provision that expressly calls for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in that area². The Treaty of Rarotonga, on the other hand, establishes a "South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty". Although in omitting the word "weapons", this title might be understood to refer to a prohibition in the area not only of nuclear weapons but also of peaceful nuclear activities, it was chosen to imply in particular that besides nuclear weapons, all testing of nuclear explosive devices, as well as radioactive pollution of the environment, would be banned. The Treaty contains specific provisions to that effect. With regard to peaceful applications, while these are not forbidden, the Treaty does not include a provision calling for their promotion³.

The first formal move made within the framework of the United Nations towards the denuclearization of Latin America came when Brazil, at the Seventeenth Session of the General Assembly in 1962, submitted a resolution concerning the establishment of a denuclearized zone in that continent. Not coincidentally, this was the year of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when countries in the area realized that they might well have become nuclear targets, had the Crisis not been settled at the last moment. The next year, the presidents of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico issued a declaration in which they announced that their countries would desist from making nuclear weapons, and called for the recognition of Latin America as a denuclearized zone. In a follow-up on this initiative, representatives of seventeen Latin American countries met in Mexico City in late 1964 and decided to establish a Preparatory Commission to prepare a preliminary draft of a denuclearization treaty for Latin America. The work of the Preparatory Commission culminated in a preliminary text for a draft treaty and in January 1967 the negotiations were concluded. The process culminated in the signing, in the district of Mexico City called Tlatelolco, of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Weapons in Latin America⁴ and the foundation of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL). The process was followed carefully by the General Assembly, where each year a resolution on the subject was passed⁵.

As should be obvious from this brief and greatly simplified historical introduction, that the issue of NWFZs in general and in particular the genesis of the Treaty of Tlatelolco have played an important role in the deliberations in the United Nations. The discussions have taken place in the context of discussions on a number of related subjects, including disarmament and arms limitation; nuclear non-proliferation; security guarantees and regional stability; verification; and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as under a heading of their own. Developments in the United Nations and in related international bodies, particularly the Conference on Disarmament and the International Atomic Energy Agency, are of interest to a wide range of NGOs but the interest in the issue of nuclear-weapon-free zones may be said to have be relatively recent. That also goes for the birth and the further development of the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone and of OPANAL; apart from a few NGOs such as Pugwash⁶, which had long been engaged in seeking regional solutions to security issues, during the early stages of the process few NGOs paid it much attention. As further NWFZs were discussed and came about, the interest of NGOs grew and it is no exaggeration to say that the creation of several of the more recent NWFZs has been helped by the efforts of NGOs.

At this point it is appropriate to insert a few words about the kind of NGOs that are active in the area.

Non-Governmental Organizations are a category of organizations that is difficult to define⁷. Taken literally, any group or institution that is not "governmental" might be categorized as a non-governmental organization, but that could not serve as a meaningful definition. One feature of NGOs is that they are associations of people deliberately created for specific purposes, as distinct from groups like families, tribes or clans, which grow naturally. Another element that helps define NGOs is what they are not: they cannot be governmental bodies or part of an administration of a country or an international, intergovernmental organization. The essential part of the definition is the "NG" in "NGO".

It is not a coincidence, therefore, that most publicly recognized NGOs are found in states run on democratic principles where citizens think it is worthwhile to gather in pursuit of a given cause and are free to do so. In many western democracies, NGOs are becoming more and more important, some of them primarily to promote social associations among persons with kindred interests, but many also as lobbies or pressure groups formed to influence government at various levels, for or against particular legislative measures, executive actions and government policies, at home or abroad. While retaining their "non-governmental" independence, in a way such NGOs may be seen as part of the government system.

NGOs that are created for the purpose of influencing government policies and actions come in many shapes and forms. One way to categorize them is to distinguish those that deal with a variety of issues which are all part of one basic subject from those that are set up to pursue a specific issue. An example of an American NGO that covers a range of problems is the Union of Concerned Scientists, which is involved with most of the problems scientists interested in what goes on around them might be concerned about: environmental issues, such as the greenhouse effect and acid rain; social ills such as drug abuse; national security. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is but one of their concerns and is part of their preoccupation with security questions. The activities of groups like Greenpeace or the Parliamentarians for Global Action also have a wide spread; the interest of the former is mainly environmental, in the widest sense; the latter is active in many aspects of international politics. Both organizations have branched out to deal with issues connected with their principal fields of interest, through the networks of contacts which they maintain in their respective areas. Greenpeace in particular is well-known for its ferocious defense of the environment against actual or supposed nuclear pollution. Its preoccupation with this problem has led it to agitate against the use of nuclear energy altogether. That effort has had a striking success. As part of its campaign it has for instance encouraged and stiffened the resistance of the government of Austria to the completion and the further operation of nuclear installations in countries bordering on that nation. Greenpeace's activities in that respect are a good illustration of the phenomenon described in the Foreign Affairs article by Jessica Matthews referred to below in endnote 7, of ways in which cross-border NGO networks constitute "unprecedented channels of influence".

At the other extreme are groups like PPNN, that concentrate on a single issue with which they deal in depth, paying attention to topics that are related to their primary interest, but trying not to be diverted too far from that main interest. Such groups tend to give preference to study, to the dissemination of topical information and to the exchange of ideas, and they make it a point to refrain from advocating a particular policy or approach to achieve their goals. The business of these NGOs is in the first place to help improve the ability of its target audience to consider a given subject with a view to finding solutions for specified problems. PPNN, for instance, having adopted as its primary mission to help deter the spread of nuclear weapons and promote their elimination, seeks to impart to government officials, diplomats, academics and the media, objective information on developments in the area of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Constructed around a Core Group of non-proliferation and disarmament experts from 17 states, it can act as a source of advice based on impartial information and without a political bias.

Any important international issue nowadays becomes a topic of interest of a large number of NGOs, whether those belong to the category of specialized or of diversified NGOs referred to. The conference that was held in New York in the Spring of last year, which reviewed the implementation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and ended by extending it indefinitely, was attended by representatives of more than 150 non-governmental bodies. The list of those representatives bears the heading "Research Institutes and Non-Governmental Organizations", thereby reflecting and avoiding the difficulty the Secretariat would have had in defining precisely which of these bodies were NGOs proper and which might have to be described differently. That list includes anything from major national and international advocacy groups to individual researchers, and points to the wide range of purposes of the organizations listed⁸.

Diverse though they are, what these groups have in common is the absence of formal governmental involvement. Some governments may seek to associate themselves with the aims and activities of a particular group and promote - and in doing so, to some extent influence - its work by giving it practical or financial support. In principle, however, the NGOs discussed here, "true" NGOs, are independent from governmental interference. Some, such as Parliamentarians for Global Action referred to above, may get some funds from governments or legislatures, but because they involve members of the legislatures in a wide range of states they achieve a remarkable degree of non-partisanship. NGOs may include current or former governmental officials but, as in the case of my own organization, those act in a purely personal capacity. PPNN gets its funds from a range of private foundations, in the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom. It has on occasion received modest help-in-kind from governments, as when one government subsidizes the travel of participants from developing countries to a particular meeting, or another provides interpretation of the proceedings of a conference into a second working language. It should be underlined, however, that such assistance is in no way conditioned upon PPNN acting in the specific interest of the countries in question or on its following the donor's specific policy. The multinational composition of the Core Group that is at the basis of PPNN's operations guarantees its independence from any one state or group of states.

One special merit of some NGOs is that they can serve as a sounding board for potential governmental initiatives which cannot productively be discussed at governmental level, or are not ripe for such discussion. In this way NGOs may prepare the ground for the spread of ideas that may eventually become subjects for discussion or negotiation at an official level. Because NGOs can work without publicity, activities in this area do not publicly exist, and are deniable; even if the proposals they advance reflect the thinking of a particular government or governments, that source need not be identified. In this way NGOs can be a meeting place for discussion of initiatives that do not or do not yet lend themselves to open intergovernmental dialogue. One might call this "preparatory treaty building" or "prenegotiation". An aspect of this function is that NGOs can pursue objectives faster than bureaucracies, which by nature move slowly.

An exceptionally important element in the work, especially of the kind of international NGOs that concentrate on specific issues, is advising governments on legislation to make given policies possible (example: export regulations to restrict the free flow of materials or equipment for the production of weapons of mass destruction) and training officials in the application of such rules (example: customs practices; the recognition of items that might belong in restricted categories). NGOs can also serve as avenues for the transfer of experience in sensitive matters such as physical security of installations or materials, on which governments may not always wish to ask other governments for advice. International governmental organizations may also benefit from the experience and advice of NGOs. We have seen this, for instance, during the process of establishment of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, in which PPNN played a modest but discernable role and one of the members of its Core Group in particular was one of the primary authors of the Treaty of Pelindaba.

Experience has shown that there are a number of ways in which a specialized international body like PPNN, operating on a strictly non-governmental basis but possessing good connections with a large number of government officials in all regions of the world, and blessed with the favourable views of most of the governments that are aware of its activities, can contribute to the creation and the work of NWFZs. The expertise represented by present and previous members of its Core Group enable it to function as a valuable resource on which secretariats of NWFZs can call for impartial advice and subject-specific research. If called upon, such bodies can consider certain issues relevant to the creation, respectively the functioning, of new or existing NWFZs, as PPNN has done in the past. NGOs endowed with the attributes that characterize a body such as the one with which this author is associated may serve as the venue for discussions that could lead to inter-governmental negotiations on regional arrangements which might ultimately result in the establishment of an NWFZ. Their meetings present good occasions at which to explain the functions and potentialities of NWFZs, in general or in region-specific terms. Meetings of NGOs such as PPNN may also present a venue for the discussion of the modalities of implementation of regional denuclearization arrangements and generally create opportunities for personal contact and informal deliberations which participating diplomats and other government officials may not find elsewhere.

Reverting more specifically to OPANAL and to PPNN, it is obvious that the former's long-established practices owe little or nothing to the activities of an NGO precisely two decennia younger. On the other hand, the experience gained with the establishment and implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the creation and consolidation of OPANAL has given PPNN much material to bring to bear when it is called upon to assist others in this area. Much of that material has long since entered the public domain, especially through multilateral deliberations in the framework of the United Nations. But there are a range of aspects unique to OPANAL and PPNN has used these to promote similar moves elsewhere. In that context one may think in the first place of the existence of subregional verification arrangements such as the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) that meet the specific requirements of the states concerned while complying with requirements set by the Treaty and the global safeguards body, the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The genesis of those special verification arrangements, although widely known, deserves a brief mention in this context. In the 1970s and 1980s there were intermittent reports about attempts on the part of both Argentina and Brazil to use nuclear energy for military purposes. Both states were reported to be developing means of enriching uranium intended for the propulsion of naval vessels, with Brazil possibly being somewhat ahead of Argentina. There were also reports that Brazil was constructing natural uranium fuelled reactors for the production of plutonium. These activities were said to be carried out as part of a "parallel programme" which was not under international safeguards. It was even alleged that IAEA safeguards staff seeking to inspect facilities covered by agreements that called for safeguards found their access barred. At the same time Argentina, which also had not submitted all its facilities to safeguards was also said to be enriching uranium in at least one non-safeguarded facility, presumably also with a view to using this in the propulsion of naval vessels. The relations between the two countries - already somewhat strained - were understood to be further impaired by these developments.

In the late 1980s the military regimes in Argentina and Brazil were replaced by civilian governments and it was not long before the respective Presidents decided to convert any military nuclear activity that had taken place in their countries to purely peaceful uses. In April 1988, Presidents Alfonsin of Argentina and Sarney of Brazil signed an agreement of cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Shortly after, the new President of Argentina, Menem, visited Brazil and on that occasion the bilateral cooperation was further widened. Argentina raised the possibility of acceding to the Tlatelolco Treaty if it and Brazil could together administer their own system of verifying compliance. Meanwhile, however, there were reports about further developments in the nuclear programme of Brazil's navy and in the summer of 1990 the Brazilian Physics Society claimed that the navy had the means to enrich uranium to weapons-grade quality, that the army was planning to construct a plutonium production reactor, and that in the Amazon state of Para a shaft had been dug to test nuclear explosives. Apparently in response to this report, Brazil's President Collor de Mello ordered the military project dismantled and the shaft at Para publicly closed. Subsequently, in a speech to the UN General Assembly, he formally renounced all nuclear explosions. This gave further impetus to the Argentine-Brazil cooperation and the establishment of ABACC, under which the two countries would verify compliance with the respective undertakings to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. Argentina, Brazil and ABACC later concluded an agreement with the IAEA, providing for the coordination between the various verification systems. In 1992, Argentina announced that it was set to ratify the Tlatelolco Treaty and that year, on the 25th anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Argentina and Brazil jointly declared their intention to bring the Treaty into effect. This was duly realized one year later⁹.

The development is worth noting as an example of the versatility and the usefulness of NWFZ arrangements as solutions to regional tension. Here was one major Latin American country with an active nuclear-weapons programme facing another that certainly had the potential of developing such a programme if it had not already embarked on one. The situation was dealt with through a unique form of cooperation, both in peaceful nuclear activities and in the arrangements to ensure that the respective states were indeed complying with their undertakings to keep those activities peaceful. Subsequently, these arrangements, duly associated with the IAEA safeguards system, were brought under the aegis of the Tlatelolco Treaty. In the last instance it is fair to say, therefore, that the existence of the Treaty made it possible for both states to step back from the brink¹⁰.

As further important features inherent to Tlatelolco one might mention the clear geographic definition of the zone it covers; the high number of ratifications; the solemn undertakings given by all states outside the region that have geographic and political responsibilities in the region, to behave as if they were members of the region; the negative security assurances given by all nuclear-weapon states. Last but not least, mention should be made of the existence of an effective secretariat and the increasing efforts of OPANAL to make member governments and governments of non-member states, as well as non-governmental bodies with an interest in the area aware of its activities.

The recognition by OPANAL of the contributions NGOs could make to its work bears the seed of much positive cooperation. NGOs - and here again, the writer should be understood to speak from the point of view of one such body, and even then in a purely personal capacity - can do things which neither government nor intergovernmental organizations can readily do. For instance, while the regional organization might conceivably be capable of seeking to coordinate the positions taken by its members at various meetings of a global nature, such as review conferences of the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a body like PPNN might help it in that effort by activities the central secretariat might be less inclined or equipped to shoulder. PPNN has already made a move in that direction by holding a regional meeting at Caracas at which it briefed diplomats and other government officials from the region about global non-proliferation issues and set the stage for informal discussions of those issues in the light of strictly regional preoccupations. PPNN has also found that it can make contributions through, among other ways, the distribution of pertinent documentation; the provision of opportunities for persons from the regional organization to present regional points of view at meetings on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament that are primarily globally oriented; and by setting the stage for informal exchanges between regional representatives and spokespersons for organizations that function as elements of the world-wide non-proliferation system, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. As we have also seen in the past, informal meetings can serve to promote an airing of views about issues of physical security and environmental safety that arise from the international transport of nuclear material and of radioactive waste. Perhaps most importantly, PPNN's periodic seminars for diplomats may present openings for discussions between representatives of states parties to instruments like the Treaty of Tlatelolco and personnel from nuclear-weapon states, on such matters as nuclear disarmament, security assurances, and other nuclear security aspects of regional as well as world-wide interest.

In sum, nuclear-weapon-free-zone arrangements have become key factors of regional security, barriers to the spread of nuclear weapons in the areas concerned, and essential elements in global moves towards nuclear disarmament. The nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean that was created 30 years ago by the Treaty of Tlatelolco has become the prototype for such arrangements as the first, and so far most successful example. It presents some unique features that reenforce its prototypical role. The secretariat of OPANAL, the organization created by the Treaty for its implementation, is engaged in seeking ways to enhance that implementation to the fullest extent. As one way of doing so, it has begun to call on the expertise of non-governmental organizations active in the substantive and geographic area covered by the Treaty. It considers where the most effective use might be made of the particular capabilities of NGOs to complement its activities and assist it in particular areas of work. This development is still in an early stage but it already shows a potential for mutual benefit. OPANAL might wish to explore where that potential is likely to be greatest and to promote cooperation where it feels a need and a possibility. PPNN, for one, along with other non-governmental groups, should be ready to be of any assistance it might be called upon to render.

NOTES:

(1) UN Document S-10/2, Final Document of the 10th Special Session of the General Assembly, paras 60-62.
(2) Article 8 of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty of 11 April, 1996. (UN Document A/50/426 13/9/1996).
(3) Article 4 of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty of 6 August, 1985, entitled Peaceful nuclear activities is limited to non-proliferation provisions similar to those of the NPT. This would imply but does not expressly state that peaceful nuclear activities in the Zone are not prohibited.
(4) The phrase "and the Caribbean" was added as one of a set of amendments adopted at a special session of the General Conference of OPANAL in August 1992.
(5) For a brief history of discussions in various sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, see 'The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-1970', UN Publication, Sales No.: 70.IX.1, pages 334-346.
(6) Full name: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs.
(7) For a brief but very informative discussion of the role "non-state actors" and particularly NGOs have come to play in international relations, see Jessica T. Matthews, 'Power Shift', in Foreign Affairs, January/February 1997, Volume 76, Number 1, pp. 50-66,
(8) NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part 11), pages 550-576.
(9) The earlier stages of this development are clearly outlined in John Redick's 'Argentina and Brazil: an Evolving Nuclear Relationship', PPNN Occasional Paper Seven, July 1990.
(10) The development can be traced in PPNN's Newsbriefs for the period March 1988 to September 1993, in particular, No. 1, p. 3; No. 2, p. 3; No. 6, p. 8; No. 7, p. 3, 7; No. 8, p. 3, 7; No. 11, p. 2, 7; No. 17, p. 3; No. 21, p. 3, 12; No. 24, p. 7. It is interesting to compare the case of Brazil in this context with that of South Africa, which had succeeded in producing a modest nuclear arsenal and destroyed this before becoming a party to the Treaty of Pelindaba. If the existence of the Tlatelolco Treaty made it easier for Brazil to step back from its military programme, it was the reversal of South Africa's military policy that may be said to have made the conclusion of the Pelindaba Treaty possible.