Precedents and Legacies:
Tlatelolco's Contribution to the Next Century

John R. Redick, Professor,
University of Virginia

INTRODUCTION

By most historical accounts, Tlatelolco originated in the heat of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, as Latin American and Caribbean nations found themselves helpless pawns and potential targets in a super-power nuclear contest. In fact the Cuban Missile Crisis was only a catalyst which gave political momentum to a movement with older and deeper roots.

The first proposal for a Latin American nuclear arms control agreement was offered by Costa Rica in 1958 to the Organization of American States (OAS) in the context of a broader initiative for regional arms control. The Costa Rican proposal called for an agreement by Latin American nations "not to manufacture nuclear weapons or acquire them from the powers that do manufacture them."¹ This proposal, and subsequent Chilean proposals (1959-60), sparked interest in several Latin American capitals. However, progress toward regional arms control within the Inter-American system proved impossible.

At approximately the same time, however, the seeds of the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone were also germinating in Africa. Stimulated by French nuclear testing in the Sahara (1960) and growing indications of nuclear weapons interest by the apartheid government of South Africa, African nations began to call for creation of an African nuclear-weapon-free zone. In 1961 the 16th United Nations General Assembly supported a resolution stressing that Africa should remain free of the global arms race, and that the African continent should be considered as a nuclear-free zone.² Brazil was the only Latin American nation to support this resolution; seventeen others, including Mexico, abstained.

The interest of African nations in creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone strongly resonated in Brazil in the 1960-61 period. At that time the Brazilian government (under the leadership of Janio Quadros and, subsequently, Joáo Goulart) was nurturing close diplomatic relations with African nations which have contributed significantly to Brazil's rich cultural heritage. In September 1962, prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis, Brazil's ambassador to the Geneva Disarmament Committee, Alfonso Arinos de Melo Franco, proposed to the 17th U.N. General Assembly that the previous year's resolution for the denuclearization of Africa be expanded to include Latin America.³

In early 1962 the Mexican government appointed Alfonso García Robles as its ambassador to Brazil. García Robles had already established a highly distinguished career as a member of the Mexican delegation to the San Francisco Conference (which created the United Nations) and, subsequently, as a part of the U.N. Secretariat, and in other leadership positions in the Mexican Foreign Ministry. García Robles observed the discussions within the Brazilian Foreign Ministry and ultimately became convinced as to the importance of a Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone. Subsequently, he persuaded his foreign minister that Mexico should assume a leadership position and, in March 1963, President Mateos extended an invitation to the presidents of Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Bolivia to join in this effort. The rest, as is often said, "is history."

This brief, early historical background to Tlatelolco illustrates an important point: the power of ideas and the importance of individual leadership. The idea of a Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone had multiple sources and authors, and preceded the Missile Crisis, but ultimately the leadership was provided by a great Mexican, a great Latin American, and a great citizen of the world, Alfonso García Robles. If there is one legacy of Tlatelolco that stands out, it is that when individual tenacity and leadership is joined to a noble objective, the human condition can be improved. Tlatelolco's legacy is hope and confidence for a better future.

TLATELOLCO'S ENDURING CONTRIBUTIONS

Tlatelolco's main contributions to arms control and disarmament have been well-documented by scholars and experts. They include:
- it was the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a populated area;
- the commitment of the parties to acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards;
- the prohibition of foreign-controlled nuclear weapons bases (not covered by the NPT);
- the innovative entry-into-force procedures;
- the inclusion of binding protocols of support for nuclear-weapon states and states having territorial interests in the region;
- an organizational structure which included the General Conference, Council, and the Secretariat (OPANAL);
- and the expectation that Tlatelolco would serve as a model for other regions.

This essay, however, emphasizes some of the less obvious but more enduring contributions of Tlatelolco.

(1) The Value of a Partial Zone.

Tlatelolco demonstrated the value of a nuclear-weapon-free zone agreement even if it lacks, initially, participation of "core" countries in a region. Conventional wisdom long accepted by many experts and policy makers suggests that to be effective and deserving of foreign support, a zone must have participation of all the "important" nations in the region. Yet the Latin American zone existed for twenty-five years without the full participation of several nations which, by any calculation, (size, GNP, population, nuclear development) are key regional nations. During the long absence of these nations many experts incorrectly dismissed the value of the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone, by overlooking important points which also have relevance for the current era. First, even without the participation of all regional nations, the zone had value by providing mutual assurance to those Latin American nations that were Contracting Parties to the treaty. Of comparable importance was the fact that, even without participation of important nations, for twenty-five years the Tlatelolco Treaty defined the regional "norm" of no nuclear weapons in Latin America. Those important Latin American nations that were not Contracting Parties (Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, and Chile) were seen as being at variance with the "norm" or the common will of their Latin American neighbors. The existence of the zone, however incomplete, defined a common goal which most Latin Americans believed would, in the course of time and political conditions, involve all Latin American nations. This Tlatelolco lesson applies today to other regions, including regions of tension, where the political conditions may currently preclude participation by all nations in a proposed zonal agreement. Tlatelolco teaches us that there is real value in negotiating even a partial zone, because in doing so we shape the future norm.

(2) A Differentiated Entry into Force Procedure

Tlatelolco's innovative entry-into-force procedure suggests a second contribution having relevance to certain regions lacking nuclear-weapon-free zones, such as the Middle East. Fashioned by García Robles as an act of political expediency, the procedure (Article 28, Paragraph 2) allowed the treaty to come into force for those nations choosing to waive certain requirements: treaty ratification and completion of IAEA safeguards by all Latin American states, and conclusion of supporting protocol agreements by nuclear-weapon states and external states having territorial interests within the zone. Less noted, but of long-term significance, this procedure also permitted certain Latin American countries that chose, at the time, not to become full Contracting Parties, to retain on organic link to the treaty. That was done by differentiating between "Contracting Parties" (ie, those countries which had waived the provisions of Article 28, Paragraph 1, thereby bringing the treaty into force for their territory) and "Signatories" (ie, those nations which had signed and ratified, including those not waiving the provisions of Article 28, Paragraph 1, and for which the treaty was not in force). Non-Contracting Parties which were Signatories, such as Brazil and Chile, retained a mechanism to advise and influence the conduct of the treaty (Article 6) while the ultimate authority rested with the Contracting Parties.

The relevant point for a region such as the Middle East, is that it suggests a method of formal linkage to a nuclear-weapon-free zone agreement for states (such as Israel) which are not yet prepared to allow entry into force for their territory. The concurrent obligation assumed by such nations is that they take no additional actions contrary to the objectives of the treaty during that period in which the agreement is not yet in force for their territory. Such a two-tiered relationship could provide a creative way of linking all Middle East nations both to an agreement for a partial zone in the short-term, and to a long-term process for completing a regional nuclear-weapon-free zone.

(3) Creating a Political Context for Rapprochement

A third contribution of Tlatelolco was to help set the political context for the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear rapprochement and accommodation with the nuclear non-proliferation regime.⁴ It was during the latter stages of the Tlatelolco negotiations (from 1964-67) that, for the first time, these two nations began to discuss and develop common positions on sensitive nuclear issues. For many years following completion of the Tlatelolco Treaty, these common positions were in the form of opposition to a perceived discriminatory non-proliferation regime. Eventually, over a period of two decades, these common positions took a positive turn toward reciprocal confidence-building measures, establishment of a bilateral accounting and inspection regime (ABACC), acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards, and full adherence to an amended Tlatelolco Treaty. These significant changes in Argentine and Brazilian nuclear policies helped accelerate and deepen their evolving economic, military, scientific, and political cooperation. This mitigation of historic rivalry and suspicion in turn contributed significantly to the peace and security of the entire Latin American region.

During this two-decade-long bilateral confidence building process, the Tlatelolco goal of a region completely free of all nuclear weapons could not be ignored by the leadership in Argentina and Brazil. In part due to the importance attributed to this goal by other Latin American nations, Argentina and Brazil both pledged to take no action contrary to objectives of the Tlatelolco Treaty. In pledging to respect the goals of the treaty, the two historic rivals were also sending an important message to each other: that their nuclear competition should be curbed.

Without the pre-existing Tlatelolco regime, nuclear competition in the Southern Cone could have taken a very different and possibly ominous turn which could have destabilized the entire region. At present these two nations have not only joined the Tlatelolco regime, but are also assuming important leadership roles in global non-proliferation initiatives. This Tlatelolco contribution suggests how a nuclear-weapon-free zone can contribute to mitigation of historic rivalries and distrust, and to the creation of innovative bilateral nuclear arms control mechanisms.

(4) Regional Nuclear Arms Control Organization

A fourth Tlatelolco contribution was to help establish the concept of an activist regional control mechanism led by a professional secretariat, based on the support of the Contracting Parties. By creating OPANAL, staffing it with highly distinguished professional leadership, and providing modest, but vital, financial support, the Tlatelolco Parties established an important precedent subsequently embraced in the African and South East Asian agreements (and to a lesser extent in the South Pacific Zone). As the most advanced and sophisticated of these regional agencies, OPANAL has a special "trail blazing" role as it evolves and assumes new tasks and responsibilities. These include encouragement of regional cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through closer cooperation with the IAEA and ARCAL, and with ABACC. Yet another area of new OPANAL responsibility is the environmental implications of nuclear energy, including safety and security of nuclear facilities, nuclear waste storage and disposal, and the transportation of fissile material through the zone. This latter issue is of particular importance to Latin American nations as evidenced by the recent statements by Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay.⁵

Finally, OPANAL, with the support of the General Conference, can offer the benefits of its experience to other zones in Africa, South East Asia, and the South Pacific, and can work with their leadership to mobilize support for additional nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in regions of tension.

(5) Nuclear Weapon State Responsibility

A fifth and enduring contribution of Tlatelolco lies in its establishment of the principle of nuclear weapon state responsibility. Under Protocol 2 requirements, for the first time the nuclear weapon states were forced to assume a legal posture with regard to a nuclear-weapon-free zone encompassing people, not penguins. For the first time the nuclear weapon states were required to accept the principle that regional groupings could opt out of the nuclear arms race. By mandating that the nuclear weapon states clearly define their positions with regard to the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone, Tlatelolco was setting a precedent for the relationship of nuclear weapon states to future zones of a similar nature in other areas.

Unfortunately the record of support by the nuclear weapon states for new nuclear weapon-free-zone agreements has often been characterized by indifference and resistance. The successful process of obtaining the support of all nuclear weapon states for Tlatelolco was unnecessarily prolonged and difficult. Subsequently, France, with the support of the United Kingdom and the United States, withheld support for the Treaty of Rarotonga until completion of a series of nuclear tests. Those same countries, and China, are currently declining to support the Bangkok Treaty. And most recently, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States opposed a resolution of the 51st U.N. General Assembly calling for consolidation of the existing nuclear weapon-free-zones (Latin America, Africa, South Pacific, South East Asia, and the Antarctic) into a complete Southern Hemisphere Zone. Among the nuclear powers, only China supported the resolution; Russia abstained. The reasons cited by those in opposition are references in the resolution to the Bangkok Treaty, and concern regarding freedom of the high seas.⁶ On the first, one may reasonably inquire how a generalized statement of support will in any way compromise on-going efforts to modify some elements of the Bangkok Treaty? On the high seas question, it has been pointed out by many South East Asian delegations that the resolution includes language, found acceptable in other nuclear-weapon-free zone agreements supported by the nuclear weapon states, pertaining to rights of passage through maritime space. In response to this point, the nuclear weapon states have stated: "If the new zone will not cover the high seas what will it add to the existing zones?"⁷

The answer to this question returns us to the principle of nuclear weapon state responsibility. And it may be found in Paragraph Four of the Preamble to the Tlatelolco Treaty, where it was said for the first time:

"that militarily denuclearized zones are not an end in themselves but rather a means for achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage."

In these words Tlatelolco is recognized not only as a wellspring from which other nuclear-weapon-free zones will flow, but as a first vital step in the long-range disarmament process. The nuclear weapon states have created the proliferation problem by developing these terrible weapons of mass destruction. And at a time when many of the world's most distinguished military leaders are pointing to their uselessness as war fighting tools, it is unfortunate that the nuclear weapon states are not welcoming new nuclear-weapon-free zones with an enthusiastic "Abrazo." But efforts to create additional nuclear-weapon-free zones should not be deterred; rather we should recall the simple, sincere and direct words of the "father of the Tlatelolco Treaty" as he hoped that the Latin American efforts might stimulate:

A gradual broadening of the zones of the world from which nuclear weapons are prohibited to a point where the territories of powers which possess these terrible weapons of mass destruction will be something like contaminated islets subject to quarantine.⁸

NOTES:

(1) The text of the Costa Rican proposal may be found in : Rosita Rieck Bennett, "The Costa Rican Limitation of Armaments Plan: An Analysis of the Debates in the Council of the Organization of American States," Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, 1959, pp 1-3.
(2) U.N. General Assembly Resolution/652 (XVI), November 24, 1961.
(3) U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament, July-December 1962, p. 1034. On October 29, 1962, following the Cuban Missile Crisis, de Melo Franco's proposal was formally submitted to the U.N. General Assembly First Committee. In November, 1962, Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador joined Brazil in proposing a revised U.N. General Assembly resolution in support of a Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone.
(4) The evolution of the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relationship is explored in John R. Redick, Julio C. Carasales, and Paulo S. Wrobel, "Nuclear Rapprochement: Argentina, Brazil and the Non-Proliferation Regime," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, January, 1995; and John R. Redick, Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, December, 1995.
(5) Joint Declaration of Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay about Radioactive Waste Transport, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brazil, July 17, 1997; Transport of Radioactive Waste, press release, Government of Argentina, January 15, 1997.
(6) Text of address by British delegation to the United Nations (speaking on behalf of the United States and France) in explanation of the vote of these three nations in opposition to a U.N. General Assembly resolution in favor of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Southern hemisphere and adjacent areas (A/Res/51/45B), adopted December 10, 1996, on a vote of 129 to 3, with 38 abstentions. For the text of the resolution see PPNN Newsbrief, No. 36, 4th Quarter, 1996.
(7) British address to the U.N. General Assembly as cited in footnote 6 (December 10, 1996).
(8) Alfonso García Robles, address to the U.N. General Assembly (A/C.1/Pev 2018), November 13, 1974.