The Strengthening of OPANAL: New Challenges for the Future

Ambassador Héctor Gros Espiell
Former Secretary General of OPANAL; Former Foreign Minister of Uruguay
Ambassador of Uruguay to France

I.

1) OPANAL, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean ⁽¹⁾, was created through the Treaty of Tlatelolco, opened for signature on 14 February 1967 and entered into force in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 29.

Paragraph 3 of this Article stipulates that:

"As soon as this Treaty has entered into force in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 for eleven States, the Depositary Government shall convene a preliminary meeting of those States in order that the Agency may be set up and commence its work".

Thus it was, in application of this article, that OPANAL was established and began operating.

2) Article 7 of the Treaty determines the aims to be fulfilled by the Agency.

Paragraph 1 states that:

In order to ensure compliance with the obligations of this Treaty, the Contracting Parties hereby establish an international organization to be known as the "Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America", hereinafter referred to as "the Agency". Only the Contracting Parties shall be affected by its decisions.

Paragraphs 2 and 3 refer to the sphere of competence of the Agency, and paragraph 4 establishes its headquarters in Mexico City.

Article 8 refers to the main organs (Arts. 9, 10 and 11) and to the possibility of establishing subsidiary organs.

The Agency plays a fundamental role in the "Control System" (Arts. 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16), which is designed to prevent nuclear energy from being used for war-like purposes.

However, its activities also deal with the right of all Contracting Parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (Art. 17), and the Treaty of Tlatelolco includes the possibility of their carrying out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (Art. 18).

The Treaty stipulates that the Agency may:

"...conclude such agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency as are authorized by the General Conference and as it considers likely to facilitate the efficient operation of the control system established by this Treaty" (Art. 18).

Furthermore,

"The Agency may also enter into relations with any international organization or body, especially any which may be established in the future to supervise disarmament or measures for the control of armaments in any part of the world." (Art. 19).

The Agency, through one of its main organs, the General Conference, shall

"...take note of all cases in which, in its opinion, any Contracting Party is not complying fully with its obligations under this Treaty and shall draw the matter to the attention of the Party concerned, making such recommendations as it deems appropriate (Art.21).

The Agency enjoys the prerogatives and immunities referred to in Article 23.

3) In accordance with the Treaty, the Agency therefore has two different types of competence, which are in fact two aspects, two sides of the same question ⁽²⁾:

a) the application of the Control System, focusing essentially on the strict observance of the prohibitions laid down in paragraphs 1 a) and b), and paragraph 2 of Article 1. Such prohibitions are specified in the legal obligations needed to fulfill the aim of the Treaty, which according to the Preamble, is:

The military denuclearization of Latin America -- being understood to mean the undertaking entered into internationally in this Treaty to keep their territories forever free from nuclear weapons -- will constitute a measure which will spare their peoples from the squandering of their limited resources on nuclear armaments and will protect them against possible nuclear attacks on their territories, and will also constitute a significant contribution towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and a powerful factor for general and complete disarmament.

b) participation in all matters regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Latin America and the Caribbean (Arts. 17 and 18 of the Treaty). This competence stems from the second aim of the Treaty, described thus in the Preamble:

Latin America, faithful to its tradition of universality, must not only endeavor to banish from its homelands the scourge of a nuclear war, but must also strive to promote the well-being and advancement of its peoples, at the same time co-operating in the fulfillment of the ideals of mankind, that is to say, in the consolidation of a permanent peace based on equal rights, economic fairness and social justice for all, in accordance with the principles and purposes set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Charter of the Organization of American States.

4) In addition, however, the Agency has implicit capabilities -- directly and necessarily linked to those stated expressly -- that exist as such, since they do not contradict any of the Treaty's regulations, are in accordance with its principles and are directed towards the fulfillment of its aims.

Two such capabilities deserve special mention:

a) engaging in international promotion and negotiation for all Latin American and Caribbean States to become parties to the Treaty and for all the States referred to in Protocols I and II to sign and ratify said Protocols.

Naturally this activity is neither exclusive nor excluding. It has accompanied the Government of Mexico's ongoing actions in that sphere and has been in keeping with the decisions repeatedly adopted in that regard by the United Nations General Assembly.

OPANAL's efforts in that area have been important and meaningful. Based on decisions taken by the General Conference and the Council, it has enabled successive Secretaries General to conduct activities that have led to highly positive results, as evidenced by the current situation with respect to signatures, ratifications and waivers of the three international instruments that make up the Tlatelolco System. Today, historically, having reached the fortunate situation that now exists ⁽³⁾, it is important not to forget the success of the complex negotiations undertaken for the USSR, France and China to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II and those carried out with France and the United States to sign and ratify Additional Protocol I ⁽⁴⁾. As for the Treaty itself, we must not forget the efforts made by the Agency to secure Argentina's, Brazil's, Chile's ⁽⁵⁾ and Cuba's ⁽⁶⁾ signing, ratification and waiver, as applicable, and its contribution towards solving the problems related to Belize and Suriname's ⁽⁷⁾ incorporation into the Treaty. Neither can we fail to mention the constant attention and concern shown for the complex issues surrounding Guyana's accession ⁽⁸⁾.

b) The task of promoting the idea of the role played by nuclear-weapon-free zones in contributing to international peace and security, by giving impetus to the creation of other such zones through the example set by the Tlatelolco Treaty, while also contributing to the drafting of the treaties of Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba -- now in force -- and other initiatives currently under way.

II

5) Based on the provisions of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, bearing in mind the amendments made to it ⁽⁹⁾, the experience gained by OPANAL ⁽¹⁰⁾, Latin America and the Caribbean's current international reality, the current situation in international law regarding the use and threat of using nuclear weapons ⁽¹¹⁾ and nuclear tests ⁽¹²⁾, the co-existence of nuclear-weapon-free zones covering inhabited areas of the planet ⁽¹³⁾ and the process of creating others ⁽¹⁴⁾, issues related to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, particularly with respect to the generation of electricity in view of what has happened in recent years ⁽¹⁵⁾ and the necessary consideration of ecological problems -- an issue I raised in 1977 when the Treaty of Tlatelolco reached its tenth anniversary ⁽¹⁶⁾ -- there is a need to re-examine and reappraise the role of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean.


Reviewing OPANAL's role should focus on strengthening the Agency, in view of the ongoing validity of its aims and principles, in order to address the challenges of today's world and consider future prospects.

6) We shall therefore briefly outline the prospects for the future, in accordance with OPANAL's spheres of competence and following the guidelines set forth in paragraph 3.

III

7) The first question is obviously how OPANAL should act in order to preserve Latin America and the Caribbean's legal and political status as a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

There can be no doubt that this is a certain prospect in view of the current reality. There is no possibility today of a nuclear arms race in Latin America or even a remote prospect of a war involving the use of nuclear weapons.

This has been the outstanding victory of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The shadows that existed in the 70s and 80s, as a result of the absurd dreams of a few -- a very few Latin American countries -- of using nuclear energy for warlike purposes, are now but a reminder of an attempt that sought to be secretive and that was aborted in the midst of discredit and rejection.

The Falklands War, which perhaps brought Latin America closer to the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons, is now just a sad reminder of a past that has been overcome, although the conflict that brought it about has yet to be resolved. As for the unfounded rumors on the possible use of nuclear weapons in the border conflicts between Argentina and Chile, these are now just a memory of a period that has fortunately been left behind and a current reality in which differences have been settled through peaceful means.

To ensure the legal security -- since there is no political problem -- of maintaining the whole of Latin America free of nuclear weapons and of the possibility of a nuclear attack, Cuba must ratify, with the waiver, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which it signed on 25 March 1995, and a few English-speaking Caribbean islands must sign and ratify the Treaty. St. Kitts and Nevis exercised the right to waiver on 14 February 1997, after having ratified the Treaty on 18 April 1995.

Thus in this regard, which is essential to its future activities, in which victory has already been secured as a result of the policy of the member States, OPANAL need only continue on its present path.

Victory has been achieved; the idea now is to prevent any setbacks while maintaining and consolidating the current situation ⁽¹⁷⁾.

8) Latin America and the Caribbean was the first inhabited nuclear-weapon-free zone, created on the basis of a treaty that opened for signature in 1967.

Previous initiatives had existed, such as the Rapacki and Kekonnen plans, but never reached fruition. Many other initiatives were undertaken during the long years that followed its creation, but it was not until 1985, with the Treaty of Rarotonga, that the South Pacific followed the Latin American example. Eighteen years had elapsed ⁽¹⁸⁾.


There followed another period without developments, until 1996 and 1997, when the military denuclearization of Southern Asia was achieved through the Treaties of Bangkok and of Pelindaba. Major political changes, both internal and international, had to take place for such progress to be made. The changes had to be political, because the idea that nuclear-weapon-free zones were an important contribution to peace and security had been confirmed many years before, after analyzing and discussing the example set by Tlatelolco.

The process of creating such zones in places such as the Near East, the Middle East and the Mediterranean, and of broadening and consolidating the area covered by some of those already in existence, is now under way and expanding.

Today no-one doubts that the existence of these zones contributes not only to regional peace, but also to general, comprehensive peace and security ⁽¹⁹⁾.

It is worth recalling what the NPT Review Conference of 1995 stated in this regard:

We reaffirm the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of freely reached arrangements between the States of the region concerned strengthens world and regional peace and security.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be given priority, especially in areas of tension such as the Middle East, together with the establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction, bearing in mind the particular characteristics of each region. It would be advisable to establish additional nuclear-weapon-free zones by the next Review Conference, to be held in the year 2000.

Cooperation among all the States that possess nuclear weapons and their respect and support for the pertinent protocols are necessary for the maximum effectiveness of said nuclear-weapon-free zones and their protocols ⁽²⁰⁾.

However, the existence of such zones is just one contribution, albeit a very important one.

The most important consideration concerns the attitude of the nuclear powers and the establishment of an international system to prevent a military confrontation between the main international players, while leading to gradual, realistic and balanced progress, through appropriately planned stages, towards the final aim -- still very distant -- of general, complete disarmament under international supervision. The prohibition of other weapons of mass destruction -- such as chemical weapons, banned by the Convention of 13 January 1993, which is now in force -- is a parallel approach that is consistent with the aim of nuclear disarmament.

9) The current existence of four nuclear-weapon-free zones gives rise to the problem of coordination, joint action and a common policy in relation to control systems, links with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the nuclear powers, and alignment of their policies on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and the defense and protection of the environment.


That is one of the tasks facing OPANAL. Its status as an international agency, created by the first treaty to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in an inhabited zone, gives it the right -- as well as an obligation -- to head the planning of the coordination of other existing zones and those in the process of creation.

10) There is an issue that has sometimes been brought up during meetings of the General Conference and that cannot be ignored, since this would be unforgivable.

It refers to discussions as to whether OPANAL should play a role in the regional prohibition of other weapons of mass destruction. Without forgetting the progress made in international law in this field in recent years, within the framework of humanitarian international law and of banning and destroying chemical weapons, it is worth asking whether OPANAL should reflect on these matters from a regional perspective, in order to keep pace with those significant developments and cooperate in applying them in Latin America and the Caribbean.

I will not venture a concrete proposal. It is a difficult topic politically and a delicate one from a legal point of view.

Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored. The answer depends on whether OPANAL's future role will be limited or expanded.

11) Similarly, thought should be given to the question of classic weapons and the arms race. It is not a new topic. It was addressed specifically in the decade of the eighties. Its consideration will require -- if a decision is made to involve OPANAL in that extremely serious matter -- close contact with the United Nations and the Organization of American States.

IV

12) Another major issue that must be addressed -- in relation to the strengthening of OPANAL -- to deal with an uncertain future, in the conviction that it is and will continue to be a challenge in the future, is the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes ⁽²¹⁾.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco refers to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the Preamble and in Articles 12, paragraph 2 a), 17, 18 and 19.3.

The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes -- a right of all States, stemming from their sovereignty -- is a fundamental means of accelerating the economic and social development of the peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean. This is the view expressed in the Treaty, and has not changed in essence, although the dangers it poses or can pose to human life and the environment means it must be tackled with caution and prudence ⁽²²⁾.

That view has been upheld and defended by OPANAL for thirty years.

13) But what is the situation today? What should be done? What new realities have emerged regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy?


First problem: nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The possibility of carrying them out is provided for and legitimized --in principle and with practical and legal limitations -- in Article 18 of the Treaty. This norm has never been applied and its existence was one of the objections -- resolved after arduous negotiations -- that at one time prevented the signing of the Additional Protocols, particularly by the Soviet Union. Nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes have now been rejected. Such explosions have been reproved and none of the three treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones that have followed Tlatelolco (Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba) have allowed them. Quite the opposite.

Furthermore, the adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty carries evident consequences on the negativity of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

Without necessarily amending the Treaty of Tlatelolco by eliminating Article 18, I think it would be a source of prestige for OPANAL if the General Conference were to solemnly declare that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes would not be carried out in Latin America and the Caribbean and that nuclear energy can be used peacefully to benefit progress, development and human well-being without resorting to the danger of nuclear explosions, which, in addition to their possible use for warlike purposes, pose enormous -- and uncontrollable -- risks to the environment and to ecological systems in general.

14) Second problem: coordinating and harmonizing the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in Latin America and the Caribbean, within the framework of scientific and economic cooperation among member States and without detriment to their sovereign rights in this field. Such coordination and harmonization among the Parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco would not exclude -- on the contrary, it should complement -- cooperation with other States, particularly those that possess nuclear weapons, which must fulfil the obligation stemming from Articles IV.2 and V of the NPT. It also includes the necessary cooperation with other international agencies, especially the IAEA.

The practical disappearance of the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission (IANEC), which has not carried out any activities since 1988, makes it all the more necessary for OPANAL to fill the existing vacuum.

Close cooperation between OPANAL and the IAEA on this subject would be a natural consequence, forming part of general cooperation with the Vienna Agency in relation to the control system.

Although IANEC has stopped functioning, there is a need for OPANAL to be in contact with the OAS in this field, and with the IDB as regards advisory services on the promotion, coordination and alignment of eventual funds to finance peaceful nuclear activities in Latin America and the Caribbean.

15) Thirdly, there is the issue of OPANAL's activities in linking the peaceful use of nuclear energy to protection of the environment.

This is a problem that was not taken into account when the Treaty of Tlatelolco was drafted, which is why it contains no reference to the ecological question. However, I stressed the importance of this topic in the address I delivered to the General Conference on 14 February 1977.

International awareness of this issue was first created at the Stockholm Conference. It has now become -- as shown by the Rio Conference of 1992 -- an essential, inescapable, priority topic ⁽²³⁾.

The treaties of Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba, which were drafted years after Tlatelolco, when the environmental issue had been taken up by the international community, contain specific references to this issue.

V

16) There is no doubt in my mind that efforts must be made to strengthen OPANAL and build it up at the international level.

This is a responsibility that pertains to the Member States and their policies should be directed towards that aim.

The Agency is the instrument in charge of executing the Latin American and Caribbean States' foreign policy in nuclear matters. It is empowered to propose, plan and execute it by its organs, but the primordial responsibility lies with the states of Latin America and the Caribbean. They must become fully aware of OPANAL's role and of what it can and must do.

17) New challenges and new problems, stemming from global and regional political changes, scientific and technological progress and the increasingly serious and pressing issues concerning the environment, arise every day in the field of prohibiting nuclear weapons and using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Such changes cannot be examined in such a short paper. Suffice it to say that the changes in the international context that have taken place in the past few years, the existence of a totally different reality to that of 1967, the end of a bipolar world and the situation of the nuclear powers, the relations between them and their attitude to the rest of the world, and the possession of nuclear weapons by countries that are not "officially" nuclear powers, all make it necessary to rethink OPANAL's role and, along more general lines, Latin America and the Caribbean's situation with regard to nuclear weapons. Although such weapons are not mentioned so frequently now, they are no less terrifyingly threatening than they were in the past.

In this paper we have pointed out the issues that OPANAL must now address regarding nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, so no more need be stated.

The best tribute we can pay to the Treaty of Tlatelolco on its thirtieth anniversary does not lie in describing its history, discussing its virtues and pointing out its achievements, important as they are. What is more important, however, is to continue the task we have undertaken while strengthening and updating it, and to plan the new agenda that must be drawn up.

NOTES:

(1) The first amendment to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, adopted in July 1990 (Resolution 267 (E-V) of the General Conference of OPANAL), resolved to add "and the Caribbean" to its title, Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. In keeping with the amended Article 7, the Agency's title is now "Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean".

(2) Héctor Gros Espiell, El Uso Pacífico de la Energía Nuclear en América Latina, Revista Mexicana de Política Internacional, Instituto Matías Romero de Estudios Diplomáticos, Mexico, February 1997; Héctor Gros Espiell, Una Reflexión Actual sobre el Uso Pacífico de la Energía Nuclear, in G.E. Do Nascimento e Silva Americum Liber, Sao Paulo, 1997 (being printed).

(3) At present 32 States are Parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, these being all the States in Latin America. Argentina, Brazil and Chile became Parties following the amendments to the Treaty made in accordance with Resolution 290 (E-VIII) of the General Conference, dated August 26, 1992. Other obstacles preventing the accession of certain States were removed through an amendment adopted through Resolution 268 (XII) of the General Conference on 10 May 1991. All the States involved in Protocols I and II (France, Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, China and the Netherlands) have signed and ratified them.

(4) David Robinson, The Treaty of Tlatelolco and the United States, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 66, No. 2, April 1970; Héctor Gros Espiell, Gli Estati Uniti e il Tratato di Tlatelolco, Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali, Firenze, 1977; Héctor Gros Espiell, La signature du Traité de Tlatelolco par la Chine et la France, Annuaire Français de Droit International, Paris 1997; Héctor Gros Espiell, Estados Unidos y el Protocolo Adicional I del Tratado de Tlatelolco, in El Tratado de Tlatelolco, Diez Años de Aplicación, 1967-1977, OPANAL, Mexico 1978, page 39; Héctor Gros Espiell, Comentario sobre los Criterios Expuestos por la Unión Soviética como Fundamento de Negativa a Firmar el Protocolo II, in El Tratado de Tlatelolco: Algunas Consideraciones sobre Aspectos Específicos, OPANAL, Mexico 1976, page 31. I wish to acknowledge the understanding and support extended to me by the "Jurisconsult" of the Quai D'Orsay, Prof. Guy de Laclarrière -- subsequently a judge at the International Court of Justice -- and Ambassador Cuvillier, Director for America at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during the difficult negotiations with France in signing Protocols I and II that I conducted in Paris.

(5) Héctor Gros Espiell, Argentina y el Tratado de Tlatelolco, in El Tratado de Tlatelolco, Diez Años de Aplicación, 1967-1977, OPANAL, Mexico, 1978, page 63; Héctor Gros Espiell, El Papel de las Organizaciones Internacionales en la Promoción del Desarme y la Limitación de la Carrera Armamentista, OPANAL, Mexico 1977, Chapters VI and XII and especially regarding the cases of Guyana, Cuba, Argentina, Brazil, Suriname, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union, notes 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32, pages 103-105. In Cuba's case I went to Havana in 1974 to negotiate its signing of the Treaty, and in 1990 in New York, as Uruguay's Minister of Foreign Affairs, I made the same proposal to Foreign Minister Malmierca. In regard to Argentina, Brazil and Chile, when I was Uruguay's Minister of Foreign Affairs I organized a meeting, in Mexico in 1990, with the Foreign Ministers of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico -- who were in Mexico City for a meeting of the Rio Group -- held at the Brazilian Embassy, to gain Argentina, Brazil and Chile's accession to Tlatelolco. That meeting saw the birth of the process that eventually led to the accomplishment of that aim, through an amendment to the Treaty.

(6) Following several long years of negotiations -- that I witnessed as Secretary General, in Mexico, Havana and the United Nations -- and which I described in my Report to the General Conference and other papers, Cuba signed the Treaty on 25 March 1995. It has not yet ratified it.

(7) Due to Guatemala's opposition and the contents of paragraph 3 of Article 25 of the Treaty, Belize was not able to sign it until 14 February 1992. It ratified it and exercised the waiver on 9 November 1994. Suriname signed the Treaty on 13 February 1976 and ratified it with the waiver on 10 June 1977.

(8) Due to Venezuela's opposition and paragraph 3 of Article 25, Guyana was only able to sign the Treaty on 16 January 1995. It ratified it on the same day and extended the waiver on 6 May 1996.

(9) First amendment, adopted through Resolution 267 (E-V) of the General Conference of OPANAL dated 3 July 1990; second amendment, adopted through Resolution 268 (XII) of 10 May 1991; third amendment, adopted through Resolution 269 (E-VII) of the General Conference on 26 August 1992.

(10) See the proceedings of the seminar "La No Proliferación de Armas Nucleares: Puntos de Vista de América Latina y el Caribe", OPANAL, Cancún, Mexico, 11-13 January 1995.

(11) Indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1995 NPT Review Conference, Final Document, NPT/Conf.1995/32).

- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (General Assembly, A/50/1027, 26 August 1996).

- Cour Internationale de Justice, Liceité de la menace ou de l'emploi d'armes nucléaires, Avis Consultatif, 8 juillet 1996.

(12) The Moscow Treaty of 1963 banned nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water, whereas that of 1996 banned them completely. An excellent general study of this issue, despite its seemingly limited title, is a book edited by Yves Le Baut, Les Essais Nucléaires Français, Bruylant, Bruxelles 1996.

(13) Treaty of Rarotonga. Signed on 6 August 1985.

- Treaty of Bangkok. Signed on 15 December 1996.

- Treaty of Pelindaba. Signed on 11 April 1996. (See Boutros Boutros Ghali, Banissons le nucléaire, Jeune Afrique, No, 1840, Paris, avril 1996).

(14) Particularly the Near East.

(15) On the Chernobyl accident and the new awareness of the existing dangers of nucleoelectric power generation, see: Héctor Gros Espiell, Una Reflexión Actual sobre el Uso Pacífico de la Energía Nuclear, in G.E. Do Nascimento e Silva, Amicorum Liber, Sao Paulo, 1997.

(16) Address delivered by the Secretary General at the Second Special Session on 14 February 1977; Héctor Gros Espiell, El Uso Pacífico de la Energía Nuclear en América Latina, Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior, Mexico, February 1997; Héctor Gros Espiell, Una Reflexión Actual sobre el Uso Pacífico de la Energía Nuclear, in G.E. Do Nascimento e Silva, Amicorum Liber, Sao Paulo, 1997.

(17) Héctor Gros Espiell, El Desarme y las Zonas Libres de Armas Nucleares, Revista de Occidente, Madrid, 1976, reproduced in El Tratado de Tlatelolco: Algunas Consideraciones sobre Aspectos Específicos, OPANAL, Mexico, 1976.

(18) On the tenth anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, I stated the following in the speech I delivered at the Second Special Session on 14 February 1977:

"... The Treaty of Tlatelolco has shown the practical feasibility of creating militarily denuclearized zones as a means of avoiding the possibility of a military conflict with nuclear weapons in certain regions of the planet. Latin America has played a leading role in this respect and the Treaty of Tlatelolco has had and continues to have an exemplary projection that provides the possibility that, in future, on creating other nuclear-weapon-free zones and reducing and limiting to the minimum the spaces where an atomic confrontation could be possible, since atomic zones would be limited to the territories of the nuclear powers, the danger of an atomic conflagration would be significantly reduced".

(19) For a current view on the subject, see the address delivered by Hans Blix at the Fifty-first Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 28 October 1996.

(20) 1995 NPT Review Conference, Final Document, NPT Conf. 1995/32 (Part I), New York, 1995.

(21) On 14 February 1977, I stated:

I would now like to refer to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco, as is logical, deals with this issue in a positive manner, since it neither prevents nor limits the exercise of the right to the full use of this form of energy.

The current global situation, the energy crisis and the future depletion of non-renewable energy sources makes it necessary to examine the issue of the peaceful use of atomic energy with renewed attention. The unavoidable future use of such energy must be handled in such a way as not to affect or endanger the safety of the human environment, since the ecological issue as a whole must be considered, and any possible deviation of its peaceful uses towards military applications must be avoided.

Safeguards agreements are the legal instrument used to ensure that the peaceful utilization of atomic energy is not diverted to military purposes. The Treaty of Tlatelolco provides for such agreements and obliges States Parties to negotiate and conclude them with the IAEA. The experience of the past ten years has shown that it is enough to be a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco to be able to conclude these agreements solely on the basis of the Treaty's provisions. There is no need for the negotiating State to be a party to any other multilateral international instrument devoted to the prohibition of nuclear weapons or to non-proliferation. The agreements of Latin American States that are parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco are therefore all that is needed for them to receive support, assistance, and scientific, technological, financial, economic and industrial cooperation, bilateral and multilateral alike, in drawing up and executing plans to utilize atomic energy and receive, extract, prepare and process the materials needed to produce such energy.

Under the current circumstances -- and there is no need to highlight the importance of this matter in view of the examples that come to mind -- it is enough to be a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and conclude the corresponding safeguards agreement in keeping with its provisions, in order to utilize atomic energy for peaceful purposes and thus in future sustain the pace of economic growth and development, which are essential for planning and creating a better future for the peoples of our countries. The difficulties currently facing some Latin American States that are not parties to the Treaty in making use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes would disappear automatically if they decided to become parties to the instrument.

The peaceful utilization of nuclear energy in Latin America requires a regional planning body; a Latin American information center to coordinate, advise and aid the countries of the continent, when necessary, in planning and executing energy projects. OPANAL, with its experience and its cooperation agreement with the IAEA, should act as that body in future. Its mission should not focus solely on ensuring the strict application of the prohibition of nuclear weapons laid down in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, but should also include a positive element: acting as the regional agency in charge of programming and coordinating, in accordance with the will of the States of Latin America, the peaceful use of nuclear energy on the continent. This proposal will call for specific initiatives and new institutional arrangements which I feel sure the States of Latin America will soon draw up for consideration by the appropriate international forums.

(22) This is the idea I developed in the two papers I referred to in note 2. Two important books by prestigious, well-known authors have recently been published, one in favor and one against, these being Georges Charpak and Richard Gawin, Feux Follets et Champignons nucléaires, Odile Jacob, Paris, 1996, and Theodore Monod, Le Chercheur d'Absolu, Le Cherche Midi, Paris, 1996. For his part, Thierry de Montbrial (Mémoire du Temps Présent, Flammarion, Paris, 1996) proposes an attitude of prudence but open-mindedness:

"Le drame de Tchernobyl, qui a révélé le danger de certaines techniques quand elles sont entre les mains d'organisations inadaptées au sein d'une societé fragile, a cependant confirmé la pertinence des comportements de prudence. La gestion du parc de centrales nucléaires hérité des anciens pays communistes de l'Europe de l'Est constitue l'une des préocupations majeures de la fin du siècle. Mais à quelques années ou même quelques décennies près, l´heure de l'énergie nucléaire sonnera."

(23) Hans Blix, speech at the Fifty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, 26 October 1996.