The IAEA full scope Safeguards Agreements and compliance with them by Parties to the Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones

Dr. Hans Blix
General Director of the IAEA

There are currently in existence four multilateral treaties which provide for nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZs) in inhabited areas. They cover almost half of the countries of the world¹. In chronological order they are: the Treaty for the Prohibition on Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty); the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Rarotonga Treaty); the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone Treaty (the SEANWFZ Treaty); and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty). In addition, there is a bilateral arrangement establishing a nuclear-weapon-free commitment between Argentina and Brazil ².

The obligations assumed by the parties under the existing NWFZ agreements differ from treaty to treaty, and so do the verification arrangements and the obligations of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Nevertheless, there are some common denominators. All NWFZs represent the "building block" approach to détente, arms control and disarmament and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. The aim of each is to ensure that the relevant area is freed from the threat of nuclear war, through specific or additional guarantees against "horizontal" proliferation in a given region and by insulating the countries of the zone against any nuclear-weapon State action which would be incompatible with the underlying treaty or agreement.

One of the common characteristics of all these treaties or arrangements is the parties' undertakings to conclude with the IAEA agreements for the application of safeguards on all of their respective peaceful nuclear activities - present and future (so-called "full scope" or "comprehensive" safeguards agreements). These safeguards agreements are based, either de jure or de facto, on the model³, adopted by the Member States of the IAEA, for full scope safeguards agreements required under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT)⁴ .

As the concept of NWFZs has developed, however, the role of the IAEA in such zones has also developed. A brief summary of the various NWFZ agreements demonstrates the changing role of the IAEA in the development, implementation and verification of compliance with NWFZ arrangements.

The Tlatelolco Treaty⁵

The first zonal approach to non-proliferation in a populated region was the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty, concluded by Latin American States in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis. The Treaty aimed from its inception to manage domestic and regional security situations in order to foster economic, social and cultural development and to protect the region from further super-power rivalry. The control system established aims at ensuring Contracting Party compliance with commitments to the exclusively peaceful use of their nuclear material and facilities and to prevent, in their respective territories, any attempt to test, use, make, produce or acquire nuclear weapons. The receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of nuclear weapons within the Parties' respective territories is likewise prohibited.

Article 13 of the Tlatelolco Treaty obliges each Contracting Party to negotiate multilateral or bilateral agreements with the IAEA for the application of IAEA safeguards on all such parties' nuclear activities.

In August 1992, the General Conference of OPANAL, amended Articles 14-16 of the Treaty, with a view to enhancing the potential role to be played by the IAEA in carrying out any special inspections required under the Treaty. The enhanced role foresees such inspections not just in the safeguards context, but in verifying, if requested, compliance with any of the obligations assumed by the Parties.

Thirty-two Latin American and Caribbean countries are party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, thirty-one of which are also party to the NPT. Pursuant to either or both of these Treaties⁶, the IAEA currently implements comprehensive safeguards in nine such countries. As Cuba signed the Tlatelolco Treaty in March 1995, the Treaty could soon enter into force for its entire zone of application. Key also to full entry into force of the Treaty for the zone as a whole is the conclusion by all Contracting Parties of the relevant safeguards agreement with the IAEA. During 1996 and 1997 the Secretariat of the IAEA has made extensive efforts to obtain all the necessary approvals of such agreements. With a view to facilitating that process, and avoiding undue duplication and delay, the Board of Governors of the IAEA has authorized the Director General to confirm, through exchanges of letters with the relevant States in the Latin America and Caribbean region, inter alia that comprehensive safeguards agreements concluded pursuant to the NPT satisfy the requirement under the Tlatelolco Treaty for Contracting Parties to conclude safeguards agreements with the Agency⁷.

The Rarotonga Treaty ⁸

The Rarotonga Treaty⁹ was a reaction to the French decision, after Algeria's independence, to move its nuclear testing to the Pacific Ocean atolls of Mururoa and Fangataufa. This exacerbated growing regional worries about nuclear issues, not least because of the nuclear weapons proliferation of the 1960s and '70s; the dumping of nuclear waste at sea; and the fear that such dumping would contaminate vital marine resources. The Treaty reflects the wish of South Pacific Forum countries to preserve their region from super-power rivalry and to protect its peace, security and natural resources.

Along with a requirement that each State party conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA¹⁰, the Rarotonga Treaty shares other similarities with the Tlatelolco Treaty, especially the traditional NWFZ proscription of possession and development of nuclear weapons; a ban on testing of any nuclear explosive device (not just nuclear weapons); a prohibition of the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of the parties; and commitments from nuclear-weapon States. There are, however, differences from the Tlatelolco Treaty. The Rarotonga Treaty contains an explicit requirement of safeguards on nuclear exports, whether to nuclear-weapon States or to non-nuclear-weapon States¹¹. In addition, the Rarotonga Treaty contains provisions banning the dumping of nuclear waste at sea within the area of application, an issue not addressed in the Tlatelolco Treaty.

SEANWFZ Treaty ¹²

The SEANWFZ Treaty of 1995 was prompted by the Cold War and constitutes one response by the ASEAN States to political, economic and security challenges. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971 marked the ASEAN States' determination to secure the recognition of and respect for South East Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN) free from interference by outside powers. In 1984 Indonesia first formally raised the SEANWFZ concept in the context of ZOPFAN - though not without reservations on the part of others. However, the seven Members of ASEAN¹³, plus Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar, have now signed the Treaty. There appear, however, still to be problems on the part of nuclear-weapon States about certain points and terminology in the text of the associated Protocol.

The Prime Minister of Thailand explained in December 1995 that the Treaty was designed to contribute towards nuclear non-proliferation - specifically the NPT regime - at the global level. The control system foreseen is modelled on that of the Rarotonga Treaty, including the requirement of States parties to conclude full scope safeguards agreements and to require safeguards on nuclear exports, but goes further than either that Treaty or the Pelindaba Treaty (which was under negotiation at the time the SEANWFZ Treaty was being concluded). Thus, "fact-finding missions" to clarify and resolve situations "which may be considered ambiguous or which may give rise to doubts about compliance with the provisions of this Treaty ..." are foreseen as a matter of course to consist of three IAEA inspectors. The Treaty also requires each State party to subject its peaceful nuclear energy programmes to a rigorous nuclear safety assessment conforming to IAEA recommended guidelines and standards. Obligations such as these, as well as the broader anti-dumping provisions¹⁴, could involve greater interaction with the IAEA than has been the case of in other NWFZ.

The Pelindaba Treaty ¹⁵

The conclusion of Pelindaba Treaty in 1996 hinged substantially on the end of the Cold War and the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa. Only then could the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free Africa, initially mooted in 1964 at the First Ordinary Session of the Summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), be realized. After 1991, the Cold War threats which South Africa had seen to its security no longer pertained, it had renounced nuclear weapons, joined the NPT and put all of its nuclear material under IAEA safeguards.

The IAEA was more closely involved in the crafting of this NWFZ treaty than the others so far concluded. As first requested by the United Nations Secretary-General in 1993 (the Treaty was prepared under UN auspices in co-operation with the OAU), a senior Agency representative participated in meetings of the Group of Experts drawing up the Treaty, in particular with the drafting of the verification provisions. These provisions, inter alia, entrust the Agency with the task of verifying compliance with the peaceful use undertakings of the States Parties through the implementation of full scope safeguards agreements. These consist of the usual kind of NWFZ provision barring nuclear weapons possession, development, acquisition or stationing and prohibiting any nuclear explosive testing. But this Treaty goes further than the NPT and the earlier NWFZ models in that it specifically addresses issues such as prohibition of armed attack on nuclear installations; the physical protection of nuclear material; and regional pre-occupations such as the possibility of hitherto undeclared nuclear explosive devices and the destruction or conversion to peaceful uses of facilities for manufacturing such devices. Such provisions represent political and security concerns of the 1990's which in some respects (nuclear trafficking; the possibility of "another South Africa" in terms of nuclear capability etc.) are different from earlier concerns.

The Treaty's verification provisions are modelled on Rarotonga, but go further to reflect the additional substantive obligations. The Pelindaba Treaty ascribes to the IAEA not only the rights and obligations associated with traditional NPT safeguards agreement, but additional functions as well, such as responsibility for verifying, with the African Commission on Nuclear Energy foreseen in Article 12 of the Treaty, the destruction and dismantling of any nuclear devices and the destruction or conversion of relevant production facilities. The case of South Africa set a precedent in these respects.

Argentina, Brazil and ABACC

NWFZs need not be only multilateral. The example of Argentina and Brazil demonstrates the value of internationally verified bilateral arrangements in reducing political tensions and permitting regularization of inter-State relations. Over a period of six years, Brazil and Argentina were able to develop a common policy on nuclear cooperation and non-proliferation. This policy called for the establishment of a bilateral inspectorate, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control (ABACC), mutual inspections carried out by the two States under ABACC's authority, and the conclusion of a quadripartite comprehensive safeguards agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC and the IAEA. The Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement entered into force in March 1994.

Agency co-operation with ABACC further attests that co-operative arrangements can be worked out between the international nuclear verification system implemented by the IAEA and bilateral and/or regional safeguards verification systems. This is so provided that the bilateral and/or regional system has proven technical effectiveness and that the Agency remains able at all times to satisfy its obligation to reach its own, independent conclusions.

This arrangement offers a possible model for the eventual resolution of non-proliferation concerns on the Korean peninsula, entailing mutual inspection and/or IAEA verification of additional undertakings (such as the foreswearing of enrichment and reprocessing activities). Perhaps some similar arrangement could serve as a vehicle for achieving comprehensive non-proliferation commitments between Pakistan and India as well.

A Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

Security-related verification arrangements need to be the most intense in areas marked by deep conflict and mistrust. Also, the more dimensions there are to a problem the harder it is to solve. In the Middle East, not only is there the dimension of long-standing hostilities between Israel and its Arab neighbours but also problems among some of those neighbours themselves and between States in the Arab/Israel sub-region and others outside. It is obvious that an agreement can only come about in the context of detente and peacemaking in the region. At the same time such an agreement will contribute to detente and peace. It is, indeed, hard to imagine detente and peacemaking without such an agreement. It is also obvious that rigorous, intrusive verification covering declared and any possible undeclared nuclear activities would be required.

What those arrangements will actually consist of is for the parties to a future NWFZ to decide. To them also fall the material obligations to be assumed and on which the verification arrangements will be based.

The Director General of the IAEA has been asked by the General Conference of the IAEA (1) to take such measures as are necessary to facilitate the early application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region; and (2) to prepare model agreements as a step towards the establishment of an NWFZ. The Secretariat of the IAEA continues to be involved in consultations with Middle East States on these and related issues.

States of the region agree in principle on the need to apply IAEA safeguards to all nuclear material and facilities in the Middle East. But differences remain on whether this should precede or be part of a NWFZ agreement. As for the verification agreements, these obviously would depend on the material obligations to be verified. In this context, the Agency is actively seeking better to acquaint the relevant States with the wide range of material obligations available open and the verification modalities and scenarios which could flow from them. The IAEA still needs further clarity from the Middle East States about their preferences with regard to material obligations. Without such clarity, it cannot meaningfully embark on preparing the model verification agreements foreseen. What is already clear, however, is that, for the Middle East, the Agency's global verification arrangements would have to be supplemented by very stringent and intrusive regional arrangements. These could involve, for example, mutual inspections by regional inspectors working additionally to or in parallel with Agency inspectors. The Agency's Statutory mandate to apply safeguards leaves considerable room for flexibility to accommodate fresh tasks and challenges.

Why Regional Systems are Necessary

An often-asked question in connection with NWFZs is: why are regional non-proliferation arrangements necessary in the light of the practically universal NPT? Why is the NPT not enough?

By catering for specific concerns and needs, the NWFZ treaties provide assurances within and between the parties to the treaties, and, in so doing, complement the global verification system which the IAEA implements under the NPT. The latter remains a sine qua non of effective verification because, through the IAEA safeguards comprehensive safeguards system, States can show the international community that they are complying with their non-proliferation undertakings and the international community can derive assurance. This was not lost on the participants at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, in whose report it was concluded:

... the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, particularly in regions afflicted with conflicts, enhances regional and global peace and security and contributes to the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. ..... such zones constitute an important disarmament measure which greatly strengthens the international non-proliferation regime in all its aspects.¹⁶

It can be seen that NWFZ agreements have the advantage of permitting adherence to the universal objective of non-proliferation, while addressing shared security concerns of a regional or bilateral nature which might not command universal agreement. Moreover, they may be tailored by the States within their respective zones to fit those shared concerns. While the NPT seeks to achieve that States around the world commit themselves to a non-nuclear-weapon status, NWFZs seek to assure that neighbours in a region are committed.

The NWFZ agreements thus far concluded have been able to avoid the distinction between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. The Tlatelolco Treaty, which actually pre-dated the NPT, demonstrates the value of a regional approach in obviating the need for discrimination between categories of States within the zone. Of particular and obvious note in this respect is the Pelindaba Treaty, the only non-proliferation treaty which expressly calls for verified dismantlement and destruction of existing nuclear weapons.

Finally, as demonstrated by the case of Brazil - and perhaps soon by Cuba - regional or bilateral approaches to non-proliferation may be the only way to achieve commitments to verifiable undertakings of nuclear non-proliferation by States which have objections to the NPT.

NOTES:

(1) The first NWFZs were the Antarctic Treaty (1959), the Outer Space Treaty (1967) and the Seabed Treaty (1971), which prohibit military activity or the deployment of any weapons of mass destruction within the respective zones of application. Their scope of application is limited to normally uninhabited environments. They do not call for IAEA verification, and, as such, are not treated in this article.
(2) The Argentine-Brazilian Declaration on Common Nuclear Policy, signed on 28 November 1990 at Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil (IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/388 and Add.1), building on the commitments assumed, inter alia, in the Joint Declarations and Protocols of 1985-1988 (IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/351 and Add.1).
(3) IAEA document INFCIRC/153 (Corr.).
(4) Opened for signature in London, Moscow and Washington, D.C. on 1 July 1968; entered into force on 5 March 1970.
(5) Opened for signature in Tlatelolco, Mexico, on 14 February 1967.
(6) And in the case of Argentina and Brazil also pursuant to the Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the IAEA and ABACC which entered into force in March 1994.
(7) IAEA document GOV/2786. The exchanges of letters are also to confirm that comprehensive safeguards agreements concluded pursuant to the Tlatelolco Treaty alone satisfy the requirement under Article III.1 of the NPT, and that the comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded with Argentina and Brazil satisfies that requirement of a State Party under either treaty.
(8) Opened for signature on 6 August 1985; entered into force on 11 December 1986.
(9) There are 11 parties to the Treaty of Rarotonga (Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and Western Samoa), each of which has a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force with the IAEA.
(10) Annex 2, para. 2 provides that: "The agreement ... shall be, or shall be equivalent in its scope and effect to, an agreement required in connection with the NPT on the basis of the material reproduced in document INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) of the IAEA."
(11) Article 4(a)(i) of the Rarotonga Treaty requires acceptance of the safeguards required by Article III.i of the NPT as a condition for nuclear transfers.
(12) Opened for signature on 15 December 1995 in Bangkok, Thailand.
(13) Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
(14) The SEANWFZ also address the discharge of radioactive material or wastes in the atmosphere and its disposal on land.
(15) Opened for signature in Cairo, Egypt, on 11 April 1996.
(16) NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.2.