The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

By: Ambassador Jaap Ramaker
Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the Conference on Disarmament,
Former Chairman of the CD's Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban

CONTENTS

1.Introduction
2.Main features of the CTBT
3.Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and nuclear testing

3.1.Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Treaty of Tlatelolco)
3.2 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Rarotonga)
3.3 The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Pelindaba)
3.4 Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-free Zone (the Treaty of Bangkok)

4. The CTBT and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
5.Conclusions

Introduction

The fact that the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on 24 September 1996 is followed so quickly by the 30th anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, better known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, is significant in a number of ways.

It shows us that nuclear issues have been on the agenda of the international community for a long time and that they deserve continuous attention, both in terms of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. It also shows us that sometimes progress in nuclear disarmament and arms control can be slow: after the Treaty of Tlatelolco was the first to prohibit the testing of nuclear weapons in one particular region basis it took the world community almost 30 years to negotiate a worldwide Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Furthermore, and maybe most importantly, the fact that in the meantime the Treaty of Tlatelolco has come to be seen as a cornerstone for peace and stability in Latin-America, shows us that even if a treaty - like Tlatelolco - does not enter into force immediately, it can set a clear norm that retains all possibilities to be consolidated in due course. Critics of the CTBT's entry into force provisions should bear that in mind.

Of course, the significance of the Treaty of Tlatelolco for the CTBT surpasses the rather coincidental fact that a period of almost 30 years lies between the opening for signature of the two treaties. After the conclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, Tlatelolco set an example for regional initiatives directed at achieving nuclear-weapon free zones, including prohibitions of nuclear testing. These initiatives in various regions around our globe gradually enforced the general conviction that nuclear testing should be halted, an indispensable element in the coming into being of the CTBT.

With the CTBT in place, there now exists a comprehensive prohibition on nuclear testing, that is, a prohibition of nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, in any environment and for all time. The present paper will take a closer look at the relationship between the CTBT and the (provisions on testing in the) various nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties in place at present. Before doing so, the main features of the CTBT will be discussed, as well as the provisions of the existing nuclear weapon-free zone treaties related to nuclear testing.

2. Main features of the CTBT

Much has been said and written on the "comprehensive" character of the CTBT. From the history of multilateral negotiations for a nuclear test ban it is clear that the international community has been seeking a comprehensive ban, that is a ban anywhere and not just in one environment such as the atmosphere, on nuclear explosive testing. That is why the CTBT prohibits states to carry out "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion".¹ Although the Treaty has kept the theoretical option open that in future it might be amended so as to allow for peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs)², the prohibition on "any other nuclear explosion" clearly outlaws such explosions in the Treaty as it now stands. Not only has the benefit of PNEs never been demonstrated, but the so-called peaceful nuclear explosions are not distinguishable from a test of a nuclear weapon. Allowing for PNEs would therefore have created a loophole in the CTBT, detrimental to the disarmament objectives of the Treaty: development of nuclear weapons could have continued onder the guise of peaceful nuclear explosions.

Since negotiating a comprehensive test ban treaty was first considered over forty years ago, much attention has been given to the elaboration of a system to verify compliance with the basic obligation not to conduct nuclear testing. One of the main features of the CTBT is its elaborate verification mechanism, basically founded on two pillars.

First, compliance will be monitored on daily, continuous, basis through the International Monitoring System or IMS. More than 300 monitoring stations will be used to detect and locate a nuclear test explosion - whether this is a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, underwater or undergroud.³ The monitoring data collected by IMS-stations are received in the International Data Centre. This Centre is part of the Technical Secretariat of the international organisation (CTBTO) which will implement the provisions of the Treaty. The IDC has an important function in selecting or filtering the many, many data which daily are being received from the various stations of the monitoring network. The results of these analyses, by which non-nuclear events are filtered out as much as possible, are made available to all States Parties, which will have to make their own final judgement as to the character of the shortlisted events.⁴ The daily monitoring is primarily aimed at preventing a violation of the basic obligations of the Treaty by deterring the potential perpetrator. Although the IMS has been designed to detect (and locate) nuclear explosions as low as 1 kiloton, in many cases the threshold of detection can be much lower. That uncertainty is expected to provide sufficient deterrence, also against smaller nuclear explosions or those under so-called evasive scenarios.⁵ Deterrence will only be enhanced by the fact that States Parties will be allowed to use their own national means of verification⁶ to monitor compliance and as a basis for a request for an on-site inspection.

This brings us to the second pillar of the CTBT's verification regime: the possibilty to request an on-site inspection (OSI) in cases where events registered by the IMS and/or national technical means of verification cause States Parties to suspect that the CTBT was violated. Those suspicions have of course to be well-founded, because in international relations a (request for an) inspection is considered to be a very sensitive and intrusive measure, affecting the sovereignty of states. That is why the CTBT has detailed provisions on the conduct of an inspection. These provisions were aimed at striking a balance between an effective inspection regime, enhancing deterrence against treaty violations on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the need to protect States Parties against abusive OSIs, which would interfere with their sovereignty and would risk revealing sensitive information not related to the Treaty. Such protection is furthermore afforded by the possibility of sanctions the CTBT provides for in casae of abuse of the right of each State Party to request an OSI.⁷

In order to avoid unnecessary on-site inspections, the CTBT encourages States Parties to consult with each other on matters relating to its implementation. This ranges from a general obligation to cooperate and consult to specific "consultation and clarification" procedures between States Parties directly or through the Director-General of the CTBTO.⁸ It is obvious that when a concern about a possible treaty violation can be resolved through consultations between the states concerned, political sensitive, time-consuming and costly OSIs can be avoided.

Upon the request for an on-site inspection by a State Party, the Executive Council of the CTBTO has to take a decision within 4 days. In order for the inspection to go ahead, the Executive Council must approve the request by at least 30 affirmative votes of its 51 members.⁹ Once the inspection has been approved, inspection activities in the area to be inspected have to start no later than 9 days following the request.¹⁰ These relatively short timelines have been chosen to enable the inspection team to arrive quickly in the area¹¹ where an alleged nuclear explosion has taken place, in time to be able to detect certain time-critical (that is, quickly disappearing) phenomena unique to a nuclear explosion.¹² Also, these provisions are directed at increasing the deterrence value of the Treaty against possible violations of its basic obligations.

This is not the place to dwell upon all the aspects of on-site inspections (requests, the various phases, inspection mandate, conduct, overflights, managed access etc.), which take up almost one-third of the treaty text. Suffice it to say that these provision have struck a balance between the possibility of carrying out an effective inspection, enhancing deterrence against treaty violations, and due regard for the protection of States Parties against unwarranted interference with their sovereignty.

In the event that the basic obligations of the CTBT have been violated, sanctions can be taken against the contravening State Party. The Conference of the States Parties, being the principal organ of the CTBTO, may then recommend to States Parties collective measures in conformity with international law. The matter may also be brought to the attention of the United Nations.¹³

A final feature of the CTBT that needs to be addressed is its very unique entry into force formula (befitting, by the way, a paper written as a contribution to the 30th anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which itself has complicated provisions for its entry into force!). The Treaty will enter into force upon ratification by 44 states, members of the Conference on Disarmament possessing nuclear power reactors or nuclear research reactors.¹⁴ During the final phase of the negotiations, a great deal of effort was devoted to finding an entry into force formula which would strike a balance between ensuring on the one hand that states of particular relevance to the Treaty ratify the CTBT in order for it to enter into force, and on the other that the goal of timely entry into force would not be lost. The eventual formula has been criticised because it makes it unlikely, under the prevailing circumstances, that the treaty will enter into force in the foreseeable future.¹⁵ The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, now signed by nearly 140 states, nevertheless establishes a powerful norm against nuclear testing. Violation of the treaty no doubt will entail a heavy political, if not economic cost for the violator. Thus, in all likelihood, an end has come to nuclear test explosions even prior to treaty's entering into force.

3. Nuclear-weapon-free zones and nuclear testing

This section will briefly examine what provisions on nuclear testing are contained in the existing nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and compare these with the main features of the CTBT just described. At the outset it should be clear that all nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties share one specific difference with the CTBT: their geographical scope of application is limited to a specific region, whereas the CTBT is a universal treaty also in the geographical sense in that it applies anywhere.

3.1 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Treaty of Tlatelolco, opened for signature on 14 February 1967)

Tlatelolco's prohibition of nuclear testing is contained in article I, paragraph 1 (a) of the Treaty, the relevant part of which reads: "The Contracting Parties hereby undertake ..... to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories: (a) The testing, ..... of any nuclear weapons by the Parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other way, .....".

A number of observations can be made. It is clear from this provision that the Treaty of Tlatelolco does not prohibit peaceful nuclear explosions. Indeed, Article 18 specifies procedures for carrying out PNEs. This seems an important distinction from the CTBT, which bans any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. In practice, however, this distinction nowadays seems to have lost its relevance. All states in the region apparently agree that the most important condition for allowing PNEs under the Treaty cannot be met. According to Article 18, PNEs must be carried out in conformity with the Treaty, which aims at banning nuclear weapons. Since no technical distinction can be made between a nuclear device for military purposes and one for peaceful purposes, no PNE could be carried out in conformity with the Treaty.¹⁶

The CTBT establishes the responsibility for states not to carry out nuclear tests themselves, and to prohibit and prevent such tests at any place under their jurisdiction or control. Furthermore states shall "refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out" of nuclear tests. It is the latter obligation in particular which appears to be more strictly formulated than the corresponding formulation in Tlatelolco "the testing, ..... of any nuclear weapons by the Parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other way, .....". Notably, encouraging others (states or non-state entities) to perform a nuclear test does not seem to be covered under the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Although Tlatelolco embodies a verification mechanism, which even includes "special inspections"¹⁷, it does not have a verification regime like the one foreseen in the CTBT, which is based on the monitoring of nuclear explosions and on inspections especially designed to find evidence specific to such explosions.

3.2 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Rarotonga, opened for signature on 6 August 1985)

It should first of all be observed that the Treaty of Rarotonga differs from the other three regional nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties in as much that is is a nuclear free zone treaty rather than a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty. This wider notion is reflected in the provision of Rarotonga banning the dumping of radioactive waste and other matter at sea.¹⁸

As far as nuclear testing is concerned, the prohibition in the Treaty of Rarotonga covers all nuclear explosive devices. Article 6 of the Treaty reads: "Each Party undertakes:
(a) to prevent in its territory the testing of any nuclear explosive device; (b) not to take any action to assist or encourage the testing of any nuclear explosive device by any State." As far as the region covered by Rarotonga is concerned, this provision has certain similarities with the CTBT scope-article. Notable differences concern the fact that (a) in the CTBT States Parties undertake "to prohibit and prevent", which seems stronger than Rarotonga's undertaking only to prevent, and (b) in the case of the CTBT, the undertaking to prohibit and prevent nuclear tests applies to "any place under its jurisdiction or control", which also seems wider than Rarotonga's "in its territory".

It should be noted that Rarotonga's undertaking "not to take any action to assist or encourage" nuclear testing is related to actions by "any State", and therefore not limited to the region to which the Treaty applies.

As far as verification of compliance is concerned, Article 8 of the Treaty of Rarotonga establishes a "Control System". Apart from the application of IAEA-safeguards to peaceful nuclear activities, this system incorporates reports and exchange of information, a consultation mechanism and a complaints procedure, which may eventually lead to a special inspection.¹⁹ Again here, the verification mechanism is not specifically dedicated to detection, location and inspection of nuclear explosions.

3.3 The African Nuclear-weapon-free-zone Treaty (the Treaty of Pelindaba, opened for signature on 11 April 1996)

Although called "nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty", the Treaty of Pelindaba limits itself to securing the region against nuclear weapons neither, as it also incorporates provisions on the prohibition of dumping of radioactive wastes.²⁰

The prohibition of nuclear testing in the Treaty of Pelindaba is similar to the corresponding provision in the Treaty of Rarotonga. So, not only testing of nuclear weapons is prohibited, but the Treaty also covers peaceful nuclear explosions. The relevant provision, Article 5 on the "Prohibition of testing of nuclear explosive devices", reads: "Each Party undertakes:
(a) not to test any nuclear explosive device; (b) To prohibit in its territory the testing of any nuclear explosive device; (c) Not to assist or encourage the testing of any nuclear explosive device by any State anywhere." Like the CTBT, the Treaty of Pelindaba establishes clearly the direct obligation of States Parties themselves not to resort to testing. The scope of the CTBT seems nevertheless wider, because it (a) obliges States Parties "to prohibit and prevent", whereas Pelindaba is limited to "prohibit", and (b) as in the case of Rarotonga, the CTBT's notion "under its jurisdiction or control" seems wider than Pelindaba's "its territory".

Also in the case of the Treaty of Pelindaba, the undertaking of Parties "not to take any action to assist or encourage" nuclear testing is related to actions by "any State", and therefore not limited to the region to which the Treaty applies.

As far as verification of peaceful uses of nuclear energy is concerned, Article 9 of the Treaty of Pelindaba obliges Parties to conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Article 12 of the Treaty establishes the African Commission on Nuclear Energy for the purpose of ensuring compliance with it. The main mechanism is a consultation and complaints procedure contained in Annex IV to the Treaty of Pelindaba. If, after consultation, explanation and consideration by the Commission there is "sufficient substance to warrant an inspection" the Commission may request the IAEA to conduct such an inspection as soon as possible.²¹ Compared with the detailed verification regime of the CTBT, this the verification mechanism is not specifically dedicated to detection, location and inspection of nuclear explosions.

3.4 Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-free Zone (the Treaty of Bangkok, opened for signature on 15 December 1995)

The Treaty of Bangkokalso, although labelled a "nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty", has some provisions of a wider nature than the mere prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons in the region.²²

The prohibition on nuclear testing in the Treaty of Bangkok is part of the "Basic undertakings" in Article 3, and not addressed in a seperate article. This prohibition is formulated in the following three "stages":

Article 3, paragraph 1 (c): "Each State Party undertakes not to, anywhere inside or outside the Zone ..... test or use nuclear weapons.";

Article 3, paragraph 2 (c): "Each State Party undertakes not to allow, in its territory, any other State to ..... test or use nuclear weapons.";

Article 3, paragraph 4: "Each State Party undertakes not to: (a) seek or receive any assistance in the commission of any act in violation of the provisions of Paragraph 1, 2 and 3 of this Article; or (b) take any action to assist or encourage the commission of any act in violation of the provisions of Paragraph 1, 2 and 3 of this Article."

The structure of this prohibition in the Treaty of Bangkok is quite different from the scope of the CTBT or the provisions on nuclear testing in the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Pelindaba. Three major differences can be pointed out easily. First, the prohibition on testing seems to be limited to nuclear weapons. However, Article 1, on "Use of Terms" defines "nuclear weapon" as any explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner .....". No doubt this will give rise to legal arguments on whether Bankok includes a prohibition on peacuful nuclear explosions or not The second distinction is that the Treaty of Bankok is also a "no-use" treaty by the undertaking of States Parties not to use nuclear weapons anywhere and not to allow their use in their territory. Thirdly, the undertaking in paragraph 4 (b) of this article at first glance seems to be limited to assistance to states, which could imply that assistance to non-state entities in the carrying out of nuclear tests would not be prohibited.

As far as verification is concerned, the Treaty of Bangkok also entrusts the IAEA with the implementation of its safeguards regime in the region. For the verification of compliance with the obligations of the Treaty generally, a control system is established, based on report and exchange of information, clarification and activities of a fact-finding mission.²³ As is the case with the other nuclear (weapon) free zone treaties, also the verification mechanism of the Treaty of Bangkok is not specifically dedicated to detection, location and inspection of nuclear explosions, as is the case with the CTBT.

4. The CTBT and Nuclear-weapon-free Zones

Comparing the provisions of the existing nuclear weapon-free zone treaties on nuclear testing with the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty teach us that the following three major differences can be distinguished:

1. The prohibition on nuclear testing is generally limited to the geographical area to which these treaties apply. In some cases, however the undertaking of Parties not to take any action to assist or encourage nuclear testing by third states is related to actions by any State, and therefore not limited to the region to which the Treaty applies. This already indicates some movement in the direction on a ban on nuclear testing anywhere, as provided for in the CTBT.

2. There are legal differences between the nuclear weapon-free zones in the scope of the obligation not to test as well as between them and the CTBT. In particular, in some cases there is legal ambiguity on the prohibition of peaceful nuclear explosions.

3. All NWFZ treaties have established a verification mechanism. These mechanisms serve the general purposes of the treaties: the prevention of nuclearisation of the regions concerned. They provide for safeguards through the IAEA and for consultation between states parties in cases of alleged breach of treaty obligations. Further investigation into such allegations is also provided for, with the possibility of inspections to be carried out by the Vienna Agency or the regional body, which in some cases is established by the NWFZ treaty in question. Verification and inspections are, however, not specifically taylored to the need to detect and locate nuclear explosions and provide a time-frame which does not deter effectively against carrying out nuclear tests, as the CTBT does.

Although the legal differences between the prohibition on nuclear testing in the NWFZ treaties on the one hand and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on the other are certainly important and by themselves give the latter treaty a distinct added value, the main distinction certainly lies in the CTBT's elaborate and treaty specific verification regime. This should be no surprise: nuclear-weapon-free zones are not designed for the sole purpose of prohibiting nuclear testing. They are mainly aimed at preventing the nuclearisation of their regions, to enhance the international non-proliferation regime and to secure the region against nuclear threat or attack by nuclear weapon states.²⁴ A prohibition on testing is an important prerequisite, but not the only one, for the achievement of these goals. In this respect, the CTBT provides an essential umbrella for the existing nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Finally, two points of a more general nature merit some attention.

As far as entry into force is concerned, at least one interesting parallel presents itself between the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the CTBT.²⁵ In order to secure that states of particular relevance to each of these treaties ratify it in order for it to enter into force, in both treaties the provision in question is specifically designed for that purpose. Of course, the Treaty of Tlatelolco also incorporates a so-called waiver formula²⁶, which allowed it to become operative in April 1968. For a long time now, however, the formal requirements of Article 28 for entry into force have not been met and countries significant for the successful implementation of the Treaty had, until recently, either not ratified it or refused to invoke the waiver formula. The obstacle that certain states, particularly relevant for its purposes, did not support the Treaty of Tlatelolco, was finally overcome in 1992, 25 years after the Treaty was opened for signature.²⁷ From this it is clear that it is far too early to say - as is sometimes heard - that, because of the fact that some states whose signature and ratification are essential conditions for the CTBT's entry into force do not support it at present, that Treaty will never enter into force.

Multilateral treaties on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation considerably gain in importance when supported by the recognised nuclear weapon states. The CTBT has obtained the support of these states and has also been signed by all five of them. In the meantime, the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Pelindaba generally enjoy the support of the nuclear weapon states. The Treaty of Bangkok, however, does not yet.²⁸ Securing such support would certainly enhance the value of this Treaty as a disarmament and non-proliferation instrument.

Conclusions

In the above a number of nuclear-weapon-free zones have been briefly analysed from the angle of nuclear testing. These treaties, while using different formulations on the prohibition of nuclear testing, sometimes allowing for loopholes or at the very minimum a lack of clarity, on the whole have played an important role in preparing the ground for the conclusion of the CTBT, which was signed in September 1996.

In its turn the CTBT, in its comprehensiveness, both geographically and in time, strenghtens the NWFZ treaties' prohibition of nuclear testing. As such it can safely be said the the signature of the CTBT on 24 September 1996 has greatly strengthened the regimes created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Pelindaba as well as the Treaty of Bangkok.

REFERENCES:

(1) Article I of the CTBT (Basic Obligations, the scope of the Treaty) reads in full:
1. Each state party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.
2. Each state party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.
(2) Article VIII, para 1 on Review of the CTBT.
(3) Underground testing will be monitored by seismic stations, many of which are already operating. For the monitoring of nuclear explosions underwater, a network of hydroacoustic stations is foreseen. Atmospheric testing can be identified by a combination of radionucleide (radioactive particles or gases) and infrasound (low frequency sound caused by big explosions) technologies.
(4) The IMS will pick up a large number of non-nuclear events, either natural (earthquakes or thunderstorms) or man-made (mining explosions or sonic booms). The shortlist provided to States Parties will contain events which will need closer examination before it can be decided whether it concerns a non-nuclear or nuclear event. In no case will the IDC itself state whether an event was nuclear or not.
(5) Evasion is possible, inter alia, by trying to escape detection by detonating a nuclear device in a large cavity ("decoupling") or by masking a nuclear explosion by a large scale conventional explosion.
(6) Referred to in the Treaty as "national technical means of verification" (Article IV, paragraph 37).
(7) Article IV, paragraphs 36 and 67 of the CTBT.
(8) Article II, paragraphs 1, 5 and 40 and Article IV, paragraphs 20 to 33 and 42 to 45 of the CTBT.
(9) Article IV, paragraph 46 of the Treaty.
(10) Article IV paragraphs 46 and 53 of the Treaty and Paragraph 57 of Part II E of the Protocol to the CTBT.
(11) Paragraphs 2,3 and 41 of the Protocol to the CTBT.
(12) E.g. seismic aftershocks, readioactive particles or noble gases.
(13) Artcle V, paragraphs 3 and 4. Issues can be brought to the attention of the United Nations by "the Conference, or alternatively, if the case is urgent, the Executive Council ...".
(14) Article XIV of (and Annex 2 to) the CTBT.
(15) At present, 41 out of the 44 states required by Article XIV and mentioned in the list in Annex 2 to the Treaty have signed the CTBT. The three states on the list that not have signed are the DPRK, India and Pakistan.
(16) In particular not in conformity with the Articles 1 and 5 of Tlatelolco. See also Jozef Goldblat, "Arms Control, a Guide to Negotiations and Agreements" (1994), page 149.
(17) Article 16 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, now amended to empower the IAEA to carry out these special inspections.
(18) Article 7 (Prevention of dumping) of the Treaty of Rarotonga.
(19) Annex 4 of the Treaty of Rarotonga: the complaints procedure enables a Party to bring a complaint "that another Party is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty", after allowing the Party complained to provide an explanation, before the Director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation. Paragraphs 4 to 8 of Annex 4 lay down rules for the conduct of a special inspection if "there is sufficient substance in the complaint to warrant" such an inspection.In such a case a "special inspection team" is appointed by the Consultative Committee, established Annex 3 of the Treaty.
(20) Article 7 of the Treaty of Pelindaba.In this respect attention should also be drawn to Article 10 on the "Physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities".
(21) Paragraph 4 of Annex IV. This paragraph furthermore provides some detail for the conduct of the inspection.
(22) See for instance Articles 3 (3) and 4 (b) and (e) of the Treaty of Bangkok on nuclear safety and disposal of radioactive wastes and Article 5 on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident.
(23) Article 10 of the Treaty of Bangkok. The Executive Committee of the Commission for the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, established by Article 8 of the Treaty, plays a central role the exchange of information (Article 11), the request for clarification (Article 12) and the request for a fact-finding mission (Article 13).
(24) See also Jozef Goldblat, op. cit., page 148 - 158. All nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties have protocols providing for security assurances to be given by the nuclear-weapon states.
(25) All three other NWFZ treaties have a simple numerical provision providing for the treaty's entry into force after ratifiation by a certain number of states.
(26) Article 28, paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
(27) When Argentina, Brazil and Chili declared that they would waive the requirements of Article 28 upon completion of the ratification procedures of the amended Treaty text.
(28) As appeared from the consideration during the 51st UNGA of a draft Resolution on "The nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas" (51/45B): of the nuclear weapon states, France, the United Kingdom and the United States voted against, whereas the Russian Federation abstained. One of the reasons for this voting behaviour was a reference in the draft Resolution to the Treaty of Bangkok, which in theview of these nuclear weapon states contains limitations on the freedom of navigation.