Nuclear Weapon Free Zone: Their Meaning for a
Nuclear Weapon Free World¹

Harald Müller
Director of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt

Introduction

Nuclear weapon free zones that ban all nuclear weapons within their boundaries, are usually considered measures taken in support of nuclear nonproliferation². All states in such zones undertake not to develop, acquire or deploy nuclear weapons. In contrast to the obligations of the non-nuclear weapon states party to the Nonproliferation Treaty that do not belong to any zone, all participants in zonal arrangements commit themselves also to non-deployment on their territories of nuclear weapons that are owned or controlled by another state. This enlarged prohibition excludes the extension of the territorial area where such weapons can be stationed - a process occasionally coined "geographical proliferation"³ - and thus contributes even more to nonproliferation "in all its form" than that global treaty itself.

What has been rarely noticed are the contributions that such zones make, and can and will make in the future, to the cause of nuclear disarmament. This is somehow strange, because these contributions are manifold and significant. This chapter attempts to explore this issue and to present a comprehensive description and analysis of these functions. It looks into the question of what contribution nuclear-weapons free zones are already making to enhance the conditions conducive to the movement towards nuclear disarmament; how they would contribute, and how they would have to adapt, when this process will reach its advanced stages; and what their place would be in a world where, eventually, no nuclear weapons would exist anymore.

Nonproliferation and Disarmament: The Obvious Link

The contribution of NWFZ to nonproliferation - briefly mentioned in the introduction - is in and of itself a contribution to disarmament as well: it eliminates an important motivation that would compel nuclear weapon states to retain huge, flexible and diverse arsenals and even enhance them in a multiple arms race. As it has often be stated in the debate between the nonaligned countries and the nuclear weapon states in the run-up to the Extension Conference of the Nonproliferation Treaty, while nonproliferation cannot be upheld without an ongoing, trustworthy and effective disarmament process, the reverse is equally true: the nuclear weapon states will not be prepared to stick to their commitment to rid the world of nuclear weapons if they are not reliably reassured that no new nuclear weapon states will emerge against which their own arsenals would provide the ultimate means of national security. In giving such reassurances for an increasing number of non-nuclear weapon states, the contribution of nuclear weapon free zones to nonproliferation can be called significant; they exert thus a commensurate effect in the creation of a fundamental condition on which the nuclear disarmament process must rely.

It could be argued that the existence of a global instrument such as the Nonproliferation Treaty renders this function void, all the more as the NPT has now become almost universal and of unlimited duration. Skeptics could thus assume that NWFZ today serve factually no purpose that could not be serviced by the NPT itself For a couple of reasons, this view is fairly shortsighted.

Firstly, nuclear weapon free zones contain a feature that is - against all the efforts of non-nuclear weapon states, especially the nonaligned ones - not found in the NPT context: the availability of legally binding negative security assurances⁴. To all nuclear weapon free zones, protocols are attached that oblige the nuclear weapon states not to use, or threaten the use of, nuclear weapons against the zones' member states. These undertakings are both unconditional and legally binding. The negative security assurances expressed in UNSC resolution 984, and the attached unilateral statements of which that resolution takes note, are highly conditional (except in the case of the People's Republic of China), and they are politically, not legally binding. In offering negative security assurances of a better quality to the non-nuclear weapon states of nuclear weapon free zones than the NPT can afford, these zones exert a more solid break on the possible motivation to revoke the non-nuclear commitment of the zonal parties, as their confidence in not being confronted with a nuclear threat is somewhat higher. As zones provide for more security and thus less motivation to counter the perceived threat by a nuclear option, the nonproliferation-disarmament relationship discussed above is more solid here than there. Zones are thus even better endowed to break the proliferation/nuclear arms race link than the NPT which, however, remains, a most important and inexorable part of global security, not the least as they are regions - Europe for example - where the global instrument is more acceptable to all players than a nuclear weapon free zone might be, as is illustrated by the present refusal of NATO member states, and accession candidates to take up the proposal for a nuclear weapon free zone in Central Eastern Europe.⁵

NWFZ as Direct Disarmament Measures: The Difficult Regions

Secondly - and probably even more importantly - nuclear weapon free zones permit effective steps to pursue nonproliferation and disarmament where the NPT itself has proven to be an instrument not ideally adapted to the particular political and strategic conditions obtaining in certain regions. In these areas, NWFZ thus can build a bridge between an presently unregulated and thus dangerous situation of nuclear rivalry, and a future where that area may be one day covered by the NPT or a global disarmament instrument.

Latin America is very much a case in point. The Tlatelolco Treaty was instrumental in offering a way for several countries that were not happy with the features of the NPT, but had nevertheless decided to adopt a commensurate commitment. While it is quite possible that all member states of the Tlatelolco Treaty will in the future be covered by the NPT, the Latin American nuclear weapon free zone was an indispensable instrument of transition from the past into this future.⁶

Moreover, the most worrysome hold-outs - non-parties to the NPT -, i.e., India, Pakistan, and Israel - are rather unlikely to join the NPT unless the regional security environment is arranged in a way that giving up nuclear weapons becomes feasible for them. How such arrangements will look like, and what their particular dynamics might be is a matter of conjecture at present. Suffice it to state that regional arrangements - with due regard to all security factors impacting on the region, a consideration of great importance in South Asia in particular - are more likely to induce these three countries to reconsider the value of their nuclear capabilities than the NPT.

In these cases, the purpose of the zone is not any more a matter of nonproliferation in the true meaning of the word. This wrong interpretation is engendered by the euphemistic use of the term "threshold countries" that covers the reality in these three countries only insufficiently. For all practical purposes, India, Pakistan and Israel have crossed the threshold long ago. Israel, for one, is credited with a full-fledged nuclear arsenal of considerable variety, India and Pakistan, even if - as some suppose - they do not dispose of complete nuclear weapons, could make them in a very short time. Experts agree that both countries have prepared all necessary components. This includes the physics package containing the fissile material, which for each newcomer to the nuclear club presents the greatest challenge.⁷ These three countries are thus much more appropriately called de-facto nuclear weapon states, since the de-jure definition - the one of the NPT (Art. IX, 3) defines only those countries as nuclear weapon states that have exploded a nuclear device before January 1, 1967. This definition covers the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, but not - as far as our knowledge goes - the three countries in question. However, as de-facto nuclear weapon states, any zonal arrangement that would lead to the reduction and/or the elimination of their capabilities - warheads, launchers, fissile materials, weapons-related facilities and activities - would be a measure of disarmament, not of nonproliferation, as the dismantling of the six South African nuclear weapons was, clearly, an act of disarmament. In this event, the zonal approach would directly serve the objective of a nuclear weapon-free world.

Strong verification regimes

One of the reasons why zonal treaties may be better endowed to address particular security concerns is that they may add verification features not available at the global level. For example, a zone may provide for more intrusive measures them the broader world community may feels necessary, acceptable, and affordable.⁸ Moreover, challenge inspections with full involvement of the challenging party could be part of the regional arrangement, if the parties so agree; this particular mechanism is not available in the NPT context. The "Special Inspection", foreseen in paragraphs 74 ad 77 of INFCIRC/153 - the model safeguards agreement for NPT non-nuclear weapon states - is conceptually different from a challenge inspection, and the enhanced access provision enshrined in the draft protocol in the context of enhanced safeguards (the IAEA's program 93+2) is conceived of as a routine, not a challenge, activity. The participation of expert inspectors from the country that nourishes the suspicion that a neighbour is possibly in violation of its commitment by conducting clandestine nuclear activities may be a necessary condition in regions of high tension and past wars to create the necessary confidence in the validity and effectiveness of the zonal arrangements. Again, such particular and more stringent verification measures might be deemed necessary and inevitable by the de-facto nuclear weapon states in those two regions if they are ever to renounce the possession of nuclear weapons.

In combination with this argument, it might also be noted that stricter verification standards may be combined with a wider scope of zonal treaties. It is remarkable that the Pelindaba Treaty prohibits not only production, acquisition and possession of nuclear weapons but also research and developments. It further provides for the dismantlement of existing nuclear weapons and attached facilities. Since the Commission that is to be created in the context of the Pelindaba Treaty's entering into force is authorized to verify, in cooperation with the IAEA, compliance with the Treaty in all its aspects, it has far-reaching competences that are very conducive for comprehensive trust-building in this area, an example that might well be emulated in more quarrelsome regions.⁹

Zonal arrangements and the readiness of the nuclear weapon states to disarm

Such more stringent measures may have also a significant bearing upon the willingness of the nuclear weapon states to proceed forward to drastical reductions and, finally, to the complete elimination of their nuclear arsenals. As they draw down the number and variety of their warheads, they will come to the point where they will reconsider their security posture with regards to the de-facto nuclear weapon states as well as to countries that they regard as potential proliferators with hostile intentions.

Countries that are proliferation-suspect and are rated as potentially hostile by the nuclear weapon states, and the U.S. in particular, are mainly located in regions where establishing nuclear weapons free zones promises particular security gains. If the verification arrangements in the zone go clearly beyond those contained in the global regime, the nuclear weapon states are likely to feel more reassured that the risk to confront, in the future, suddenly a nuclear aimed enemy from the ranks of the de-facto nuclear weapon states or those additional countries they look upon presently with some distrust.

A nuclear-weapon free zone that would include a stronger-than-usual verification system would thus contribute considerably to convincing the nuclear weapon states that their move towards zero arsenals would not contain unacceptable risks with regard to their interests in the regions concerned.¹⁰ So far, this potential has not been realized, mainly because the present zones have been concluded by countries that harbour less suspicions and hostilities against each other than in the most problematic, and thus most nuclear-proliferation prone, regions of the world. But it must be expected that the creation of nuclear weapon free zones in East Asia, South Asia, or the Middle East would make use of these enhanced verification possibilities.

Synergistic effects at the regional level

Carrying these considerations one step further, this positive effect upon the readiness of the nuclear weapon states - and also the threshold states -to disarm may be enhanced if the scope of the zonal treaties were expanded as to address other weapons of mass destruction as well as vast conventional imbalances, Increasingly, some countries regard nuclear weapons not only as a counter to nuclear weapons hold by rival states, but as a potential response, and thus as a deterrent, against the threat of use or use of chemical and, in particular, biological weapons.¹¹

Should the countries in a region agree to include these weapons in the scope of prohibited behaviour, and to adapt verification systems at, to provide assurances that these prohibitions are strictly observed, this could, again, mean that measures could be taken well beyond those available in the Chemical or Biological Weapons Conventions. The synergy of the various regional confidence-building and verification activities is not presently available at the global level where the verification systems for various types of weaponry are strictly separate and the respective organisations possess no legal authority to pool their insights. Unfortunately, therefore, the synergies that could emerge from cumulating the evidence gained by all of them is lost.

It might be difficult, given the diverse membership of the global regimes, to reach an agreement that would authorize close cooperation among organisations, like the LAEA, the OPCW, and the CTBTO. In such global regimes, matters not directly related to security concerns, such as technology transfer and commercial competitiveness, tend to play a large role and make their impact upon the shape of verification regimes. Member states must be expected to be cautious towards new proposals that might burden their industries or imply greater risks that commercially relevant technical information might be compromised by communication among the inspection agencies.

It is probably much easier to forge a consensus on this issue at the regional level, where security interests dominate the effort to arrive at regimes among countries that are neighbours, potential rivals, and, at worst, former enemies. It is likely that at this level, alternative instruments are available to care for enhancing economic cooperation, such as joint projects, free trade zones, or regional development banks. Arms control and disarmament regimes such as zones free of weapons of mass destructions can thus be expected to be installed, and operate, in enhanced liberty from unrelated issues.

Beyond that, regional arrangements offer the opportunity to exploit industrial, collaboration for confidence-building and verification objectives. A regional organization that is not a nuclear weapon free zone, EURATOM, holds some interesting experiences and features in this regard. EURATOM contains the most sophisticated verification system of any regional organization, even if two of the member states of the European Union are nuclear weapon states. In fact, on the basis of the Rome Treaties, France and the United Kingdom are the only nuclear weapon states where the whole civilian fuel cycle is obliged to be subjected to verification for non-diversion of nuclear material from civilian to military purposes. Only exclusively military installations are control-free, while dual-use facilities are subjected to safeguards whenever they process material destined for peaceful uses, while the safeguards would cease when they contain material for military uses. EURATOM controls, nominally, all fissile material within Union territory. It must be notified, and give formal approval, of all. contracts affecting movement of such material in and out of the Union. It operates an international system of material accountancy and control for all the EU member states that are non-nuclear weapon states.

Since the Rome Treaty obliges member states to seek cooperation in the civilian uses of nuclear energy, a lot of cooperative activities are under way. Sensitive facilities such as enrichment is under the control of the multinational consortiums EURODEF and URENCO. German Siemens and French Framatome develop together the "Euroreactor", a 1500 MW light water reactor for civilian power plants. Superphenix, the French fast breeder reactor, is also operated as a multinational project; the same was true for the (aborted) German FBR at Kalkar.¹²

The greater confidence engendered by such synergistic verification regimes may well be the precondition on which countries in more difficult regions would consider relinquishing their nuclear capabilities. Thus, zones contain a specific advantage for dealing with the most formidable obstacle in the way to a nuclear weapons free world.

Broader zonal arrangements and strategic considerations of the nuclear weapon states

The same aspect bears also on the considerations of the official nuclear weapon states themselves. Particularly in the U.S. and the French strategic discussions, nuclear weapons are increasingly seen not only in the function of a deterrent against a threat on one's own territory and, possibly, that of one's closest allies, but with a view to serve important, deterrent functions against chemical and biological weapons in regional contingencies where the nuclear weapon states may be called in, e.g., under a U.N. mandate. If the offending state against which the intervention is directed possesses such weapons, or if they are present in a theater in which nuclear weapon states' armed forces are introduced in the context of a peacekeeping mission, then the nuclear umbrella should be available to prevent any actor in the region concerned from considering the use of chemical or biological weapons to neutralize the opposing power of the intervening forces.¹³

Or, following from this, such a deterrent may be instrumental for conducting the intervention in the first place, as otherwise the troops could not be sent into the theater under the assumption that a party there would use non-conventional weapons in order to forestall the introduction of extraterritorial forces from the beginning. The qualifications given in the U.S. statement accompanying the signature of the protocols to the Pelindaba Treaty are a clear signal in this direction.¹⁴

In other words, to preserve the integrity of the intervention option - and thus of UNSC-mandated operations in areas of high risk - the mission of the nuclear deterrent must be extended with a view to cover non-nuclear contingencies. The experience in Iraq has strengthened this position, according to its proponents. They maintain that only the threat of nuclear retaliation, conveyed during their meeting in January 1990 by then Secretary of State Baker to his Iraqi counterpart Tarik Aziz, prevented the Iraqi leadership from using their chemical and biological weapons against the allies. And only the Israeli nuclear deterrent, the argument continues, persuaded Saddam Hussein to restrict his missile assault against Israeli Cities to conventional munitions.¹⁵

It goes without saying that this interpretation of the utility of nuclear weapons presents a formidable new obstacle to nuclear disarmament. It also threatens to compromise security assurances to existing and future nuclear weapon free zones, as the U.S. statement on the occasion of the signature of the Pelindaba Treaty protocols indicated. The merits or shortcomings of this position shall not be discussed in this context; but it is immediately plausible that the immensely dense network of verification and transparency offered by regional zones free of weapons of mass destruction holds greater prospects for convincing the nuclear weapon states that an attempt to procure any such weapons would be detected early on. Early detection would gain some warning time that could be used for political and, if necessary, military preventive action. The strategic pressure to retain some nuclear weapons as residual deterrent against the contingencies just described would thus be effectively diminished. This may be a most important condition to move forward to a nuclear weapon-free world. However, it is clear that this mission would require the present nuclear-weapon free zones to enhance considerably the scope of the respective treaties as well as their verification activities.

Constraints on the nuclear weapon states imposed by zonal arrangements as a condition for disarmament

Nuclear weapon free zones contribute in another respect to the movement to make the world nuclear weapon free: they impose constraints on the political and military use of nuclear weapons and on the uninhibited operations with these weapons. The first constraint emerges from the negative security assurances embedded in the protocols that are attached to all the nuclear weapon-free zones that exist today. In these protocols, the nuclear weapon states undertake not to threaten the use or actually use nuclear weapons against the countries party to the zone. In this undertaking, they reject the use of nuclear weapons in contingencies other than those where they would be threatened or attacked by nuclear weapons themselves. This excludes the use of nuclear arms in contingencies that would involve the use of conventional weapons or non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction.

Outside of the zones, the nuclear-weapon states would be free to use nuclear weapons at least under extreme circumstances, though both, the negative security guarantees given in Security Council resolution 985 of April 1995 - as interpreted in the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, and the extreme limits put by the same advisory opinion on the legitimacy of threat or use impose similar constraints.¹⁶

Nevertheless, only in the context of nuclear weapon free zones have the nuclear weapon states given, consciously and unequivocally, legally binding guarantees that contain the said constraints. It must be noted, though - as mentioned above -, that in its explanation accompanying its signature of the Protocols of the Pelindaba Treaty, the U.S, appeared to backtrack from such absolute guarantees with a view to reserve the right of use in contingencies involving the use of biological or chemical weapons by a state confronting the U.S. in an armed conflict. It remains to be seen whether this signals a general tendency that would detract from the "Constraint" value of nuclear weapon free zones.

The second constraint imposed by a zone is the geographical limitation for the movement of nuclear weapons. This applies to both the territorial possessions of the nuclear weapon states within the zone area - usually covered by a separate protocol - and the territory as a whole, where the undertakings by the states party would prohibit such a move, while the nuclear weapon states (in separate protocols) commit themselves to respect these undertakings, thereby renouncing the deployment of nuclear weapons on foreign territory within the zone area.

The meaning of this constraint becomes immediately clear if we compare it to the deployment patterns that have prevailed during the Cold War, and are still prevailing in Western Europe. The forward basing of tactical nuclear weapons on non-nuclear weapon states allies territory - vastly practiced by both the United States and the Soviet Union - enhances the is flexibility of a given nuclear posture and immerses nuclear weapons in war fighting and in the security policies and defence plans of the allies, even though they are de facto and de jure non-nuclear weapon states.

Additionally, such forward basing contains an inherent incentive to enlarge the variety of the nuclear arsenal and to produce additional types of nuclear warheads for specific "theater missions".¹⁷ By categorically excluding such forward deployment, nuclear weapon free zones eliminate this incentive and impose constraints on the capability of nuclear weapon states for combined conventional/nuclear warfighting in the region of concern. This supports a trend of nuclear de-emphasis and thus contributes to a devaluation of nuclear weapons that is indispensable as a condition for going towards a nuclear-weapon free world.

On the other hand, in appreciating this important function of zones, we should not overlook their present limitations. These limitations concern mainly the maritime area. Here, due to the reticence of nuclear weapon states' navies to renounce their principled policies of "neither confirm nor deny" the presence of nuclear weapons aboard their warships, coastal states in the zones that value friendship and partnership with nuclear weapon states must compromise their principle of non-deployment.¹⁸ They are expected to accept port visits by their allies' warships without asking questions as to the armaments these ships may carry. Nuclear weapons can thus be introduced into their territorial waters without their knowledge. Nuclear-armed warship may also pass through narrow maritime streets in "innocent passage" without being molested by the coastal country on whose territory the street is located. Likewise, aircraft carrying nuclear weapons might touch down at military airports for interim stops en route to other destinations without questions being asked by the respective zonal party.

All three possibilities are usually acknowledged as legal in the language of nuclear weapon free zones and do thus not present a violation of the respective treaties. Yet they are compromising, to a certain extent. the value of such zones in constraining the freedom of action of nuclear weapon states. It is quite clear that this state of affairs has to be changed, sooner or later, as the world moves down the road towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Enhancing constraints in the course of nuclear disarmament

We can assume, for example, that nuclear disarmament will pass through a stage where the nuclear weapon states are only permitted to deploy nuclear weapons on their own territories and on submarines, the most invulnerable part of the strategic triad. In this case, the zonal treaties would have to be amended as to prohibit call on ports by surface ships that would carry nuclear arms, and the landing of any nuclear-armed aircraft. Nuclear weapon states would thus have to renounce their "neither confirm nor deny" policies, and it would fall upon the states belonging to the regions to enforce the new prohibitions. This may well entail a claim to visit incoming ships and to verify that they are nuclear-weapon free, or to deny any call-on port. Verification techniques for this purpose would have to be developed; Soviet and U.S. scientists, led by the Natural Resources Defense Council, have been working on such measures in the context of banning nuclear-armed cruise missiles from the general purpose navies, several years ago. Their results may prove useful for this future task.¹⁹

Likewise, nuclear-capable aircraft pursuing conventional missions must have discernible features that would clearly identify them as non-nuclear, and host states within the zone would bear an obligation to make sure that only aircraft with these particular feature would land on their territory. It goes without saying that this obligation would continue into the nuclear-weapon free world; in such a situation, this enforcement obligation would be extended to submarines, with due regard to the antisubmarine capabilities of the respective navies.

In a nuclear free world, such obligations of enforcement would exist, in principle, erga omnes, that is, not only towards the known nuclear weapon states and, possibility, the de-facto nuclear weapon states. In addition, not only countries in zones, but all states joining a nuclear abolition pact would bear this obligation. However, it might be appropriate to make a distinction - for a certain period of time - between those who were possessors of nuclear weapons and respective capabilities in the past and which are thus in a "better" position to cheat on their obligations and to reconstitute quickly military nuclear capabilities, and the majority of now and ever non-nuclear weapon states. The armed forces of these countries may be subjected to somewhat deeper scrutiny when they deploy abroad. It remains to be seen, however, whether those countries will agree to such discriminatory measures that would be the reverse of the present discrimination pattern under the NPT.

And it might be that countries belonging to a zonal arrangement bear a stronger interest that these enforcement procedures follow strict and well established rules. This interest would derive from the tradition and the particular combination of obligations and regional security complexes that are at the roots of the zonal concept. Thus, the world may see a "passivity discrimination", whereby the former nuclear weapon and threshold countries would have to offer more transparency, and a "activity discrimination", whereby a higher degree of enforcement obligations is put on the shoulders of parties to a zonal agreement.

Enhanced responsibility for enforcement immediately opens the question how zonal states should react to a confrontation with a "cheating" nuclear power that disposes of stronger military capabilities than even the regional countries combined. This issue links up with the general problem of collective security arrangements in a non-nuclear world, and with the whole issue of positive security assurances, put in a new and even more urgent light. The responsibility of the UN Security Council to deal with such a contingency expeditiously is obvious. But equally obvious is the great difficulty that would exist if one of the P-5, endowed with a veto, could block the respective decision. Quite clearly, this touches upon the much broader area of how security will be guaranteed in a nuclear weapon free world. However, for countries in a zonal region, the question is salient - in principle - even today.²⁰

Will nuclear weapon free zones become obsolete in a world free of nuclear weapons?

This leads us into our final consideration: A nuclear weapon free world creates the conditions for the whole world that obtain presently only in nuclear weapon free zones, At first glance, then, it might seem that such zones will become obsolete, and that they should merge with the global regime that will establish, and guard over time, the eventual and enduring elimination of nuclear weapons.

However, on second thought, this conclusion of obsolescence may be premature. Zonal arrangements express a particular mutual commitment of neighbours to care for each other's security, They demonstrate the common concern for the security of the region they all share, and a willingness to mitigate the security of all neighbouring states by voluntarily accepting constraints on one's own armament and commensurate burdens of (passive) verification and transparency. As security is mainly a regional issue²¹, these commitments continue to fulfill an essential function, whether the world goes non-nuclear or not. In that sense, the zonal concept is not only linked to disarmament, but to the higher cause of peace which disarmament is supposed to serve.

It has already be emphasized that regional arrangements can contain more far-reaching stipulations for verification and transparency than global ones, including the synergy of various verification regimes. This is not only a precondition for some regions to move down to non-nuclear status, it is as well a precondition for their remaining in this state of affairs for an unlimited duration. Wherever regional tensions cause some continuing distrust, very tight rules are indispensable to keep these regional rivals faithful to their non-nuclear commitments. It is also very likely that these functions will be optimally realized only where zonal arrangements have moved from solely non-nuclear areas to zones free of all weapons of mass destruction.

Conclusions

For all these reasons, the positive contribution of nuclear weapon free zones to the cause of nuclear disarmament must not be underrated. They create important conditions under which nuclear weapon states and threshold states may be more ready to consider getting rid of their nuclear arms and dissuade countries that would otherwise have considered going nuclear from actually doing so. They put constraints on the freedom of action of nuclear weapon states and thus underline the process of nuclear de-emphasis. They can provide for special arrangements in particularly difficult regions that help all countries of the region, as well as extra-regional powers with vital interests therein, maintain non-nuclear status.

The creation of new, and strengthening of existing, nuclear weapon free zones must hence be seen as complementary to other pathes towards nuclear disarmament: bilateral or P-5 negotiations on nuclear arms reductions; multilateral negotiations with a view to establish global rules; and general agenda- and norm-setting activities through bodies like the Canberra Commission, the International Court of Justice, or the network of NGOs working together for nuclear abolition. In this context, regional arrangements such as unclear weapon free zones are a significant contribution to the overall process.

In order to optimize this contribution, hence, movement in four directions is conceivable: First, new nuclear weapon free zones should be established, making an ever wider area of the globe inaccessible to nuclear arms. Secondly, existing zones could consider deepening existing commitments (e.g. more intrusive verification measures, enhanced transparency) as well as widening them (e.g. enhancing the scope of zonal arrangements as to cover additional types of weapons). Third, as nuclear disarmament progresses, the parties to the zones must be careful to adapt their own treaties accordingly, notably in terms of additional protocols prohibiting nuclear weapons in transit, and of enhanced obligations concerning enforcement. Fourth, mechanisms might be developed to link nuclear weapon free zones that border each other, to adapt the undertakings in each, and to agree on joint enforcement measures among them. This is a rich and difficult agenda indeed.

NOTES:

(1) This article is based on research done on a PRIF project on complete nuclear disarmament. This project is supported by the Volkswagen Foundation.
(2) cf. Helen Leigh-Pippard, Nuclear-Weapon Free Zones, in Darryl Howlett/John Simpson, Nuclear Non-Proliferation. A reference handbook, Harlow. Longman 1992, S. 63-66.
(3) cf. Edmundo Fujita. The Prevention of the Geographical Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear-Free Zones and Zones of Peace in the Southern Hemisphere, UNIDIR Research Papers No. 4, New York, United Nations 1989
(4) George Bunn/Roland Timerbaev, Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapons States, in The NonProliferation Review, Vol. 1. No. 1. Fall 1993. pp. 11-20
(5) Jan Prawit, A Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone from the Black Sea to the Baltic, PPNN Issue Review, Southampton, PPNN 1997
(6) cf. John R. Redick, Latin America's Emerging Non-Proliferation Consensus, in Arms Control Today, Jg. 24, Nr. 2, Marz 1994, S. 3-9
(7) cf. Leonard S. Spector/Mark 0. McDonough/Evan S. Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation. A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1995, Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995; a recent and most comprehensive analysis of the nuclear capabilities of these countries is David Albright/Frans Berkhout/William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996. World Inventories. Capabilities and Policies, Oxford, Oxford University Press 1997
(8) More far-reaching measures have been considered by a group of experts as possible preconditions for establishing such a zone in the Middle East; cf. James Leonard, Jan Prawitz, Benjamin Sanders, Study on Effective and Verifiable Measures Which Would Facilitate the Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East, Report of the UN Secretary General, Oct, 1990, UNGA, 45. Session Doc. A/45/435, Oct. 10, 1990 also Jonathan B. Tucker, Monitoring and Verification in a Noncooperative Environment: Lessons from the UN Experience in Iraq, in The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, Spring-Summer 1996, 1-14
(9) David Fischer, The Pelindaba Treaty, Africa Joins the Nuclear-Free World, in Arms Control Today. Vol, 25, No. 10, December 1995/January 1996, pp. 9-14
(10) Lewis A. Dunn, Rethinking the Nuclear Equation: The United States and the New Nuclear Powers, in: The Washington Quarterly, Jg. 17, Nr, 1, 1993, S. 5-25
(11) George H. Quester/Victor A. Utgoff, No-First-Use and Nonproliferation: Redefining Extended Deterrence, The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 103-114; George Quester, Nuclear proliferation and the elimination of nuclear weapon, in Regina Cowen Karp (ed.), Security Without Nuclear Weapons?- Different Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Security, Oxford, Oxford University Press 1992, 202-225
(12)Darryl Howlett, Euratom and Nuclear Safeguards, Houndmills, Basingstoke. Macmillan 1990; European Commission, Memorandum on the activities of the European Atomic Energy Community relevant to the objectives of Articles III and IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Document prepared by the Commission of the European Communities for the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, Brussels, 1995
(13) Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, Washington, D.C. 1996, S. 50
(14) Editor's Note - Negative Security Assurances, in Disarmament Diplomacy. Nr, 5, Mai 1996, S. 42
(15) e.g. Kathleen C. Bailey, Responding to the Threat of Biological Weapons, in Security Dialogue, Vo., 26, No, 5, 1995, 393-397, part p. 391
(16) International Court of Justice, Year 1996, 8 July, General List No. 958, July 1996, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons
(17) Lawrence Freedman. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 2. ed, Basingstoke, Macmillan 1989
(18) Recall the example of New Zealand, Wade Huntley, The Kiwi that Roared: Nuclear-Free New Zealand in a Nuclear-Amed World. in The Nonproliferation Review. Vol. 4, No. 1, Fall 1996, 1-16
(19) cf Steve Fetter et. 0, Detecting Nuclear Warheads, in Science and Global Security, Vol. 1. 1990. 225-302
(20) I have tried to analyse this problem, and possible solutions, in Harald Müller, Between Security Council Inaction and Self-Helplessness: The Case for a Positive Security Assurances Alliance, in Virginia Foran (ad.), Security Assurances, Implications for the NPT and Beyond, Washington D,C. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1995, s. 25-39
(21) Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. Hemel Hempstead, Harvester-Wheatsheaf 1991.